LIV. 1808. CHAP. strong, under the orders of SIR DAVID BAIRD, whose gallantry and firmness had been conspicuous at the storm1 Nap. i. ing of Seringapatam, was assembled in the British islands, and was destined to land at Corunna, descend through Galicia, and co-operate with those which had advanced 264. from Portugal, in the plains of Leon.1 247, 248. Lond. i. 179, 180. Nevis, ii. 84. the united forces, and their ad Spain. The two together, it was hoped, would amount to Strength of nearly forty thousand men, even after providing, in an British adequate manner, for the security of Portugal, and the magazines and depots in the rear-a force which appeared, vance into and doubtless was, if tolerably supported by its Peninsular allies, capable of achieving great things for the deliverance of Europe. Meanwhile the Spanish troops, fully five thousand strong, which had been liberated at Lisbon, were equipped anew at the expense of the British government, and despatched by sea to Catalonia, from whence the most pressing representations had been sent his valour and conduct were again evinced in the expedition to the Helder; in 1801 he led the vanguard which first landed in Aboukir Bay, and rushed with such vigour up the sandhills; and in the decisive battle of 21st March, in which he was wounded, his gallantry and conduct attracted universal notice. For these services he was made a knight of the Bath; and for some years commanded the army which occupied Sicily, until in 1807 he was sent in command of the expedition to the Baltic, from which he was soon recalled to more glorious, though melancholy destinies, in the Spanish Peninsula. Brave, chival rous, and high-spirited, no man ever more thoroughly understood the art of war, or more completely acquired the affections while he commanded the respect of his soldiers; and to the improvement of their discipline and increase of their comforts he devoted a large portion of his attention. But though second to none in personal valour, he had not the energy and vigour necessary to reinstate the military character of England after the early disasters of the Revolu tionary war and was unhappily possessed with a desponding impression as to the capability of this country to withstand the power of France on the Continent, which was very different from the fearless confidence and indomitable tenacity of Clive or Wellington. The heroism he displayed in his last moments, and the romantic circumstances attending his death, have justly secured for him a lasting place in the grateful affections of his country.-See MOORE's Life, 2 vols. by his brother, London, 1832; and Scottish Biography, iv. 28, 29. * David Baird was the second son of William Baird, Esq., of the Bairds of Newbyth, in East Lothian, an ancient and respectable family. He entered the army in December 16, 1772, as an ensign in the 2d Foot, and he was ere long engaged in serious service in that regiment, when it was despatched to Madras in 1779, to take a part in the formidable war that then raged between the infant British settlements at Madras and the redoubtable forces of Hyder Ali. In July 1780 Hyder's dreadful irruption into the Carnatic LIV. 1808. Sept. 25. of the necessity of regular troops to aid the efforts and CHAP. improve the discipline of the numerous peasants in arms in the province; the Russian fleet, in conformity with the treaty, was conducted to the British harbours; and a central junta was formed at Lisbon, to administer the affairs of the kingdom in the absence of the Prince-Regent. The preparations for the campaign being at length completed, the British troops began their march from the i. 267. Portuguese capital, for the seat of war at the foot of the 264, 287. Pyrenees.1 Oct. 13. Nap. i. 247, 248. South. Nevis, ii. 85. culty in Central The decisive influence of the recent successes and central position of the English army, in possession of the capital Great diffiand principal strongholds of the country, rendered the forming a appointment of a central junta, and the defeat of the Junta at local intrigues everywhere set on foot in order to obtain Madrid. a preponderating voice for particular men in its councils, a comparatively easy task in Portugal. But the case was very different in Spain, where jealousy of foreign inter took place, when seventy thousand horse threatened with destruction the little army of five thousand men, who struggled to defend the British possessions on the coast. In this terrible campaign, young Baird was at once initiated into the most perilous and animating warfare. In September 1780, after a desperate and most heroic resistance, he was made prisoner by Hyder at the head of fifty thousand infantry and twenty-five thousand horse, in consequence of the accidental blowing up of the British ammunition-waggons in the centre of their square, which deprived them of their whole reserve ammunition, after the supply which the men had in their cartridge-boxes was expended in repelling the incessant charges of the Asiatic cavalry. Even after this disaster, and when their little square, now reduced to two hundred Europeans, had no weapons for their defence but the bayonets of the men and the swords of the officers, they repelled no less than thirteen charges of Hyder's horse; and at length the few survivors were only made prisoners by being fairly pierced through and overwhelmed by the ponderous elephants and innumerable squadrons of the enemy. Being made prisoner in this terrible conflict, Baird was conducted to Seringapatam, where he was chained by the leg to another captive, and confined in a dungeon for three years and a half. In July 1784, however, he obtained his release upon the conclusion of the peace with Hyder, and was promoted to the rank of major in the 71st regiment, of which he soon became lieutenant-colonel. In 1791, he took an active part in the campaign against Tippoo Saib and the storming of the intrenched camp in front of Seringapatam, and in 1793 he commanded a brigade of Europeans at the siege of Pondicherry. After this he returned for a short time to Europe, but was again sent back to India as brigadier-general, in which capacity he commanded the storming party at Seringapatam, of which an account has already been given.-Ante, Chap. XLIX. § 27; Scottish Biography, i. 82, 83. 1808. CHAP. ference had already risen to a most extravagant height; LIV. where the people entertained a most exaggerated idea of their own strength and resources; and many different provincial governments, elected under the pressure of necessity in different parts of the country, had opposite and jarring pretensions to advance for the supreme direction of affairs. Much division, and many dangerous jealousies, were rapidly rising upon this subject, when the junta of Seville, whose prudence and success, as well as the consideration due to the great cities and opulent province which they represented, had already invested them with a sort of lead in the affairs of the Peninsula, had the good fortune to bring forward a project which, from its equity and expedience, soon commanded universal assent. This was, that the different supreme juntas, each on the same day, should elect two deputies, who should, when united together, form the central government, to which all the local authorities were to be subject; that the local 92. Jovel- juntas should nevertheless continue their functions, in moria, 12, obedience to the commands of the supreme junta; and that the seat of government should be some town in La Mancha, equally convenient for all the deputies.' Aug. 3. 1 Tor. ii. 80, lanos, Me 24. South. ii. 277. 86. Appointment of a Central Junta at Madrid. Sept. 25. This proposal having met with general concurrence, the different provincial juntas elected their respective representatives for the central government, which was installed with extraordinary pomp at Aranjuez in the end of September, and immediately commenced its sittings. At first it consisted of twenty-four members, but their ranks were soon augmented, by the number of provinces which claimed the right of sending representatives, to thirty-five—an unhappy medium, too small for a legislative assembly, too large for an executive cabinet. Though it numbered several eminent men and incorruptible patriots among its members, particularly Count Florida Blanca, who, though in the eightieth year of his age, preserved undecayed the vigour of intellect and cautious policy which had distinguished his long administration, and Jovellanos, in LIV. 1808. whom the severities of a tedious captivity had still left CHAP. unextinguished the light of an elevated understanding and the warmth of an unsuspecting heart; yet it was easy to foresee, what subsequent events too mournfully verified, that it was not composed of the elements calculated either to communicate vigour and decision to the national counsels, or impress foreign nations with a favourable idea of its probable stability. Formed for the most part of persons who were totally unknown, at least to public life, before the commencement of the revolution, and many of whom had been elevated to greatness solely by its convulsions, it was early distinguished by that overweening jealousy of its own importance, which in all men is the accompaniment of newly, and still more of undeservedly, acquired power, and torn with intestine, intrigues. These two broke out at a moment when the 80, 90, 97. Nap. i. 298, utmost possible unanimity and vigour were required, to 308. South. enable them to make head against the formidable tempest Jovellanos, which was arising against them, under the guidance of ii. 12, 34. the Emperor Napoleon.1 ii. 277, 313. Memoria, condition of Govern on the Ebro. The central junta displayed a becoming vigour in 87. asserting the inviolability of their privileges against Miserable Cuesta, who had arrested one of its members; but they the Central were far from evincing equal energy in the more import- ment and ant duty of providing for the wants of the military force the armies which was to maintain the conflict. So completely had the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of the Spaniards, that they never once contemplated the possibility of defeat. All their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees, and intended to meet the contingencies which might then occur. They did not imitate the conduct of Napoleon, who, after the drawn battle at Eylau, fortified all his strongholds as far back as the Rhine. Nothing was foreseen or provided for in case of disaster: there were no magazines or reserved stores accumulated in the rear, no positions fortified, no for LIV. 1808. CHAP. tresses armed; there was no money in the treasury, no funds in the military chests of the generals. The soldiers were naked, destitute of shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions: the cavalry dismounted; the artillery in the most wretched condition; even the magnificent supplies which the generosity of England had thrown with such profuse bounty into the Peninsula were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the proper objects of their destination. Corruption in its worst form pervaded every department of the state; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores; the superior in many instances made free with the military chest. In the midst of the general misrule, the central junta, amidst eloquent and pompous declamation, could find no more worthy object of their practical deliberations than discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the ample salaries which they assigned to themselves, the dress they were to wear, and the form of the medals which were to be suspended round their necks. During the progress of this general scene of cupidity, imbecility, and vanity, nothing efficient was done, either for the service of the armies or the defence of the state. This deplorable result is not to be ascribed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the character of the members of the central junta, or the leaders at the head of the troops. It arose from the nature of things-the overthrow of all regular government in Spain, and the jarring and conflicting interests of the popular assemblages by which its place had been supplied. Democratic energy is a powerful auxiliary, and when directed or made use of, in the first instance, by aristocratic foresight or despotic authority, it often produces the most important results. But its vigour speedily exhausts itself if not sustained by the 200, 203. lasting compulsion of terror or force; and the tyranny of Nap. i. 310, 311. South. a Committee of Public Salvation is not less necessary to 315. give success to its external operations than to restore credit or usefulness to its internal administration. 1 Tor. ii. 95, 102. Lond. i. ii. 298, 307, |