LV. 1808. 19. on the before the CHAP. striking a decisive blow in the outset, and dispersing the Spanish armies in his front, before the warlike and disciplined reserve of the English troops could arrive at the Movements scene of action, lost no time, after his arrival on the French right Bidassoa, in pressing forward the most active operations. arrival of Some inconsiderable actions had, before his arrival, taken Napoleon. place on the French right, where Blake had, since the 18th September, been engaged in an offensive movement, from which no material results had ensued. Prior to this, the French had evacuated Burgos and Tudela, and extended themselves towards Bilbao, which they still held, much against the will of Napoleon, who strongly censured such a proceeding, as gaining nothing in strength of position, and losing much in moral influence.* Blake broke up from Reynosa on the 18th September, with thirty thousand Galicians, and advanced by Espinosa into Biscay. The effect of this movement was to make the French concentrate their forces in the basin of Vitoria ; Sept. 18. Sept. 23. sending the whole army round by Elvas, but it could be none for separating it into two parts, severed by two hundred miles from each other, and exposing either to the chance of destruction, when the other was not at hand to lend it any support. Colonel Napier, much to his credit, admits that this separation violated a great military principle, though he endeavours to defend it in that particular case as unattended with danger. It will appear in the sequel, that the greatest commanders sometimes unnecessarily fall into a similar forgetfulness; and that the cantoning the English infantry apart from the cavalry and artillery on the Flemish frontier, and within the reach of the enemy's attack, in 1815, had well-nigh induced a serious disaster at Quatre-Bras.—See NAPIER, i. 334, and Infra. "The line of the Ebro," says Napoleon, "was actually taken; it must be kept. To advance from that river without an object would create indecision; but why evacuate Burgos-why abandon Tudela? Both were of importance, both politically and morally; the latter as commanding a stone bridge and the canal of Saragossa; the former as the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. If occupied in force, it would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, even Madrid itself. If the enemy occupies Burgos, Logrono, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful situation." It is remarkable how early the experienced eye of the French Emperor, at the distance of three hundred leagues from the scene of action, discerned the military importance of BURGOS-a town then unknown to military fame; but the value of which was afterwards so strongly felt by the Duke of Wellington, that he strained every nerve, and exposed himself to imminent risk in the close of the brilliant campaign of 1812, in the unsuccessful attempt to effect its reduction. See Note, Sur les Affaires d'Espagne, August 1808, taken at Vitoria; NAPIER, App. No. iv. p. 18. LV. 1808. and Blake attacked Bilbao with fifteen thousand men, CHAP. which fell the day after it was invested; while the French withdrew up the valley of Durango, and all the lateral valleys in its vicinity, to the higher parts of the mountains of Navarre. But though these operations were at first successful, yet the natural effects of the presumption and want of foresight of the Spanish government and generals soon developed itself. Blake had engaged in this laborious and dangerous mountain-warfare without magazine stores or any base of operations, and with only seventy rounds of ammunition for each gun. His men, when the winter was approaching, and the snow beginning to fall, were without greatcoats, and many without shoes; and, the bulk of the enemy's forces being grouped around 105. Vitoria, exposed his right flank to successful attack.1 Nap. i.343, 369. South. 387, 689. Tor. ii. 104, Castancs at Oct. 27. A combined attack had been arranged between the 20. Spanish generals, along the whole circumference which Check of they occupied, upon the central mountain position of the Logrono. French army. While Blake, with the Spanish left, was to threaten the French communications by Durango : Belvidere, with the reserve of Estremadura, twelve thousand strong, was to advance to Burgos in the centre; and Castanos, with the army of the centre, to cross the Ebro, and, uniting with the right under Palafox, to turn the French left and menace Pampeluna. But such a complicated movement, difficult and hazardous even with the best disciplined troops, when acting along such an extensive and rugged line of country, was altogether hopeless with the disorderly and ill-appointed bands of the Peninsular patriots. An attack by Castanos, with the Andalusian army, upon the French posts on the Ebro around Logrono, though at the first attended with some success, at length terminated in disaster; and the Spanish division of Pignatelli was driven back by Ney, with the loss of all its artillery, and immediately dispersed. Discouraged by this check, Castanos fell back to Calahorra ; and dissensions, threatening very serious consequences, VOL. VIII. 20 LV. 1808. CHAP. broke out between that general and Palafox, who, having met with a severe check from Moncey at Lerin, retired with the Aragonese levies towards Saragossa. Meanwhile Blake, whose forces, from the junction of the troops under Romana, which had come up from Corunna, and the Asturians, with whom he was in communication near Santander, were increased to nearly fifty thousand men, commenced a forward movement on the French left in the Biscayan provinces, and, stretching himself out by the sea-coast, and up the valley of 1 Tor. ii.110, Durango, threatened to interpose between the advanced 113. Nap. i. 368. Thiers, divisions of Lefebvre and Ney's corps, which lay most exposed, and their communication with the French frontier on the Bidassoa.1 ix. 392, 393. 21. Defeat of Blake at This offensive movement was well conceived, and, if conducted and followed up with the requisite vigour, Durango. might have led to great results. As it was, however, his forces were so scattered, that though thirty-six thousand were under his immediate orders, only seventeen thousand were collected by Blake in front of the enemy, without any artillery, in the valley of Durango; the remainder being stretched inactive along the sea-coast, or separated from the main body by impassable mountain ridges. Alarmed, however, by the probable consequence of the interposition of such a force between the bulk of his troops and their communications with Bayonne and San Sebastian, Lefebvre resolved to make a general attack upon the enemy, and drive them back to the neighbourhood of Bilbao. Descending from the heights of Durango, under cover of a thick fog, he suddenly attacked the Spanish army at daybreak on the 31st October, with such vigour that the divisions in front were thrown back on those in the rear, and the whole driven in utter confusion Tor.ii.120, to Bilbao, from whence they continued their retreat in 379, 381. the night to Balmaseda, in the direction of the Asturias. 394, 397. Lefebvre followed them next day; but Blake having assembled his troops, turned upon his pursuers, and, after Oct. 31. 123. Nap. i. Thiers, ix. 2 LV. some sharp partial engagements, the French, leaving a CHAP. division at Balmaseda, retired to Bilbao, of which they were allowed to retain undisturbed possession. 1808. 22. the French armies on Matters were in this state in Navarre and Biscay, when Napoleon arrived at Vitoria, and instantly, as if by an Position of electric shock, communicated his own unequalled energy and Spanish to the operations of the army. Disapproving of Lefebvre's Napoleon's unsupported attack upon Blake, which promised merely arrival. to force him back from the scene of action, without effecting those decisive results which his presence usually occasioned and which he then required, he instantly gave orders for the most vigorous operations. The position of the Allied armies promised the greatest results to immediate attack. Blake, with twenty-five thousand defeated and starving mountaineers, was near Espinosa in Biscay; the Conde de Belvidere, with the Estremaduran levies, twelve thousand strong, was in Burgos; Castanos and Palafox, little dreaming of the danger which was approaching, were preparing to advance again towards Logrono and Lerin, and confidently expected to drive the invaders over the Pyrenees; while the English forces, slowly converging towards the scene of action, were still scattered, from Corunna to Madrid, over the half of Spain. Napoleon, on the other hand, had a hundred thousand excellent troops ready for immediate operations, within a circumference of, Nap. i. twenty miles round his headquarters at Vitoria, besides 385, 387. nearly an equal force at a greater distance in Biscay and 125. Navarre.1 Tor. ii. 124, 23. Espinosa. The plans of the French Emperor were immediately formed. Reinforcing Lefebvre with the corps of Victor Actions at on his right, and Moncey with a divison of Ney's corps Nov. 10. on his left, he prepared himself to break through the centre of the Spanish line, by advancing upon Burgos with the corps of Soult and Ney, the Imperial Guard, and the cavalry of the reserve. This once accomplished, he intended to double back upon the flanks and rear of their two now isolated wings. Blake, whose eyes were at LV. 1808. CHAP. length opened to the perilous situation in which he was placed, so far in advance, and cut off from all communication with the other Spanish armies, had, after a successful action with the division left at Balmaseda, and a check received from Lefebvre at Guenes, retired to ESPINOSA, where he had concentrated nearly all his troops, including those which had come with Romana from the Baltic, in a very strong position; while his reserves and park of artillery were stationed in the rear at Reynosa. He had now collected twenty-five thousand men, with six guns; but his men, half-naked, and in great part without shoes, were shivering from the inclemency of the weather, and exhausted by incessant marching and counter-marching, often without food, for fourteen days. In this state they were attacked on the forenoon of the 10th by Marshal Victor with twenty-five thousand men, while Lefebvre, with fifteen thousand, marched upon the Spanish line of retreat. Romana's infantry, posted in a wood on the right, at first made a gallant resistance, and though they finally lost the wood, yet not only was the action prolonged till nightfall, without any disadvantage, by those steady veterans, but the Spanish centre, who were protected by the fire of a battery well posted, to which the French had no guns to oppose, had gained ground upon the enemy. Next morning, however, the result was very different. Victor, who had changed his columns of attack during the night, renewed the action at daybreak, and directed his efforts against the left, where the Asturian levies were posted. These gallant mountaineers, though almost starving, and but recently embodied, stood their ground bravely as long as their chiefs, Quiron, Acevedo, and Valdes, remained to head them. But the French, 1Jom. ii. 97, perceiving the influence which they exercised over the 98. Nap.i. 391, 392. minds of their followers, sent forward some sharpshooters 130. Thiers, under cover of the rocks and thickets in front of the ix. 399, 424. position, who speedily killed the first and severely wounded the two latter.1 Nov. 11. Tor. i. 126, |