LV. 1808. 24. of the Span Reynosa. Disheartened by this loss, the Asturians broke and fled. CHAP. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to support them, but instead of doing so, they were themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of fugitives, and swept along. Total defeat In a short time the whole army disbanded, and rushed in jards at the wildest disorder towards the river Trueba, which en- No. 13. circles the rear of the position.* Great numbers perished in the stream, which was deeply swollen with the rains of winter; those who reached the fords, or the bridge of Espinosa, dispersed, and made the best of their way into their own provinces, carrying dismay into all parts of Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, where Romana afterwards contrived to rally ten thousand men. With difficulty : Blake collected seven thousand men, with whom he fell back to Reynosa, where he endeavoured to make a stand, with the aid of his reserve artillery which was still stationed there but this attempt only rendered his defeat in the end more complete. Soult, after the victory of Burgos, was despatched by Napoleon to Reynosa, to cut him off from his retreat towards Leon and upon the 13th he was attacked by the advanced guard of that marshal, who displayed even more than his wonted vigour on the occasion, was completely routed, with the loss of his whole artillery and ammunition, and driven, with a 15. few thousand miserable and spectre-looking followers, into Nap. i, the heart of the Asturian mountains. Meanwhile, Bilbao, Jom. ii. 97, Santander, and the whole line of the intermediate sea- ii. 389, 393. coast, with great stores landed at the latter port by the 424, 427. British, fell into the hands of the enemy.1 Tor. ii. 126, 391, 393. 98. South. Thiers, ix. 25. Burgos, and While these decisive blows in a manner annihilated the Spanish left, an equally important stroke was deli- Battle of vered by Soult, who had now taken the command of the defeat of the second corps, against the centre. It consisted of the Spanish army of Estremadura, under the Count de Belvidere, Nov. 10. Great part of the disasters of this defeat were owing to the injudicious selection of a position for battle with a river in the rear-another example, like that of the Russians at Friedland, of one of the most fatal errors which a general can commit. centre. LV. 1808. CHAP. with which were united some of the bravest regular troops in Spain-in particular the Spanish and Walloon Guards, two of the best appointed regiments of the line, and the Royal Carabineers-and the whole were completely equipped and clothed by the English government. It made, however, even less resistance than the undisciplined levies of Asturias and Galicia. The Spanish soldiers, eighteen thousand strong, of whom eleven thousand were regulars, were posted at Gamonal, in front of Burgos, with twenty pieces of cannon disposed along their front; the right occupied a wood, the left the walled park of Villemer. The action commenced by General Lasalle, with the French horse, driving in the Spanish right, and threatening its flank, while Mouton, with a division of veterans, charged rapidly through the trees, and assailed their front: Bonnet followed closely with another division immediately in his rear. But such was the vigour and effect of Mouton's attack, that, before his support came up, the enemy broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, pursued all the way by Bessières' heavy dragoons, who did dreadful execution among the fugitives, and took all the guns which had been saved from the first attack. Don Juan de Henestrosa, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, to cover the retreat, charged this dreadful body of horse with more gallantry than success; his dragoons, led by youths of the best families in Spain, were unable to withstand the shock of the French cuirassiers, and shared in the general rout. Two thousand Spaniards fell on the field, or in the 3096. pursuit; all the artillery, consisting of twenty guns, with Tor. ii. 131, eight hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. ii. 395, 396. The whole ammunition and stores of the army were taken in Burgos, which was given up to pillage, and the dispersion of the defeated troops was complete.1 1 Nap. i. 389,390. 132. South. Thiers, ix. 410, 412. Burgos now became the centre of the Emperor's operations; headquarters were established there on the 12th ; Soult was directed upon Blake's line of retreat at Reynosa; LV. 1808. 26. against Cas Palafox. and ten thousand cavalry, under Lasalle and Milhaud, CHAP. were despatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. Such was the consternation produced by their advance, Movement that they traversed the open fields in every direction, tanos and without experiencing the slightest opposition. They swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benavente, Toro, and Tordesillas, spreading everywhere the triumphant proclamations of the Emperor, and boasting that, notwithstanding their utmost exertions, the French horsemen could not overtake the English army, which, abandoning its allies without striking a blow, was flying in disgrace to its ships. But while, by these incursions, the attention of the enemy was drawn to the side of Salamanca, the eyes. of Napoleon were, in reality, turned in a different quarter; and it was against Castanos and Palafox that the weight of his forces was directed. The position of the French army seemed to expose them to certain destruction; for Ney's corps, which had been destined to act against the army of Estremadura at Burgos, being rendered disposable by its sudden destruction, was in a situation to make a circuit round their position, and cut them off from the line of retreat to New Castile and Madrid. That brave marshal, accordingly, was directed to move from Burgos, through Aranda, by Soria to Agreda, which was directly in their rear; while Lannes was despatched with a division of infantry and two of cavalry, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps, and, descending the right bank of the Ebro, attack them in front.'* Meanwhile Castanos, 395, 401. finding himself separated both from Belvidere's and Blake's 427, 433. army, with the destruction of which he was unacquainted, In crossing a mountain range near Tolosa, the horse of Marshal Lannes fell with him, and he sustained several severe and dangerous bruises. He was cured in a very singular manner, by being wrapped in the warm skin of a newly slain sheep, and was able in two days to resume the command of the army.— LARREY, Memoires et Camp. iv. 237. He was to assume the command of la Grange's division of Ney's corps, which had been left at Logrono along with Colbert's cavalry and Dijeon's dragoons, and was to join Moncey at Lodosa.THIERS, ix. 436. 1 Nov. 21. Thib. vii. Tor. ii. 138, 160, 161. 139. Nap.i. Thiers, ix. LV. 1808. CHAP. had adopted the extraordinary plan of forcing a passage through the French forces in his front, and marching by Concha-de-Harra and Soria to Burgos, where he was to annihilate the Emperor's reserves and rearguard, and thence pass on to Vitoria to co-operate with Blake in the destruction of the two corps in Biscay. 27. the French armies before the battle of Tudela. In the midst of these extravagant projects, the hand Positions of of fate was upon him. Marshal Ney, who left Aranda and Spanish on the 19th, entered Soria on the 21st, upon which Castanos retreated towards TUDELA, which he reached on the evening of the 22d. There his army formed a junction with that of Aragon under Palafox, and their united forces amounted to thirty-nine thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, with forty guns. The generals of the armies of Andalusia and Aragon could not concur in any plan of common operations; Palafox contending strongly for the defence of Aragon, Castanos for the more prudent plan of retiring before the enemy. Nothing was as yet decided between these conflicting opinions, when it was announced from the outposts that the enemy were already upon them. In haste the troops were drawn up nearly on the ground which they occupied at the moment, which was along a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly six miles long, stretching from Tudela to Tarazona. The Aragonese, with. Palafox, were on the right, leaning on Tudela; the Valencians and Castilians loosely scattered in the centre; the veterans of Andalusia, proud of the laurels of Baylen, on the left, stretching to Tarazona, which they occupied with three divisions, the flower of the army. Lannes, who commanded the French, and had, after uniting with Moncey at Lodosa, concentrated thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, instantly perceived the weakness of the enemy's line, and prepared to attack 1 Tor. ii. the right, and then pierce the long and feebly guarded Jom. ii. 98, front in the centre, where it was weakest, and composed 401, 404. of the most inexperienced troops, so as to separate altogether the army of Aragon from that of Andalusia.1 138, 140. 99. Nap. i. LV. 1808. of the 28. This well-conceived plan proved entirely successful. CHAP. General Maurice Mathieu, with a strong body of infantry, assailed the Aragonese on the right, while Grandjean and Morlot, with their divisions and the whole cavalry under Total defeat Lefebvre-Desnouettes, attacked the Valencians and Cas-Spaniards. tilians in the centre with great vigour, and soon compelled them to give ground. But they were in their turn charged by the Spanish Guards, whom Castanos despatched to their assistance from the left, who threw the assailants into confusion; and the Spanish line in that quarter was gaining ground, when they were taken in flank by General Maurice Mathieu, who had beaten back the Aragonese on the right, and now turned fiercely upon the enemy's centre. Aided by such powerful auxiliaries, Morlot and LefebvreDesnouettes regained the advantage, and in their turn drove back and threw into confusion the Valencians and Castilians, who had fallen into disorder from the length of the combat. The centre was speedily routed, and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, charging the right with vigour, drove them entirely off the field in confusion towards Saragossa. Meanwhile la Pena with the victors of Baylen, on the extreme left, had routed the French under la Grange, by whom he was opposed; but when following up their success in some disorder, and already confident of victory, the victors were suddenly met and broken by a solid mass of infantry which diverged from the victorious centre of the enemy. The other divisions of the army of Andalusia, three in number, and embracing twelve thousand soldiers, took no part in the action. They commenced their retreat, however, in good order, when it was evident the battle was lost; but some of the advanced troops of Ney's corps having appeared in the rear from the side of Soria, and a powder-waggon having exploded by accident, the retreat became disorderly, and it was with some difficulty the guns were brought off. As it was, the separation of the Spanish armies was complete ; fifteen thousand men, Aragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, had taken refuge in Saragossa, without either |