LV. 1808. CHAP. Soria, was stationed at Madrid, under his own immediate control, with the Guards and reserve; Victor was advanced to Toledo, which, notwithstanding its expressed determination to hold out to the uttermost, opened its gates on the first summons; while his light cavalry scoured the plains of la Mancha, carrying devastation and terror to the foot of the Sierra Morena, Lefebvre advanced to Talavera, on the great road for Badajos and Elvas; Soult was reposing on the banks of the Carrion, preparing to follow the broken remains of Romana's army into the fastnesses of Galicia; Junot's corps was broken up, and the divisions composing it were incorporated with Soult's troops; Moncey was ordered up in person to Madrid for an expedition against Valencia; while Mortier was directed to advance to support his corps (now commanded by Junot) which was occupied with the siege of Saragossa. Thus the Emperor, from his central position at Madrid, was preparing expeditions to subdue the insurrection at once in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, Valencia, and Aragon; governed in these measures by his favourite maxim, which had been acted upon with such fatal effect against the Prussians after the battle of Jena, that the true secret of war is to concentrate when a decisive blow is to be struck, but to disperse when the broken remains of the enemy are to be pursued, and the moral effect of victory is to be magnified by the numerous minor successes by which it is followed. 37. Vast as such a plan of operations undoubtedly was, it Vast forces was not disproportioned to the resources of the Emperor; posal of the for the imperial muster-rolls, on 10th October, showed in Emperor. the Peninsula the enormous number of three hundred at the dis and thirty thousand men and sixty thousand horse, of whom no less than two hundred and fifty thousand were present with the eagles and with their regiments, and the losses since sustained had been more than counterbalanced by the reinforcements received. Thus, after making every allowance for the troops requisite for garrisons and LV. 1808. 1 Imperial Rolls, Nap. communications, at least a hundred and sixty thousand CHAP. were disposable for active operations, or above thirty thousand men could be directed against each of the provinces menaced with an attack.1 * The disorganised Mustercondition of the Spanish armies, the deplorable state of i. App. 28. destitution to which they were reduced, the vast distance which separated them from each other, and the want of any efficient central government to combine their operations, rendered it too probable that this vigorous and unrelenting system of conquest would be attended with the desired effect. There was every reason to fear that the national resistance of the Spaniards would, in the first moments of consternation consequent on their disasters, be speedily suppressed in all the provinces; when Napi the career of victory was arrested from a quarter whence Jom. iii. it was least expected, and by an enemy who had been hitherto almost forgotten, from the mistaken view which 500, 501. the Emperor entertained of their prowess.2 2 421, 422. 104. Tor. ii. 166, 172. Thiers, ix. 38. vance of While these disasters were accumulating on the Spanish monarchy, the English army, unobserved and unassailed, Bold adhad at length been concentrating its forces. Baird had Sir John come up from Corunna to Astorga; Hope from the Escu- Moore. rial had united with the main column at Salamanca; and Sir John Moore found himself at the head of nearly thirty thousand men, of whom above two thousand were cavalry in admirable condition, and sixty pieces of cannon. The English general was for long extremely perplexed what to do, in consequence of the imperfect information which he received, and between the plans advocated to him by Mr Frere, the British + The British army, however, had its full proportion of that usual drawback upon all armies, the difference between the actual numbers appearing on the muster-rolls, and the efficient force that could really be brought into the field. 1808. Nov. 29. CHAP. ambassador at Madrid, who strongly urged an immeLV. diate advance to the capital, and the evidence which the progress of events around him was daily affording of the utter incapacity of the Spanish troops to contend with the formidable legions of Napoleon. At one time the intelligence of the successive rout of all the Spanish armies appeared so alarming, that orders were given to the troops to retreat, and Sir David Baird's heavy baggage, which was coming up from Lugo to Astorga, commenced a retrograde movement to the former place. This determination excited the utmost dissatisfaction among the troops; officers and men loudly and openly murmured against such a resolution, and declared it would be better to sacrifice half the army than retire from so fair a field without striking a blow for the allies who had staked their all in the common cause. The gallant spirit of the general himself secretly recoiled from the mournful resolution, which nothing had made him adopt 1 Lond. i. but an imperious sense of duty to the troops intrusted to Tor. i. 178. his care, the gloomy forebodings consequent on the over440. Thiers, whelming strength of the enemy, and the defeat and dispersion of all the Spanish forces who had attempted to arrest his progress.1 217, 220. Nap. i. 435, ix. 501, 502. These feelings, both in the general and the soldiers, were wrought up to the highest degree when intelligence was received, shortly after the advance of the French to The following is the strength of the British army from the Adjutant-general's state, 19th December 1808 : Two thousand two hundred and seventy-five were left in Portugal, or were on the march between Lugo and Villa-Franca, and must be deducted from this number. See NAPIER, i. 83, App. LV. 1808. 39. nation of and joy diffused army. Madrid, of the enthusiastic preparations made for the CHAP. defence of the capital, and the determination of the inhabitants to bury themselves under its ruins rather than submit to the invader. Giving vent joyfully to the Determinative courage of his disposition, as well as the loudly Moore to expressed wishes of the army, Sir John Moore now sent advance, orders to Sir David Baird to suspend his retreat, and, to which it the infinite joy of the troops, directions were given, in- through the dicating a disposition to advance. These preparations Dec. 5. were not relaxed, although Colonel Graham, the future Dec. 9. hero of Barossa, returned on the 9th with the disheartening intelligence of the capture of the Retiro, and perilous situation of Madrid. The British general knew that his countrymen looked to him for some great exploit ; and, though fully aware of the danger of such a step, he resolved to throw himself upon the enemy's communications, and menace Soult, who, with fifteen thousand men, Dec. 11. lay exposed to his blows in the valley of the Carrion. 435, 451. The gallant resolution was no sooner taken than it was 217, 233. acted upon; two days after, the British army commenced Moore's Camp. in its advance, and Moore, with twenty-five thousand ef- Spain, 187, fective men around his banners, ventured to try his for- 178, 182. Thiers, ix. tune against Napoleon, who had two hundred thousand 503. under his command.1 1 Nap. i. Lond. i. 194. Tor. i. Sahagun, on line of com The forward march of the English forces, however, 40. was combined, as prudence, and indeed necessity, dic- Advance to tated, with preparations for a retreat; and, as it was the French uncertain which line would be adopted, magazines were munication. formed both on the great road to Lisbon and at Benavente, Astorga, and Lugo, in the direction of Galicia. On the 13th, headquarters reached Relaejos, and the Dec. 13. advanced posts of cavalry extended to Rueda, at which place they surprised a French post and made eighty prisoners. Great was the astonishment of these haughty Tor. ii. 177, conquerors at finding themselves thus assailed by an i. 212. enemy, whom the boastful proclamations of the Emperor 502, 503. had led them to believe to be in full retreat for his ships.2 2 450, 454. 182. Lond. Thiers, ix. LV. 1808. Dec. 14. CHAP. At first Sir John's march was directed towards Valladolid, in order to facilitate the junction with Baird's corps; but an intercepted despatch from Napoleon on the 14th having made him acquainted with the fall of Madrid, and the unsuspecting security in which Soult's corps lay in the valley of the Carrion, the columns were moved towards Toro and Benavente, and Valderas was assigned as the point of junction for the two armies. 41. Dec. 16. Preparations for attacking Soult on Dec. 20. At Toro, where headquarters were on the 16th, information was received that Romana, who had been informed of the movement, and invited to co-operate in it, instead of doing so, was, in consequence of the retrograde movethe Carrion. ment of Sir David Baird a few days before, in full retreat towards the Galician mountains: the truth was, his troops, from hunger, fatigue, and misery, had dwindled away to eight thousand ragged and disheartened fugitives, totally unfit to take the field with regular forces, and whom he was even ashamed to array by their side. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the English forces continued to advance; on the 20th, the junction between Sir David Baird and Sir John Moore was fully effected at Mayorga; and on the 21st the united forces were established at Sahagun, near which town Lord Paget, afterwards Marquess of Anglesea, at the head of the 10th and 15th hussars, not above four hundred strong, fell in with, and after a short but brilliant action, totally defeated a body of seven hundred French cavalry, making two colonels and one hundred and sixty men prisoners in twenty minutes. Soult, now seriously alarmed, hastily called in his detachments from all quarters, and with Nap. i. 450, some difficulty concentrated twenty-three thousand men i. 212, 243. on the banks of the Carrion, between the town of that Thiers, ix. 510. name and Saldana, where Moore was making preparations for attacking him on the 23d. Dec. 21. 1 Tor. ii. 178, 187. 461. Lond. Never was more completely evinced than on this occasion the prophetic sagacity of the saying of Napoleon seven months before, that a victory by the allies on the |