of CHAP. LV. 1809. 63. cited by the appearance of the army on its re turn. day dress their ideas of it were formed on the pomp melodramatic representation, or the interest of pacific reviews; and though strongly impressed with a military spirit, they were, from their happy insular situation, Horror exstrangers to the hardships and the calamities of actual campaigns. The inhabitants of the towns along the Channel had seen the successive expeditions which composed Sir John Moore's army embark in all the pride of military display, with drums beating and colours flying, amidst the cheers and tears of a countless host of spectators. When, therefore, they beheld the same regiments return, now reduced, in many instances, to half their numbers, with haggard countenances, ragged accoutrements, and worn-out clothing, they were struck with astonishment and horror. This was soon increased and turned into well-founded alarm, by a malignant fever which the troops brought back with them, the result of fatigue, confinement on shipboard, and mental depression, and by the dismal and often exaggerated accounts which were spread by the survivors, of the hardships and miseries they had undergone. These gloomy narratives riveted every mind by a painful but enchaining interest: they speedily made their way into the public newspapers, and were devoured with unceasing interest by the whole people. The fate of these gallant men became a general subject of commiseration; and the old cry, raised for factious purposes, began to resound through the land, that England could never contend on the Continent with France, and that the only rational policy for the prosecu- Ann. Reg. tion of the war was to withdraw entirely behind her Nap. i. 529. wooden walls.1 And yet, to a dispassionate observer, it could not but be manifest, that though the campaign had to both parties been deeply checkered by misfortune, it had in reality been far more calamitous to the French than the Allies; and that the power of Napoleon had received a shock ruder than any which it had yet received since 1 1809,22,25. CHAP. his accession to the supreme authority. LV. 1809. The Spanish armies, it is true, had been dispersed on the Ebro, the Somo-sierra forced, Madrid taken, and the British, after Reflections a calamitous retreat, driven to their ships. paign; its Peninsula was still unsubdued. character its blood-stained battlements: 64. on the cam checkered, but on the whole eminently unfavourable But the Saragossa was fortifying Catalonia was in arms: Valencia and Andalusia were recruiting their forces : Portugal was untouched, and the British troops, though to France. in diminished strength, still held the towers of Lisbon. No submission or subjugation had followed the irruption of three hundred thousand men into the Peninsula. Driven from their capital, the Spaniards, like their ancestors in the Roman and Moorish wars, were preparing in the provinces to maintain a separate warfare; while the number of their fortresses and chains of mountains, joined to the aid of England, promised them the means of their prolonging a desperate resistance. And what had happened in the same campaign to the hitherto invincible arms of France? One whole corps had laid down its arms with unheard-of disgrace; another had capitulated, and surrendered a kingdom to purchase its retreat; foiled in more than one provincial expedition, the imperial arms had been driven from the capital behind the Ebro, and only regained their lost ground by denuding Germany of its defenders, and exposing for the sake of the Peninsular thrones the Rhine itself to invasion. spell which held the world enchained had been broken; the dangerous secret had been disclosed that the French armies were not invincible. Already the effects of the discovery had become manifest: Europe had been shaken from one extremity to the other by the Peninsular disasters, and Austria, which beheld unmoved the desperate strife of Pultusk and Eylau, encouraged by the immersion of the best French armies in the Peninsula, was preparing to renew the struggle on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. The The movement in advance by Sir John Moore to LV. 1809. 65. on the cam effect of movement. Sahagun, his rapid subsequent retreat, when surrounded CHAP. by superior forces, to Benavente, the skill with which he reorganised his shattered army at Lugo, and the firmness with which, disdaining every proposal for a capitu- Reflections lation, he boldly fronted the enemy at Corunna, and paign, and met a glorious death on the field of victory, are worthy Sir John of the highest admiration, and will for ever secure him Moore's a place in the temple of British heroes. Nor is it merely the fond partiality of national gratitude, often mistaken or exaggerated in its opinions, which has secured this distinction: a calm consideration of the consequences of his campaign must, with all impartial observers, lead to the same result. In the whole annals of the Revolutionary war, there is not to be found a single movement more ably conceived, or attended with more important consequences, than that which he attempted against Soult's corps on the Carrion. Levelled against the vital line of the enemy's communications, based on the principles which, unknown to the English general, Napoleon had so emphatically unfolded six months before in his secret despatch 1 Ante, ch. to Savary,' it had literally paralysed every hostile army note. in Spain; snatched the Spanish monarchy from the verge of destruction, when its own resources were exhausted; and by drawing Napoleon himself, with his terrible legions, into the northern extremity of the Peninsula, it both gave time to the southern provinces to restore their armies and arm their fortresses, and averted the war from Portugal, till an opportunity of organising fresh means of resistance within its frontiers was afforded. But for this bold and well-conceived advance, Andalusia would have been overrun, Valencia taken, Saragossa subdued, within a few weeks; and before the Emperor was recalled from the theatre of Peninsular warfare by the Austrian preparations, he would have realised his favourite threat of *It was seriously pressed upon his consideration by several officers, when the absence of the transports on the first arrival at Corunna rendered it evident that a battle must be fought for the embarkation, but he indignantly rejected the proposal.-NAPIER, i. 492, 493; SOUTHEY, ii. 520. 1 liv. § 17, LV. CHAP. planting the French eagles on the towers of Lisbon. These great results, however, were attended with pro1809. portionate dangers: Napoleon, with seventy thousand chosen troops, was speedily sweeping round the audacious enemy who had thus interrupted his designs, and but for the celerity and skill of the subsequent retreat to Astorga, the army which achieved them must certainly have been consigned to destruction.* 66. Errors which he committed. 1 Nap. i. 474. 2 Thiers, ix. 535. But if, in these particulars, the conduct of Sir John Moore was worthy of unqualified admiration, there are others in which the impartial voice of history must deal out a different measure of eulogium. Admitting that the celerity of the retreat to Astorga was unavoidable, and saved the army from destruction, where was the necessity for the subsequent forced marches to Lugo, when Napoleon had retired with his Guards from the pursuit, in dreadful weather, attended as it was with such ruinous effects upon the discipline and spirit of his troops? His ablest defenders admit that there were in the magazines of Villa-Franca and Lugo provisions for fourteen days' consumption; and even if there had been nothing but the resources of the country to be had, subsequent events proved that they were sufficient for the maintenance of the army; for the French found wherewithal to live on and advance through it, even when following in the rear of the British soldiers. There was no necessity for hurrying on from the danger of being turned in flank, for Ney's corps was several days' march behind Soult's in the defile; and the rugged nature of the country and impassable state of the roads, rendered it totally impossible for his troops, worn out by a march of unexampled hardship and rapidity from Madrid, to attempt any threatening movement against the British flank." Everything, then, counselled deliberation and order in * Napoleon subsequently said, at St Helena, that nothing but the talents and firmness of Sir John Moore saved his army from destruction.—O'MEARA, i. 55. LV. 1809. 67. in the un of the re the retreating columns; and the nature of the road through CHAP. which they passed, consisting of an ascent several leagues in length, up a bare slope, followed by tremendous passes, continuing for several days' journey, shut in on Especially every side by steep or forest-clad mountains, offered the due rapidity most favourable opportunities for stopping, by a vigorous treat. resistance on the part of the rearguard, the active pursuit, Lond. i. of the enemy.1* The rapid restoration of discipline and 260, 261. order when battle was offered at Lugo, and the issue of the fight at Corunna, leave no room for doubt as to what would have been the result of such a conflict; and the example of Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest, in 1796, was not required to show how effectually such a fierce aspect on the part of the retiring force saves the blood and secures the safety of the remainder of the Ante, ch. army. The luminous fact that the losses sustained by 57. the rearguard when they arrived at Corunna, notwithstanding all the combats they had undergone, were less than those of any other division of equal number in the army, affords a decisive proof how much would have 3 Nap.i. 488. been gained upon the whole by fighting at an earlier period, when the strength and discipline of the army were still comparatively unbroken. 2 xxi. §§ 56, 68. Sir David But most of all, the step adopted by Sir David Baird, though a most gallant officer, in unison with Sir John Errors of Moore, in counselling the British government, instead of Baird. sending out the strong reinforcements, which they pro *“The road from Astorga to Corunna," says General Jomini, “ traverses a long defile of thirty leagues, bounded by high mountains on either side. A slender rearguard would have sufficed to defend that chaussée. And it was impracticable to manœuvre on either flank of it. That rendered it impossible for Soult to get at the enemy; and Ney, entangled behind him in the defile, could do nothing. This was the more unfortunate, as the English army, having prepared nothing on that line, stood in want of everything, and was in a frightful state of disorder, in consequence of the forced marches which it took for no conceivable reason. They cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned three or four thousand stragglers or dying men, when their line of operations was never menaced. It is impossible to conceive why the English did not defend Corunna. It is not, indeed, a Gibraltar; but against an enemy who had nothing but fieldpieces, it surely could have been maintained for some time, the more especially as they could, at any time, throw in succours by VOL. VIII. 2 R |