LVI. 1809. CHAP. nation, and it was hoped would at the same time overcome the indecision of Prussia, and bring its disciplined battalions to the side of the Imperialists in the great contest for European freedom. This plan was ably conceived, and if carried into execution with the requisite alacrity and vigour, might have been attended with great results; for the French armies were very much scattered in the 1 Jom. ii. end of February, and, by issuing suddenly from the great Pelet, i. 189, salient fortress of Bohemia, and pressing forward towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles might have entirely separated Oudinot, who lay in Suabia, from Davoust, who was cantoned on the banks of the Maine.1 Feb. 27. 152, 153. 195. Stut. 40, 49. Thiers, X. 86. 21. Plans of The Austrians had taken Napoleon, in a certain degree, at unawares; as not only was the flower of his veteran April 1. troops in Spain, but the forces which still remained in Germany, though extremely formidable if once assembled together, were scattered from the Alps to the Baltic, at a great distance from each other. His plan, therefore, contrary to his usual policy, was strictly defensive in the outset, to gain time for the concentration of his troops. At the same time, as he deemed it unfitting that he himself should be at the head of his army before any decisive blows were struck, and where, possibly, disasters might be incurred, Berthier was despatched early in April to assume the command of the whole until the arrival of the Emperor a convenient arrangement, as, if his operations proved successful, they would, of course, be ascribed to the intelligence and ability of his superior in command; if the reverse, the whole blame of a miscarriage might be laid upon himself. From the period of his arrival, the whole troops, both French and those of the Confederation of the Rhine, were formed into one army, to be called the army of Germany. It was divided into eight corps, commanded by the most distinguished marshals in the French service, and mustered two hundred thousand effective men. The Emperor was indefatigable in his efforts to provide subsistence, clothing, and ammu LVI. 1809. nition for this enormous multitude; * among other things, CHAP. twenty-five million ball-cartridges were collected. But he enjoined that the system should be rigorously followed out of making war support war, and strictly forbade any stores or provisions being purchased in France for the use of the troops, if they could be procured by requisitions or military contributions on the other side of the Rhine. Rapid concentration of his troops was enjoined to Berthier, either at Ratisbon or Donauwörth, according to circumstances; but no offensive operations were to be commenced before the arrival of the Emperor, who was expected about the middle of April. To all who were 214, 223. acquainted with the character of his movements, it was Jom. iii, evident that the moment he arrived, and deemed himself Stut. 58, 64. Pelet, in sufficient strength, he would commence a furious onset, i. 197, 209. and pour with concentrated masses down the valley of the 102. Danube.1 1 Thib. vii. 152, 153. Thiers, x. 22. once CommenceHad tilities by The cabinet of Vienna took the initiative. On the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers at on the Inn, in Bohemia, in the Tyrol, and in Italy. the original plan of the Aulic Council been followed and the Archduke Charles, at the head of a hundred thousand men, debouched from Bohemia, midway between ment of hos the Aus out, tra and 400 pieces of cannon. But at least one hundred thousand of them had not yet arrived: the Guard and reserve cavalry were on their march from Spain; Bernadotte's corps was still at a distance in the north of Germany; and the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine were far from being complete. Still a hundred and forty thousand French troops and sixty thousand of those of the Confederation might be relied on for active operations in the valley of the Danube.THIBAUDEAU, vii. 14. VOL. VIII. 2 T LVI. 1809. CHAP. the Maine and the Black Forest, and advanced towards Mannheim, this commencement of hostilities might have been attended with most important effects; for dissatisfaction with the French rule was universal in that quarter; and if a powerful demonstration from England, on the coast of Flanders, had timeously seconded this irruption, the seat of war might have been permanently fixed on the middle and lower Rhine.* On the 17th March, Austria had a hundred and forty thousand men on the two banks of the Danube, within eight days' march of Ratisbon; while Davoust only broke up from his cantonments in the north of Germany, on the Oder and lower Elbe, on that day; Massena was still on the Rhine, and Oudinot alone at Augsburg, the Bavarians being on the Iser. Thus the complete separation of the French corps was a matter of perfect certainty, by a rapid advance towards Mannheim at that period. But the successful execution of this well-conceived design required a vigour of determination and alacrity of execution to which the Austrians were as yet strangers; and the English cabinet were too great novices in the military art to be aware of the inestimable value of time in war. Thus the moment for decisive action was lost by both powers, and by hesi1 Pelet, i. tating till the period for striking the blow was past, and the French troops were concentrated on the Danube, Austria lost all the immense advantages of her central threatening position in Bohemia.1 190, 199. Stut. 60, 65. Jom. i. 152, 153. *The instructions of the Aulic Council in the outset of the campaign were, "to advance in large masses, and attack the French army wherever it might assemble, either on the Maine, the Naab, or the Danube. Should a French corps enter Bavaria, the grand Austrian army was not to swerve from its direction, but trust to arresting the movement on Bavaria, by threatening the advancing corps on the side of Ratisbon or Donauwörth. If Marshal Davoust retired in order to avoid any engagement before the arrival of his reinforcements, the grand Austrian army was nevertheless to continue to advance with all possible expedition, and take up a central position between the Black Forest and the Maine, and there be regulated by the forces of the enemy, and the chances of successful operations which were afforded. The issue of the war depends on this operation, and on the issue of the first battle, which will, in all probability, if successful, rouse the malcontents of Baireuth, overawe Saxony, and bring over to the standards of Austria great part of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine which are now arrayed against her."-STUT TERHEIM, 64-69; PELET, i. 194. LVI. 1809. 23. delay in the ments. When it was resolved to attack the French in Bavaria, CHAP. the Aulic Council committed a second error, still greater than the former; for instead of permitting the Archduke Charles, from his central position in Bohemia, to fall Impolitic perpendicularly on the French corps, scattered to the early movesouth along the valley of the Danube, at the distance of only six or eight days' march, they ordered him to countermarch the great body of his forces, and open the campaign on the Inn; a gratuitous fault, which gave his April 10. troops triple the distance to march, and the enemy triple the time to complete their preparations and concentrate their forces. At length, however, the toilsome and unnecessary countermarch was completed; the Austrian columns, after being transported a hundred miles back towards Vienna, and across the Danube, were arrayed in dense masses on the right bank of the Inn; and the Archduke, crossing that river in imposing strength, prepared, at the head of six corps, to carry the seat of war into the vast and level plains which stretch from the southern bank of the Danube to the foot of the Alps.* At the same moment, the long-wished-for signals were given from the frontiers of Styria and Salzbourg, to the provinces of the Tyrol. With speechless transport, the brave mountaineers beheld the bale-fires glowing on the 1 Jom. i. eastern boundaries of their romantic country. Instantly a 152, 153. thousand beacons were kindled over all its rugged surface; 221., Pel. the cliffs of the Brenner were reddened by the glare, the Stut. 60, 64. waters of the Eisach reflected its light;1 and before the 88, 90. ascending sun had spread his rosy tint over the glaciers of * The position and strength of his force on the 8th April, two days before the passage of the Inn, was as follows: Fourth Corps, Rosenberg, at Scharding, MEN. ZEN! First Reserve Corps,. Lichtenstein, do. do. Kienmayer,. -Koch, Memoires de Massena, vi. 375, 377. at Salzbourg, 24,914 Thib. vii. i. 191, 205. Thiers, x. LVI. CHAP. the Glockner, the inhabitants of the icy steeps were warmed by the glow, which, at the voice of patriotism, called a nation of heroes to arms. 1809. 24. First movements of the Austrians, and imminent the French. Atlas, The instructions of Napoleon to Berthier,* before leaving Paris, were clear and precise; viz. that if the enemy commenced his attack before the 15th, by which time it was calculated the bulk of his forces might be danger of assembled around Ratisbon, the army was to be concentrated on the Lech around Donauwörth; if after that date, at Ratisbon, guarding the right bank of the Danube from it to Passau. On the 12th, however, by means of the telegraph which the Emperor had established in central Germany, he was apprised at Paris of the crossing of the Inn by the Archduke and the commencement of hostilities. He instantly set out; and with such precision were the movements of the immense force, which was converging from the mountains of Galicia and the banks of the Oder to the valley of the Danube, calculated, that the last arrived at the general point of rendezvous around Ratisbon, at the very moment when the Emperor was approaching from Paris. It was high time that he * 66 By the 1st April," said Napoleon," the corps of Marshal Davoust, which broke up from the Oder and Lower Elbe on the 17th March, will be established between Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Baireuth; Massena will be round Ulm; Oudinot between Augsburg and Donauwörth. From the 1st to the 15th, three French corps, 130,000 strong, besides 10,000 allies, the Bavarians in advance on the Iser, and the Würtembergers in reserve, may be concentrated at Ratisbon or Ingolstadt. Strong têtes-de-pont should be thrown up at Augsburg, to secure the passage of the Lech; at Ingolstadt, in order to be able to debouch to the left bank of the Danube; and above all, at Passau, which should be put in a condition to hold out two or three months. The Emperor's object is to concentrate his army as soon as possible at Ratisbon: the position on the Lech is to be assumed only if it is attacked before the concentration at the former town is possible. The second corps will be at Ratisbon by the 10th, and on that day Bessières will also arrive with the reserve cavalry of the Guard; Davoust will be at Nuremberg, Massena at Augsburg, Lefebvre at one or two marches from Ratisbon. Headquarters may then be safely established in that town, in the midst of 200,000 men, guarding the right bank of the Danube, from Ratisbon to Passau,.by means of which stream provisions and supplies of every sort will be procured in abundance. Should the Austrians debouch from Bohemia or Ratisbon, Davoust and Lefebvre should fall back on Ingolstadt or Donauwörth."-NAPOLEON's Instructions to BERTHIER, April 1, 1809; PELET, i. 212, 213. |