LVI. 1809. should come to take the command of the army; for, in CHAP. the interim, Berthier had brought it, by the confession of the French themselves, to the verge of destruction.* Instead of instantly following up the Emperor's instructions, by concentrating his forces at Ratisbon or Donauwörth, he scattered them, in spite of the remonstrances 1 Pelet, i. of Davoust and Massena, in the dangerous view of stop- 225, 230. ping the advance of the Austrians at all points. Nothing Jom. i. 159. but the tardiness of their opponents saved the French 100, 109. army from the most serious calamities.1 ן Stut. 66, 70. Koch, vi. dispersion the Aus April 16. But while Berthier dispersed his troops as if to render 25. them the more accessible to the blows of the Imperialists, Imprudent the Archduke moved forward with such slowness as if of his forces he desired to give them time to concentrate their forces and slow by Berthier, before he commenced his attack. They crossed the Inn advance of on the 10th at Braunau, Scharding, and other points, and trians. on the 16th they had only advanced as far as the Iser, a distance of twenty leagues. On the latter day they attacked the bridge of Landshut, over that river; and at the same time crossed over a division at Dingolfing, farther down its course, which threatened to cut off the communications of General Deroy, who commanded the Bavarians placed in garrison at Landshut, and obliged them to evacuate that important town. The whole line of the Iser was now abandoned by the Bavarians, who fell back in haste towards Neustadt and the forest of Dürnback; while the Austrians, in great strength, crossed that river at all points, and directed their steps on the great road to Nuremberg, evidently toward the bridges of Neustadt and Kehlheim, in order to make themselves masters of both banks of the Danube. In making this movement, the Archduke was acting on the principle which his campaign of 1796 had made him consider as an axiom, "that the possession of the two banks of the Danube from "The Emperor, on his road to the army," says Jomini, "felt the liveliest disquietude at the posture of affairs-Berthier had brought the army within a hair's-breadth of destruction."—JOMINI, iii. 159. LVI. 1809. 1 Jom. ii. CHAP. Ratisbon to Donauwörth, gave to any belligerent army in southern Germany the key of a certain victory." Yet even then, when their forces were concentrated, and 159, 160. greatly superior to those of the enemy as yet assembled, Stut, and when everything depended on rapidity of movement, Bign. viii. they advanced only two or three leagues a-day: so inveterate were the habits of tardiness and delay which characterise the German character.1 Pel. i. 225, 64, 72. 196. Thiers, x. 113, 114. 26. Faulty movements The approach of the formidable masses of the Austrians, however, fully a hundred and twenty thousand strong, of Berthier even though advancing with the pace of a tortoise, threw to arrest their pro gress. April 16. Berthier into an agony of indecision. It then evidently appeared how much the major-general of the army was indebted for the reputation he enjoyed to the directions of the Emperor; and how different a capacious talent for the management of details is, from the eagle glance which can direct the movements of the whole. Despite all his remonstrances, he compelled Davoust to concentrate his corps at Ratisbon, while at the very same moment, he ordered Massena to defend the line of the Lech-separating thus the two principal corps of the French army by at least thirty-five leagues from each other, and exposing the former, with his magnificent corps, the flower of the army, to be overwhelmed by the Archduke before any adequate reinforcements could be brought up to his support. Orders were at the same time given to Lefebvre, Wrede, and Oudinot, placing them in echelons, one behind another, across Bavaria, in so useless and absurd a position, that more than one of the marshals did not scruple to ascribe it to treachery-a charge, however, from which the whole character of Berthier, and the un221, 224. interrupted confidence he enjoyed from the Emperor, is Jom. ii. 159, sufficient to exculpate him. As it was, the scattered iv. 44, 54. position which he gave to the army over a line of forty 100, 114. leagues in extent, with numerous undefended apertures 120, 121. between the corps, was such, that a little more activity on the part of the Archduke would have exposed it to 2 Pelet, i. 240, 249. Thib. vii. 160. Sav. Koch, vi. Thiers, x. 2 certain destruction, and brought the Austrian columns CHAP. in triumph to the Rhine.* LVI. 1809. 27. of the Aus almost cuts army. Meanwhile the Archduke, notwithstanding the tardiness of his movements, was inundating Bavaria with his The advance troops. Hiller, on the left, had advanced to Mosburg, trians and was to move on Mainburg; Jellachich had occupied most cuts Munich, from whence the King of Bavaria hastily fled to French Stuttgard to meet Napoleon; on the right, Rosenberg had April 17. advanced to Eckmuhl; the two corps left in Bohemia had crossed the frontier, and were approaching by leisurely marches towards Ratisbon; while in the centre the Archduke himself, with four corps, seventy thousand strong, was drawing near to Abensberg, Neustadt, and Kehlheim, midway between Ratisbon and Donauwörth. Berthier had gone to the former town, where Davoust was stationed with sixty thousand men ; but it seemed next to impossible to extricate him from his perilous situation, as Massena was at Augsburg, thirty-five leagues to the south-west, and the centre of the Archduke was interposed, in appalling strength, right between them. The Bavarians under Lefebvre and Wrede, the Würtembergers under Vandamme, who had just come up, and a division of cuirassiers, were indeed in front of the Archduke around Neustadt; but they could with difficulty maintain their own ground, and were in no condition to extricate Davoust, who, threatened by a hundred thousand Austrians under Thib. vii. the Archduke on the south of the Danube, and forty Jom. ii. 160. thousand descending from Bohemia on the north, seemed Sav. iv. 44, destined for no other fate than that of Mack, four years x. 117. before, at Ulm.1 * "You cannot imagine," said Napoleon," in what a condition I found the army on my arrival, and to what dreadful reverses it was exposed, if we had had to deal with an enterprising enemy. I shall take care that I am not surprised again in such a manner." And to Berthier himself he wrote from Donauwörth, the moment he arrived on the 17th:-" What you have done appears so strange, that if I was not aware of your friendship I should think you were betraying me; Davoust is at this moment more completely at the disposal of the Archduke than of myself."-PELET, v. 248; THIBAUDEAU, Vii, 224; SAVARY, iv. 44; Kocн, vi. 114. 1 Pelet, i. 262, 263. 225, 226. Stut. 72, 80. 45. Thiers, CHAP. LVI. 28. instantly his army. Matters were in this critical state when Napoleon, early in the morning of the 17th, arrived at Donauwörth. 1809. Instantly he began inquiring of every one concerning the Napoleon position, destination, and movements of the Austrian concentrates corps; sent out officers in all directions to acquire accurate information; and next morning despatched the most pressing orders to Massena to hasten, at least with his advanced guard, consisting of Oudinot's corps, and his cavalry, to Pfaffenhofen, a considerable town, nearly halfway from Augsburg to the seat of war round Neustadt and Kehlheim.* Davoust, at the same time, received orders to move on the 18th in the direction of Neustadt, so as to form a junction with the Bavarians and Würtembergers, who had retired to that quarter before the Arch51. Pelet, i. duke Charles; so that in the next twenty-four hours these two marshals would be twenty leagues nearer each other, and, having the troops of the Confederation in the interval between them, might almost be said to be in communication.1 At the same time, dissembling his fears, the Emperor addressed to his soldiers a nervous proclamation, in 1 Sav. iv. 50, 263, 267. Thib. vii. 226, 227. Koch, vi. 124, 127. Thiers, x. 124. A * "It is indispensable that Oudinot with his corps, and your three other divisions, with your cuirassiers and cavalry, should sleep at Pfaffenhofen to-morrow night; those in the rear, who are still at Landsberg, should do their utmost to reach Aichach, or at least get on as far as they can on the road from Augsburg to Aichach. One word will explain to you the urgency of affairs. Prince Charles, with eighty thousand men, debouched yesterday from Landshut on Ratisbon; the Bavarians contended the whole day with his advanced guard. Orders have been despatched to Davoust to move with sixty thousand men in the direction of Neustadt, where he will form a junction with the Bavarians. To-morrow (19th) all your troops who can be mustered at Pfaffenhofen, with the Würtembergers, a division of cuirassiers, and every man you can collect, should be in a condition to fall on the rear of Prince Charles. single glance must show you that never was more pressing occasion for diligence and activity than at present. With sixty thousand good troops, Davoust may indeed make head against the Archduke; but I consider him ruined without resource, if Oudinot and your three divisions are not on his rear before daybreak on the 19th, and I look to you to inspire the soldiers with all they should feel on so momentous an occasion. The enemy is ruined without resource, if your corps and that of Oudinot debouch before day break on Pfaffenhofen, and fall on the rear of the Archduke. In the 18th, 19th, and 20th, the whole affairs of Germany will be decided." To this was added a postscript in the Emperor's own hand, “ Activité, vitesse. Je me recommande à vous."-NAPOLEON to MASSENA, Donauwörth, 18th April, 1809; SAVARY, iv. 51, 52; BIGNON, viii. 195. 66 which, loudly reproaching the Austrians with the commencement of hostilities, he promised to lead them to yet more glorious fields of fame.* CHAP. LVI. 1809. 29. of the two wards each Notwithstanding the pressing instance of the Emperor, and their own sense of the urgency of the case, Davoust Movements and Massena could not reach the places assigned to them armies toso early as he had anticipated, and the former, in conse- other. sequence, was exposed to the most imminent danger. The messenger ordering Davoust to draw towards the Lech had been despatched from Donauwörth at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and his instructions were to march forthwith on Ingolstadt; while Wrede with his Bavarians was stopped in his retreat at Neustadt, and ordered to concentrate with the Würtembergers, under Vandamme, behind the Abens. Davoust received his orders at midnight of the 17th, but his divisions were dispersed in the villages around Ratisbon, as well as in that town, and could not be instantly put in motion; April 18. while the bulk of Massena's forces, being six or eight leagues behind Augsburg, could not be concentrated till the night of the 18th, even at that town, or reach Pfaffenhofen till late on the following evening. Davoust, having collected his whole force during the 18th, commenced the evacuation of that town at daybreak on the following morning, and by mid-day on the 19th was April 19. already approaching Neustadt, leaving only a single regiment, three thousand strong, to guard the important bridge of Ratisbon. On the same day the Archduke divided the army which he commanded in person into two parts; and while he left the Archduke Louis and * "Soldiers! the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine has been violated. The Austrian general supposes that we are to fly at the sight of his eagles, and abandon our allies to his mercy. I arrive with the rapidity of lightning in the midst of you. Soldiers! I was surrounded by your bayonets when the Emperor of Austria arrived at my bivouac in Moravia; you heard him implore my clemency, and swear an eternal friendship. Conquerors in three wars, Austria has owed everything to our generosity; three times she has perjured herself! Our former successes are a sure guarantee for our future triumphs. Let us march, then, and at our aspect let the enemy recognise his conquerors."-Moniteur, 26th April 1809; and THIBAUDEAU, vii. 224. |