LVI. 1809. CHAP. Kienmayer with thirty thousand men at Siegenburg to watch the troops of the Confederation on the Abens, and Hiller with twenty thousand at Mainburg to observe Massena, he himself, with seventy thousand, consisting of the corps of Hohenzollern, Lichtenstein, and Rosenberg, moved towards Ratisbon, in hopes of making himself master of that important passage over the Danube during the absence of Davoust's corps. By this means he would at once gain possession of both banks of that river, and open up a secure communication with his two corps under Klenau, on its opposite bank. The worst was to be ap81. Sav. iv. prehended for Davoust, if, in the course of his march to vii. 226, Neustadt, he had encountered this formidable mass, mov281, 293. ing in a direction almost perpendicular to his flank, and not more than a few leagues distant. 1 Stut. 76, 1 50. Thib. 228. Pel. i. . Thiers, X. 125, 131. 30. ations. Its gers. The two armies crossed without the bulk of the forces meeting.1 Napoleon's plan was now clearly formed: it was to Napoleon's concentrate his whole army as rapidly as possible on the plan of oper: Abens; and, refusing his left, to throw his right, under great dan Massena, forward, so as to drive back Hiller and the Archduke Louis, and gain possession of the high-road to Landshut; separate altogether the Grand Army under the Archduke Charles from Jellachich, who were nearer the Alps, and force it up into the narrow space formed by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. He then hoped either to compel it to surrender, from the impossibility of finding an egress, if that town was still held by the French troops, or at least induce the sacrifice of its artillery and baggage in the confusion of defiling in front of a victorious army over the narrow bridge which that town commanded. But the execution of this plan was exceedingly hazardous, and in presence of an enterprising enemy might have led to fatal results. Abensberg was the vital point whoever reached it first in sufficient strength, gained the means of preventing the concentration of his adversary. Davoust, to reach his destination, required to traverse the defiles of Abach and Postsaal, CHAP. LVI. 1809. within two leagues of Abensberg, and this defile was much nearer the camp of the Archduke Charles on the 18th at Rohr, than the point from which Davoust set out from Ratisbon. Eighty thousand Austrians might with ease have occupied the important posts of Abensberg and Postsaal, which would have effectually barred the way to Davoust's corps, and thrown him back upon Ratisbon, and the cul-de-sac formed by the bend of the Danube, over which there was no other bridge-the very fate which Napoleon designed for the army of Prince Charles. When, therefore, instead of pushing on with an overwhelming force to this vital point, the Archduke Charles, when within a day's march of it, divided his army on the 18th, and bent his course, with the bulk of his forces, towards Ratisbon, now almost destitute of defenders, Napoleon had some reason to say that his star 286, 295. had not yet deserted him.1* 1 Jom. iii. Thib. vii. 164, 165, 227. Pel. i. between and Hohen Thaun. The covering troops of Davoust, however, encountered 31. and had a rude shock with those of the Archduke, near Actions the village of Thaun. St Hilaire and Friant had arrived Davoust on the heights of Saalhaupt and Tengen, where they were zollern at stationed in order to protect the French left, and cover the march of the remainder of the corps, with its artillery and trains, through the important defile of Postsaal, when the skirmishers of Hohenzollern appeared in sight, whose province in like manner was to cover the left of the Napoleon's plans at this critical juncture are clearly developed in the letter which he wrote to Massena at twelve o'clock noon on the 19th. "Prince Charles, with his whole army, was this morning a day's march from Ratisbon, having his base and communications on Landshut. Davoust has evacuated Ratisbon to move upon Neustadt, and join the Bavarians: I look, therefore, for an affair every minute; nevertheless, it is now noon, and I have not heard the cannon. You will perceive at a glance that I am keeping back my left to throw forward my right, which you form, and which to-day should enter into action. Push Oudinot forward to Neustadt. From thence I shall probably direct the 4th corps to Landshut; and then Prince Charles, attacked on his left, will find he has lost his line of operations upon the Iser. Everything will be cleared up to-day; the moments are precious; hours must be counted. Twelve or fifteen thousand of such rabble as you have defeated this morning, should be easily disposed of by six thousand of our people."-NAPOLeon to Massena, 19th April 1809; Pelet, i. 285, 286. April 19. LVI. 1809. CHAP. Austrian army, and secure their march to Ratisbon. Fresh troops were successively brought up by either party as the day advanced, and before the evening twenty thousand men were engaged on both sides. The combat soon became extremely warm; some woods on the field were successively taken and retaken, and the greatest valour was mutually displayed. At length a violent thunder-storm, which came on at six o'clock, separated the combatants, after each had sustained a loss of three thousand men, without either being able to boast of a decisive advantage. But although both retained their positions, yet as the French, under cover of their resistance at this point, succeeded in passing unmolested 300. Stut. through the important defile, and before nightfall reached the vital point of Abensberg, overthrowing in their course a small Austrian column under Thierry, they with reason claimed the victory.1 ' Pel. i. 294, 84,89. Jom. iii. 165. Thiers, x. 133, 139. 32. armies on the night of the 19th. Reassured as to the security of his centre by the Positions junction thus effected by Davoust with the Bavarians of the two under Lefebvre, Napoleon resolved to commence a vigorous offensive, and by advancing his right against Landshut, both threaten the Archduke's communications, and throw him back into the net prepared for him by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. Early on the morning of the 19th, before this bloody combat commenced on the banks of the Danube at Thaun, Massena had encountered a body of five thousand infantry and cavalry at Pfaffenhofen, and defeated it in a few minutes, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. In the course of the day, he had concentrated all his corps at that place: Oudinot. was at Freising, with his light troops stretching along the Iser, so as to intercept all communication between the Archduke and his left wing at Munich the corps of Davoust was grouped in the villages to the French left of Abensberg while Lefebvre, Wrede, and Vandamme, with the troops of the Confederation, were at Abensberg, Neustadt, and Biburg. Thus the whole French army, at LVI. 1809. length concentrated in a line of ten leagues broad, was in a CHAP. condition to take part in any common operations on the following day. The Austrian troops were assembled in the space formed by the Iser as a base, and the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon as a curve; Lichtenstein was at Eglofsheim, Rosenberg at Dinzling, Hohenzollern at Hausen, and the remainder on the line of the Abens, in the villages from Mainburg on the south to the neighbourhood of Abensberg on the north; but their principal masses were grouped around Eckmuhl. They were less prepared than the French, however, for a decisive affair on the morrow, being spread over a surface at least sixteen leagues in extent; and what was still worse, the great mass under the Archduke was separated, by an unoccupied space four leagues in breadth, from the corps of General Hiller at Mainburg and that of the Archduke Jom. iii. Louis at Siegenburg on the Abens; and two powerful Pel. i. 305, corps under Klenau were uselessly lost on the bank of the Danube, where there was not an oppose them.1 1 164, 165. 306. Stut. northern 90, 92. Koch, vi. enemy to 149. address to Being well aware, from the position of the respec- 33. tive armies, that a decisive affair was at hand, Napoleon Napoleon's adopted the generous, and at the same time prudent the German policy, of combating in person at the head of the troops confede of the Confederation, leaving the native French to their inherent valour, their experienced skill, and the direction of their veteran marshals. He repaired to the head-April 20. quarters of their commanders, and, according to custom, visited at daybreak the bivouacs of the troops, which he traversed from right to left along their whole extent, accompanied only by the officers and generals of the Bavarians. He was received with the loudest acclamations, and a transport rivalling that of his own veteran soldiers; so contagious is the feeling of military ardour, and so winning was the confidence with which the mighty conqueror threw himself on the support of his new allies. Clapping the prince-royal of Bavaria on the shoulder, he LVI. 1809. CHAP. exclaimed, when the inspection was finished-" Well, prince-royal, this is the way in which one must be King of Bavaria; when your turn comes, all the world will follow you if you do the same: but if you remain at home, every one will go to sleep; farewell to empire and glory." To the Würtembergers, at the same time, he spoke of the glories they had acquired while combating the Austrians in the wars of the Great Frederick; and of the laurels which they had won in the last campaign in Silesia. These words, translated into German by their respective officers, excited great enthusiasm, which was soon raised to the very highest pitch by the proclamation to the troops, in which the Emperor declared that, without any French to aid them, he was to combat that day at their head, and announced a glorious destiny to their countries.* countries.* Perceiving that the spirit of the troops was now roused to the highest point, the Emperor gave the signal to engage.1 1 Sav. iv. 49. Thib. vii. 229, 231. Pel. ii. 8, 10. Thiers, x. 143. 34. Position and forces ties. April 20. Atlas, Notwithstanding, however, the deserved confidence which he placed in the German troops, Napoleon did not of the par- trust the result of the day exclusively to their exertions. Lannes, who the day before had joined the army from Saragossa, was intrusted with the command of two French divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drawn from Davoust's corps, which formed the left of the centre, under Napoleon's immediate command, and was to advance on the great road from Kehlheim to Landshut; the Würtembergers, under Vandamme, and part of the Bavarians under Lefebvre, were in the centre, close to Abensberg, and were to assail Kirchdorf; the remainder of the Bavarians on the right, directly opposite to Biburg and * "Bavarians! I do not come among you as the Emperor of the French, but as Chief of the Confederation of the Rhine and protector of your country. You combat to-day alone against the Germans; not a single Frenchman is to be seen in the first line; they are only in reserve, and the enemy are not aware of their presence. I place entire confidence in your valour. I have extended the limits of your country; but I now see that I have not done enough. Hereafter, I will render you so great, that, to sustain a war against Austria, you will no longer have need of my assistance. Two hundred years |