LVI. 1809. 39. capture of Ratisbon by the Austrians. both claimed the victory. But, as the operations of Davoust were intended rather as a feint than a serious attack, and they had completely the desired effect of preventing any reinforcements being sent from the centre to the left wing under Hiller, then in the act of being crushed by the overwhelming legions of the Emperor, the French with reason claimed the advantage. While these important events were shaking the AusAttack and trian left wing and centre, the Archduke Charles with Lichtenstein's corps, was pressing the attack on Ratisbon. That town, commanding the only stone bridge over the Danube below Ulm, and opening up a direct communication with the two Austrian corps on its northern bank, was at all times a point of consequence. But it had now become, unknown to the Austrians, of incalculable importance, as affording the only line of retreat for the army, when its communication with the Inn was cut off April 20. by the capture of Landshut, and the alarming progress of the Emperor on the left. Fully sensible of the value of such an acquisition, the Archduke, as soon as Davoust had left the town, ordered Kollowrath to attack it on the northern, and Lichtenstein on the southern side. The former quickly obeyed his orders, and appeared on the 19th in great strength in the villages at the northern extremity of the bridge, which were carried by assault. Soon after, a dense column burst open the gates, and advanced by the great street to the northern end of the bridge; but, being there stopped by the palisades, and severely galled by a cross-fire from the houses, it was obliged to retire after sustaining a severe loss. In the afternoon, however, Lichtenstein, with the advanced guard of the grand Austrian army, approached from the southern side, and attempts were made by the French garrison to destroy the bridge. But that solid structure, the work of the Romans, composed of large blocks of stone strongly cemented by Pozzuolo cement, was still, after having stood for seventeen hundred years, so firm, LVI. that it resisted all attempts at demolition by ordinary CHAP. implements; and the powder of the garrison was so much exhausted, that they had not the means of blowing 1809. it up. Deeming resistance impracticable, and having nearly expended his ammunition, the French colonel surrendered at discretion. Thus were the successes in the shock of these two redoubtable antagonists in some degree balanced; for, if the French had gained possession of Landshut, and the communications of the Grand Austrian army with Vienna, they had lost Ratisbon, the key to both banks of the Danube; and, if they had five 120. Pel. ii. thousand prisoners to exhibit, taken in the combats of 24,32. Jom. Abensberg and Landshut, the Austrians could point with vii. 232. exultation to the unusual spectacle of an entire regiment, nearly three thousand strong, with its eagle and standards, 159, 160. which had fallen into their hands.1 1 Stut. 114, ii. 169. Thib. Koch, vi. 153, 154. Thiers, x. Matters were now evidently approaching a crisis 40. between the Archduke and Napoleon, and both these able Preparatory generals concentrated their forces, to engage in it with on both advantage. Conceiving that the French Emperor was at a distance, following up his successes against Hiller, the Austrian general resumed the movement towards Neustadt, which he had so unhappily abandoned three days before, and having brought Kollowrath, with his whole corps, over to the southern bank of the Danube, concentrated eighty thousand men between Abensberg and Ratisbon; Bellegarde, with his corps, above twentyfive thousand strong, was so far removed, without any assignable reason, that he could not approach nearer on that day to the scene of action than Stadt-am-Hoff, at the northern end of the bridge of Ratisbon. The eighty thousand men, however, whom he had assembled, would in all probability have been able to make head against all the forces which Napoleon could bring against them, were it not that, instead of grouping them together in one field, the Archduke moved Kollowrath and Lichtenstein, forty thousand strong, on the great road to Neu movements sides. LVI. 1809. CHAP. stadt, by the defile of Abach, which Davoust had previously traversed, throwing thus the weight of his forces against the French left, and intending to menace their rear and communications, in the same way as they had done with the Austrian left, by the capture of Landshut. But Napoleon was in too great strength to be disquieted by such a demonstration, and leaving only a curtain of light cavalry under Montbrun to retard the advance of the Austrians in that direction, he concentrated all his forces to bear down upon their centre at ECKMUHL and Laichling, the scene of such obstinate fighting on the preceding day. At daybreak on the 22d the Emperor set out from Landshut. He had sent on during the night the Wurtembergers, the corps of Lannes, and the cuirassiers of Nansouty and St Suplice, and he now took with him 125. Pel. ii. the greater part of Massena's and Oudinot's corps and the ii. 173, 174. cuirassiers of Espagne. Thus one-half of the Archduke's army, under Rosenberg and Hohenzollern, not forty thousand strong, was to be exposed to the blows of above 162, 165. seventy-five thousand French, flushed with victory, and led on by the Emperor in person. 1 Stut. 115, 59, 75. Jom. Sav. iv. 53. Koch, vi. 162, 166. Thiers, X. 41. of the field of battle. Atlas, 1 * The Austrians, waiting for the arrival of Kollowrath's Description corps from the north of the Danube, were not in a condition to prosecute their offensive movement against the French left, till after mid-day. They had arrived at the defile of Abach, however, and were driving the light troops of Montbrun before them, when a loud cannonade on the extreme left announced the arrival of the Emperor on that weakly guarded part of the line. As they arrived on the top of the hills of Lintach, which separate the valley of the Iser from that of the Laber, the French, who came up from Landshut, beheld the field of battle stretched out like a map before them. From the marshy * Bessières was to pursue Hiller and the Archduke Louis with the French division of Molitor (detached from Massena's corps), the Bavarian one of Wrede, and a brigade of French light and German heavy cavalry. Boudet's division (Massena's corps), and Tharreau's (Oudinot's) were left in reserve behind Landshut, where the Guards soon after arrived from Spain. LVI. 1809. meadows which bordered the shores of the Laber, rose a CHAP. succession of hills, one above another, in the form of an amphitheatre, with their slopes cultivated and diversified by hamlets, and beautiful forests clothing the higher ground. The villages of Eckmuhl and Laichling, separated by a large copsewood, appeared in view, with the great road to Ratisbon winding up the acclivities behind them. The meadows were green with the first colours of spring; the osiers and willows which fringed the streams that intersected them were just bursting into leaf; and the trees which bordered the roadside already cast an agreeable shade upon the dusty and beaten highway which lay beneath their boughs. The French soldiers involuntarily paused as they arrived at the summit, to gaze on this varied and interesting scene; but soon other emotions than those of admiration of nature swelled the breasts of the warlike multitude who thronged to the spot. In the intervals of these woods artillery was to be seen; amidst those villages standards were visible; and long white lines, with the glancing of helmets and bayonets on the higher ground, showed the columns of Rosenberg and Hohenzollern already in battle array, in very advantageous positions, on the opposite side of the valley. Joyfully the French troops descended into the low grounds; while the Emperor galloped to the front, and, hastily surveying 1 Pel. ii. 76, the splendid but intricate scene, immediately formed his 77. plan of attack.1 Eckmuhl. The plan of Napoleon was to cut the Austrians off 42. from their whole remaining communications with the Iser Battle of and Inn, and, by throwing them back upon Ratisbon and April 22. Bohemia as their only line of retreat, sever them entirely from the support and protection of Vienna. With this view he began the action, advancing his right in great strength under Lannes, who commanded the divisions Gudin and Morand, belonging to Davoust's corps, who soon, crossing the Laber, commenced a furious attack LVI. 1809. CHAP. upon the Austrian left, under Hohenzollern, which his great superiority of force enabled him to turn and drive back. At the same time the Würtembergers were brought up to the attack of Eckmuhl in the centre; but the tremendous fire of the Austrian batteries at that point so shattered their ranks, that, though repeatedly brought again to the charge by their French officers, they were always repulsed, and sustained a very heavy loss. Finding that the village could not be carried by an attack in front, Lannes detached the division Gudin, which assailed in flank the guns that protected it: this rendered it necessary to draw back the artillery, or point them in another direction; and, aided by this diversion, the Würtembergers at length dislodged their antagonists from this important post. At the same time Davoust, on the French left, resumed the offensive, on the left bank of the Laber, and, by a vigorous effort, made himself master of Unter and Ober Laichling, and the woods which adjoin them, so as to prevent the enemy from drawing any support from that quarter to the left, which was principally menaced. The corps of Rosenberg, placed on the high grounds between Eckmuhl and Laichling, was now hard pressed, being assailed by the Würtembergers under Vandamme, who issued from the former village on the one side, and the victorious troops of Davoust, who debouched with loud shouts from the latter on the other. But these brave men, fronting both ways, presented an invincible resistance to the enemy; the repeated charges of the Stut, 139 Bavarian horse against their guns were baffled by the 79,85. Jom. valour of the Austrian cuirassiers; and the battle wore a vii. 334. doubtful aspect in that quarter, when intelligence arrived that Lannes had made himself master of a battery of sixteen guns on the left, after sabring the cannoneers, who gloriously fell beside their pieces.1 145. Pel. ii. ii. 174. Thib. Koch, vi. 168, 170. Thiers, x. 167, 170. Rightly supposing that the Archduke would suspend his attack on the right, in consequence of this check on the left, against which the constantly increasing masses |