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LVI.

1809.

52.

the Bava

Hiller.

April 24.

sustained under the direction of his lieutenants, that CHAP. the invincible veterans of the republic were fast wearing out, that the conscripts of the empire possessed no superiority over the now improved and invigorated armies Defeat of by which they were opposed, and that the successes, rians by where he in person commanded, were owing to the talent of his combinations or the terrors of his name. Hiller, who had retired to the Inn after the disaster of Landshut, finding that he was not pursued by the French troops, and having ascertained that Napoleon had diverged with the bulk of his forces in another direction, deemed it a favourable opportunity to take vengeance on the Bavarians, by whom he had been somewhat incautiously pursued, for the losses which he had experienced. Having collected some small reinforcements on the Inn, and divided his troops, about thirty thousand strong, into three columns, he remeasured his steps, and suddenly attacked the Bavarians under WREDE, who, along with the division of Molitor, both under the orders of Bessières, were advancing beyond the defile of Neumarkt, and had taken post on the heights in front of St Verti. The Bavarians made at first a stout resistance, but, being outnumbered and outflanked, they were soon driven back; and though Molitor came up to support them with some regiments of his division, they too were compelled to retreat, and sustained a considerable loss. Before night the French and their allies were driven entirely off the field, with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. But the intelligence which Hiller received 1 Stut. 172, in the night of the battle of Eckmuhl, and the retreat of 176. Jom. the Archduke upon Ratisbon, induced him to halt in the Pel. ii. 166, career of victory, and remeasure his steps to the Inn, in x. 237, 239. order to cover the approach to Vienna.1

A disaster of a still more serious description was sustained about the same period, by the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, in the Italian plains. On the same day on which the Archduke Charles crossed the Inn, his brother,

iii. 178.

170. Thiers,

LVI.

1809.

53.

operations

duke John

in Italy.

Atlas,

CHAP. the Archduke John, passed the mountain frontier of the kingdom of Italy with two corps numbering about fortyeight thousand men, and after defiling over the Isonzo at Successful Caporetto, and going through Udine, poured down on of the Arch- the Italian plains, and took post in front of Passeriano, already famous in the diplomacy of Napoleon.* The Viceroy had above forty-five thousand men to oppose the Plate 11. invader; but they were much scattered, in great part of Italian extraction, and could hardly be relied upon to withstand the shock of Transalpine forces. This inferiority speedily appeared in the first actions of the campaign. Eugene fell back across the Tagliamento, and established his headquarters at SACILE. The Austrians, two days after, came up in great force, and at Pordenone surprised the 35th French regiment, which, with its eagle and four pieces of cannon, fell into the enemy's hands. Stung to the quick by this disgrace, and fearful of the effect of any further retreat upon the spirit of his troops, the Viceroy determined to hold firm and give battle to 1 Erz. Johan. the enemy. Orders accordingly were given for the whole Pel. iii. 141, army to suspend its retreat, and retrace its steps, on the x. 186, 198. 15th; and on the day following he made an attack on the Imperialists between Sacile and Pordenone.1

April 14.

Feld. 44, 52.

152. Thiers,

54.

Beauharnais

at Sacile. April 16.

The field of battle, which lay between Vigo-Nuova and Total defeat Porcia, on the gentle slopes where the Alps of Roveredo of Eugene melt into the Italian plains, was singularly favourable for the operations of cavalry, in which arm the Austrians had considerably the advantage. So little did they anticipate, however, an attack, that at the moment when it commenced, the Archduke John was engaged in hearing mass at Pordenone, and one of his corps was considerably in the rear. The best dispositions, however, which circumstances would admit, were made to repel the enemy; and as the troops in the rear successively came up, they were passed on to the plain of Vigo-Nuova, on the Austrian right, so as to menace the communication between Eugene

*Ante, Chap. XXVI. § 3.

LVI.

1809.

and the bridge of Sacile. The combat was very warm, CHAP. and in the first instance, before the corps of Giulay came up, Prince Eugene had the advantage. At the villages of Palse and Porcia, on the French right, in particular, which were repeatedly taken and retaken, a frightful carnage took place. Gradually, however, the Austrians, who had outflanked the left of their opponents, cooped up their line within very narrow limits; and at length it was driven into the space between Fontana- Fredda and Porcia, which did not exceed two miles in breadth. Fearful of the consequences of any disaster upon troops confined within such narrow limits, Eugene gave the signal to retreat, which was effected at first by squares in echelon, which arrested their pursuers by alternate volleys as on a review day. But at the passage of some small streams and marshes, they fell into disorder, which was soon augmented by the intelligence that seven thousand men of the Austrian reserve had passed them, and already occupied Sacile. The left wing and part of the centre had already crossed the Livenza there, but the right wing was cut off, and had to pass lower down by the narrow bridge and miserable cross-roads of Brugnera. The whole army upon this fell into confusion,-horse, foot, and cannon became blended together in frightful disorder, and fled towards the Adige, without either direction or further attempt at resistance. The approach of night alone saved them from Feld. 44, 52. a total overthrow; but as it was, they lost four thousand 163. Jom. killed and wounded, and an equal number of prisoners, besides fifteen pieces of cannon; while the Austrians had x. 199, 204. not to lament the loss of half the number.1

1 Erz.Johan.

Pel. iii. 141,

iii. 179, 180.

Stut. 164,

169. Thiers,

55.

effects of this victory

This important victory in the outset of the campaign was likely to prove decisive, as that of Magnano in 1799 Important had been,* of the fate of Italy, and would have been attended with not less material results upon the general issue of the war, had its effects not been obliterated, and campaign. the career of success in the plains of Lombardy arrested,

* Ante, Chap. XXVII. § 36.

on the

Italian

LVI.

1809.

CHAP by the rapid and overwhelming advance of Napoleon to Vienna. As it was, however, and even though the Archduke John was far from following up his successes with the vigour which might have been expected, the results of the battle were in the highest degree important. Eugene, reinforced by a division of infantry and one of cavalry which he had left near Verona, succeeded in at length reorganising his army, and took post behind the fortified line of the Adige, already immortalised in the campaigns of Napoleon. The Archduke, though obliged to send a division to observe Marmont in Dalmatia, and considerably weakened by the necessity of making large detachments to mask Venice and PalmaNuova, in which the enemy had large garrisons, followed his retreating adversary, and took post, with thirty thousand excellent troops, in the famous position of Caldiero, a few miles from Verona. But the spirit of the two armies was essentially changed; the Italians, depressed and weakened by defeat, felt the old superiority of the Transmontane forces, and were prepared to fall back, as in the time of Suwarroff, to the furthest verge of the Italian peninsula; while the Austrians, roused to the highest degree by their early success, confidently anticipated a repetition of 1 Erz. Johan, the glories of Novi and the Trebbia. But the anticipations Pel. iii. 163, of both parties were traversed by the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the valley of the Danube, which soon rendered necessary the concentration of the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the capital.1*

Feld. 53, 57.

167. Stut.

179, 182.

Jom. iii. 180, 181.

Thus, though Napoleon's successes had been great on the Bavarian plains, he had by no means gained any decided advantage: his armies had been routed or run the most imminent hazard, wherever he did not command in person; and disasters which would have been

*

In the order of time, the war in the Tyrol should be treated of immediately after the opening of the campaign in Italy: but the vast moral importance of that contest, as well as its romantic character, require a separate chapter; and it will be treated of in a following one, before that which narrates the battle of Wagram.

LVI.

1809.

56.

the commencement of the cam

Allies.

decisive in any other warfare had been experienced by CHAP. his lieutenants on the Italian frontier. It was evident that the forces of the contending parties were approaching to an equality: the wonted vehemence of the Repub- Hopeswhich lican armies had disappeared when led by the marshals of France; the Austrians had clearly proved their supe- paign affordriority to the allies who swelled the columns of their ed to the adversaries; and it was the consummate talents, overwhelming force, and paralysing renown of Napoleon, that alone still chained victory to the standards of the Grand Army where he commanded in person. Reversing the principles of both parties in the contest, the fortunes of France had come to depend on the genius of a single man; the pyramid rested on its apex: driven by necessity to a more enlarged policy, Austria was reaping the fruits of popular enthusiasm, and successfully combating the revolution with the arms which itself had created. The aristocratic power, generally successful, failed only from the want of a leader adequate to the encounter of the popular hero; the democratic, elsewhere defeated, prevailed through the extraordinary abilities of one man. Such a state of matters might promise little for present success, but it was pregnant with hope for future deliverance. Great as may be the ascendancy, unbounded the activity of a single leader, they cannot, in the long run, compensate general disaster; and, in all prolonged contests, that power is ultimately destined to victory which, appealing to principles that find a responsive echo in the human heart, rests upon the organised and directed efforts of the many, rather than the abilities, how splendid soever, of the few.

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