er. I mean whatever are not furnished forth by our own means, but which are in existence already, as witnesses, torture, deeds, and all of this kind; by artificial, such as may be got up by means of the system, and by our own talents. So that as regards these, we have to employ the one class, to discover the other. Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species: some consist in the character of the speaker; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove the point. 4. i. Cha- [Persuasion is effected] by means of the moral characracter of ter, when the speech shall have been spoken in such the speaka way as to render the speaker worthy confidence : for we place confidence in the good to a wider extent, and with less hesitation, on all subjects generally; but on points where no real accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we even entirely confide in them. This feeling, however, should arise by means of the speech, and not by reason of its having been preconceived that the speaker is a certain kind of man. For it is not true, as some treatise-mongers lay down in their systems, of the probity of the speaker, that it contributes nothing to persuasion; but moral character nearly, I may say, carries with it the most sove5. ii. Feel- reign efficacy in making credible2. [Persuasion is ings of the effected] through the medium of the hearers, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way; about which means of persuasion alone, I declare that the auditor. 1 Πίστεις διὰ τοῦ λόγου, or artificial, of three kinds, ἐν τῷ ἠθεῖ τοῦ λέγοντος—ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴς διαθεῖναί πίος—ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ. 2 In so high estimation did Menander hold the manner of an address, that he attributed the whole effect to it ;-TpóroS ἔσθ ̓ ὁ πείθων τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος. And as Plutarch observes upon this line, καὶ τρόπος μὲν οὖν καὶ λόγος· ἢ ΤΡΟΠΟΣ LIA AUTOY. De Audiend. Poet. t. i. Op. Mor. p. 125. edit. Wyttenb. system-mongers of the present day busy themselves. On the subject of these, however, some light will be afforded, when I speak on the subject of the passions. self. shoot of Men give credit from the force of what is said, 6. iii. The when out of the means of persuasion which attach to speech iteach subject, we evince the truth, or that which appears so. Now as persuasion is effected by these 7. Rhetomeans, it is plain that it will be the privilege of him ric an offwho is able to draw inferences syllogistically, and to Dialectics take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the and Polivirtues, and thirdly of the passions, both what each tics. of the passions is, of what nature it is, and from what causes it is engendered, and how : so that the fact is, that rhetoric is, as it were, a kind of off-shoot of logic, and of that department of moral philosophy which it is fair to call the science of social life3. Whence rhetoric is invested with the costume of that science, as well as its professors, partly from inexperience, partly arrogance, and in part from other human causes; because, as I stated at the outset, it is a sort of subordinate division of logic, and portraiture of it; neither of them being a science of any one definite 3 ПoλTIKη. For an explanation of this term-an enumeration of the various arts which he comprehends under it-and for an account of the estimation in which he holds it, see Ethics, lib. i. c. 2. 'YOdUETAL. So blind are men to this affectation of rhetoric and its professors, that he who, having had no occasion for the display of his persuasive powers, other than the ordinary course of affairs presents, would be accused of great arrogance were he to talk of having exercised rhetoric. Now Aristotle, so far from holding a person guilty of presumption for such an use of the term, would rather retort on the accuser the charge of ignorance of its true import. For with a view to invest their art, and of consequence themselves, with an air of dignity, the professors of rhetoric, said he, would have the world think (some of them, poor creatures, di' àraidevσíav) that it was applicable exclusively to such cases as are of high concernment to society. This in part is true; rhetoric is Taρapuès τns Пorias: but, as Majoragius observes, "Virgulta magnam quidem cum arboribus quibus adnascuntur habent similitudinem, et rerum naturam redolent. Sed tamen multo sunt infenora, neque tam uberes fructus ferunt." So far prevalent is this notion to this very day, that we only apply this word by way of ridicule to persuasion on ordinary topics. 8. Subdivision of πίστεις, ἐν 9. Example. subject, as to what may be its nature; but both being certain faculties for furnishing ourselves with arguments. Now on the subject of the powers of the two, and their mutual relation, nearly enough has been said. With regard to means of persuading by proving, or appearing to prove your point, just as in logic one iv auT is induction, another syllogism, another apparent sylToy logism, so also is the case here in rhetoric; for its i. Enthymem, ii. example is an induction, its enthymem a syllogism; Example. and enthymem I call rhetorical syllogism; example, rhetorical induction. Now all orators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. So that if it be incumbent on you to prove with regard to any thing or person in form of syllogism or induction, it cannot but be (as is evident from Analytics) that each of these will be essentially the same as each of the former (enthymem and induction). And what the difference is between example and enthymem is plain from the Topics, where, on the subject of syllogism and induction, it has been stated before, that the proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases, is called in the other art, induction; in this, example. But when, certain points having been granted, there results, by virtue of these, something else over and above these, by virtue of their existence, either as generals or particulars; this process is, in that art, called syllogism; 10. Vari- in this, enthymem". Rhetoric, it is plain, enjoys each ous styles of speak- advantage; for [with respect to it] the case, in this treatise, is the same as in the Methodica has been stated of logic; the speeches of orators abounding, some in examples, others in enthymems; and orators themselves being in the same way, some fond of example, others of enthymem. Reasonings, however Definition of Syllogism. ing. Or, each style of rhetoric has its peculiar advantage. 6 'PηTopɛía, the words of an orator, modelled according to rhetoric, whose object it is to persuade; versus, óyos, the words of a logician, modelled according to logic, whose object it is to convince. siders the not an in conducted through the medium of example, are not less calculated to persuade; but those of which enthymem is the characteristic are rather applauded". But I will hereafter explain what is the cause of this, and how we are to use each species of proof: let us, at present, distinguish more clearly respecting these proofs themselves. Now forasmuch as that which 11. Rhe carries persuasion with it, does so in reference to toric consome one; and either is, immediately on being enun- dvor ciated, actually of a nature to persuade, and enforce for a class, belief; or [has its effect] from its appearing to prove dividual, through the medium of such [as compose the former class]; and as no art considers particular cases; medicine for example, what is wholesome for the individuals, Socrates or Callias, but what is so for any person of such a constitution; for this question comes within the province of art, but particulars are infinite, and cannot be known: so neither will rhetoric consider probability in reference to particular individuals; what, for instance, is probable to Socrates or Callias, but that which is so to persons such as they are; just in the same way as logic, for that art does not draw conclusions indiscriminately from any subjects; for some things there are which appear probable even to a madman; [yet you never would dream of arguing about them;] but it supplies itself from subjects and draws its supwhich require reasoning, as does rhetoric from subplies from jects which are usual matters of deliberation. Its subjects of business then is respecting points about which we de- deliberaliberate, and have no art specially conversant, and 12. Audibefore auditors of such abilities as are not able to take ence held a connected view of reasonings, conducted through 7 Оopußouvтaι. Twining, in his notes on the Poetic, quoting a subsequent passage of this Treatise, in which this word again occurs, (ii. 23,) translates it," are applauded," and observes, that "the commentators strangely mistake the sense of this word here, and in lib. i. c. 2. They render it absurdly,vehementius percellunt—perturbant maxime. Whether an audience be pleased or displeased, to any great degree, noise is equally the consequence; and the word Jopußeiv is used, sometimes for the uproar of approbation, and sometimes for that of dislike tion. to be ἁπλοί. 13. Hence concluding K συλλελο πρότε being many stages, nor to deduce an argument from remote principles. Now we deliberate on subjects which appear to admit of having themselves in either of two ways: for on questions which cannot, under any circumstances, past, present, or future, be otherwise; on these, I say, no one deliberates, at least not while he apprehends them to be such; for by such a deliberation nothing is gained. And you may draw your conclusions and inferences, sometimes from premises which you have arrived at by former syllogisms; and Yoμivo sometimes from propositions, not syllogistically deρου, duced, but requiring such a process by reason of their lengthy, not being probable at first sight; but of these processes, it is impossible that the former should not be hard to follow up, by reason of its prolixity (for your Mèv deμé- hearer9 is supposed to be a man of merely ordinary understanding), and the latter defective in persuasive efficacy, by reason of its not being deduced out of principles either acknowledged, or probable; so that it is necessary that both the enthymem and example should be conversant about points which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise, (the example answering to induction, and the enthymem to syllo and νων δὲ συλλο- 8 A man under a mistaken idea of the nature of the subject may possibly deliberate on a question, the nature of which is fixed and necessary. Still, however, as long as he remains under this impression, the subject relatively to him is of a contingent nature. Cicero gives a similar caution :-" Hæc nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda quæ non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinantur." De Orat. lib. ii. We may further prove that this precept has its foundation in nature, by quoting the words of a celebrated modern writer, who, at least in penetration and knowledge of mankind, had few superiors: "The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense quantum sufficit; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House; throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface." Lord Chesterfield's Letters. |