being on the eve of taking place, or as having hap pened, men make it appear to be close at hand 15. Likewise things which have just taken place, or quickly about to do so, have on this very account a 16. greater tendency to excite pity. Also the indications and actions of persons; for instance, the garments 15 of those who have suffered, and other things of that sort. And the expressions of those under suffering, for instance, of those already in act of dying. And especially is it a circumstance to move pity, that while in these crises the persons have borne themselves virtuously 16. For all these circumstances produce pity in a higher degree from its appearing near; also, the fact of the person's being unworthy, and his disaster appearing in view before our eyes.

of it.

CHAP. IX.

Of Indignation.

way

1. Indig- To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which nation op- men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at unposed to pity. deserved misfortune, is opposed in a certain the Definition feeling pain at undeserved good fortune, and it originates in the same disposition; and these feelings 2. are both those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathize with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate; for whatever happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute even of

15 Witness the effect of Antony's display of the robe of Cæsar stained with his blood. Julius Cæsar.

16 Illustrated in the effect produced by Polyxena s resignation and anxiety to preserve, even in death, the decorum of female delicacy:

ἡ δὲ καὶ θνήσκουσ', ὅμως πολλὴν πρόνοιαν εἶχεν ευσχήμως πεσεῖν, κρύπτουσ ̓, ἃ κρύπτειν ὄμματ ̓ ἀρσένων χρεών. Eurip Hecuba, 563.

the gods'. It should seem, too, that envy stands 3. Envy opposed to pity in the same way, as appearing to be opposed to pity. akin to, and in fact the same thing as, indignation; and yet it really is distinct. For envy is also a pain Definition causing agitation, it also is felt at good fortune, not, of it. however, at the good fortune of the undeserving [only], but of equals and fellows. The feeling, however, in all cases equally [of envy and of indignation], must exist [in the breasts of those affected by it], not because any difference will be likely to accrue to themselves, but on account of their neighbour, solely as regards himself. For no longer will the one feeling be envy, and the other indignation, but fear, should the pain and agitation exist on this account, viz. because some evil will probably result to themselves from the good fortune of the other.

4. Oppo

site feelings are

conse

these

But it is plain that opposite feelings will be consequent on these passions: for he who feels pain at those who are undeservedly unfortunate, will feel pleasure, or at least be unaffected by pain, at those quent on who are unfortunate under different circumstances3: emotions. for instance, no good man would feel pain about parricides and murderers when they meet with punishment; since we ought to feel joy at such occurrences; and so in the case of those who are deservedly fortunate; for both are instances of justice, and cause the good man to rejoice, since it must be that he has a hope that what has been realized to his equal, will 5. Both be realized also to himself, and these are all feelings

1 Thus Herodotus attributes the turn in the fortunes of Croesus to his having incurred the divine indignation :-MɛTÀ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον· ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑωυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὀλβιώταTOV. Herodotus, i. 34.

The envious and indignant have this in common, viz. the good fortune of their neighbour, as the object of their respect. ive passions; and the absence of any apprehension as to the degree in which their own circumstances may be affected by such good fortune; for the moment they begin to calculate the probability of any detriment arising to themselves therefrom, the feeling, ceasing to be any longer envy or indignation, will have become fear.

That is, deservedly.

are useful to repress pity.

6. Persons who excite in

dignation.

of the same disposition; and their opposites, of the opposite dispositions. Since the same man who exults in misfortune is also envious; for any who feels pain at the accession and acquisition of any good, that person necessarily must rejoice when that good is in act of being withdrawn and lost. On which

account these feelings are all of them obstacles to pity; but, among themselves, they differ for the foregoing reasons, so that all are alike available with a view to render a thing not an object of pity.

On the subject of indignation, then, let us first state who the persons are with whom men feel indignant, the occasions on which, and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions; then, after these, 7 of other points. But the subject will be plain from what has already been said; for if indignation be a feeling pain on a man's appearing to be undeservedly fortunate, it will be evident in the first place that it is not possible to feel indignation in the case of every good. For there is no one who, if another be just, or brave, or shall make acquisitions of virtue, will ral advan- feel indignation at that other; for neither is pity felt tages, but at the contraries of these qualities 5: but it is about

8. Not

such as

have mo

4 'ETIXαιρEKαкía, or, in the language of the "Ethica Magna,” χαιρεκακία, is one of the extremes between which νέμεσις is said to exist: the other extreme is p0ovɛpía, an aptitude to feelings of envy. Speaking of the "great power and force" of the Greek language, a late translator of the Agamemnon of Eschylus remarks, that " One word would sometimes require for its translation a whole sentence of modern language; as, for instance, 'ETIɣαιρɛкakíα, a disposition to feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others; which makes a sentence, and constitutes a maxim in Rochefoucault, "Il y a toujours dans le malheur d'autrui quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas ;" and adds in a note, that Lord Bacon (Essays) has beautifully touched on this disposition: " There is a natural malignity for there be that in their nature do not affect the good of others." Preface to Symmons's translation of the Agamemnon. 5 Pity is not felt at the absence of these qualities from any one, because they cannot be absent without being deservedly so; and it is essential to pity that its object be undeservedly exposed to that inconvenience which he suffers; on the other hand, indignation cannot be felt at their presence, because it is the distinguishing feature of moral advantages that they cannot be possessed, without being deserved.

fortunate.

wealth and power and the like possessions [that those of people feel indignant], and in a word, about all those fortune. things of which the good are deserving, and such as are naturally possessed of advantages; as, for example, of high birth, of beauty, and advantages of that description. But as what is ancient seems, in a 9. certain sense, akin to what is natural, it must follow, that men are indignant, in a greater degree, at those who possess the very same good, if they be recently possessed of it, and are by its means in good circumstances, [than with those who have long possessed it.] For those who have recently become rich give Such as greater pain than those who have long been rich, and are newly by right of birth. And, in the same way, persons in office, and men of power, and possessed of numerous friends, and of good children, and any good of this description; and likewise if, through the instrumentality of these, there should accrue to them any further good: here, too, those of recent wealth, who by means of their wealth get into office, give greater pain than those who have been wealthy of old. And in a similar manner in the case of the others. But 10. They the reason of this is, that while the one sort appear seem to to possess what is their own, the others do not; for that which appears ever to have held this rank, have no seems to involve an idea of truth; insomuch that the right to. others seem to possess what does not belong to them. And as, of the goods, each does not become any one 11. Such who may accidentally present himself, but there is a as have any good certain proportion and idea of adaptation; for ex- incongru ample, splendour in respect of armour, is not adapted ously. to a man whose virtue is justice, but to him who possesses courage; and splendid marriage feasts are not adapted to those of recent wealth, but to those of high birth: therefore if any one, though he may be a good man, meet with a possession which is not adapted to him, we should feel indignant; as also with an inferior who disputes with his superior; and particularly if he does so on the very points in which he is inferior. Whence also this was remarked by Homer: "He missed engaging with Ajax the son of

possess

what they

Such as compare two ob

Telamon; for Jupiter was indignant because he was fain to engage a hero his superior 6." But, if it be not on the same grounds, we feel indignant if an injects ferior challenge a superior, even on any grounds; which ad- for instance, if a musician were to dispute with a just man, for justice is superior to music. The persons then with whom, and the reasons why men feel indignant will be evident from this; for they are these or others of the same description.

mit not of

compari

son.

12. Men likely to feel indignation.

ambitious.

As regards themselves, men have a tendency to indignation, if they deserve and have acquired the highest goods; for the circumstance of those not their equals being thought worthy of equal advan13. tages, is not just. Next, they feel it, if they chance to be good and excellent persons; for they both 14. The judge aright, and hate what is unjust. Again, if they be ambitious and desirous of certain objects, and especially should they be ambitious about those things 15. which others who are undeserving obtain. And those, in a word, who think themselves worthy those things, of which they do not esteem others worthy, are apt to feel indignant at those others, and about those very objects. On which account slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition, are not liable to feelings of indignation, since there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. And from this it is evident on what occasions of misfortunes, or ill luck, or failure of success, persons ought to rejoice, or at least to be unaffected by pain; for, from what has been stated, the contraries will be evident. that should the speech have wrought up the judges into this disposition, and should it have shown that those who claim to be pitied, and that the circumstances under which they claim it, are undeserving pity, and really deserving not to gain it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity.

16. On

what occasions

men feel indig

nant.

• The remark is made of Cebriones, Il. ii. v. 542; where, however, the second line quoted by Aristotle does not occur.