it is probable that that will also happen; for instance, if there be a foundation, it is probable that there will also be a house.

of the

The subject of greatness and smallness in regard 26. to affairs, also of the degrees of greater and less, and Fourthly, of things great and small in general, is clear to us from great and what has been said. For, in the discussion of deliber- small. ative oratory, the doctrine of the greatness of goods has been stated, and respecting the greater and less in the abstract. So that as with respect to each class of speeches the proposed end is a good; (for instance, the expedient, the honourable,—and the just ;) it is evident that by every orator, his means of amplification are to be arrived at through the medium of these. But to institute, besides this, a further inquiry into 27. the subject of greatness and of excess in the abstract, is to talk idly; since particular cases are more completely applicable to use than mere generalities.

On the subject, then, of what is possible and impossible, and whether the fact has or has not occurred,-will or will not occur, and moreover on the subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, let thus much have been said.

CHAP. XX.

Of Examples;-how many species there are of them, in what manner, and when we are to employ them.

cussed.

Ir remains that I treat of the means of effecting 1. Exampersuasion which are common to every class of sub- ple disjects, since I have already treated of such as are peculiar. And these common means of persuasion are two in species, example and enthymem: for the sentiment is part of an enthymem. Let us then first 2. A spe treat of example; for the example is correspondent cies of in to induction; and induction is a principle.

duction.

But of examples there are two species; for one Twosorts.

them.

1st, Quot- species of example is the quoting real matters of fact ing real which have actually taken place; another is the fabriinstances. 2nd. Fa- cating them yourself: and of this method, one species bricating is illustration, the other fable; like those of Æsop and the African legends. Again', example is some3. This latter is what of this description, as if one were to assert that subdithe state ought to set itself in order against the king, vided into and not to allow him to make himself master of Egypt; i. παραβολή, and this, because aforetime Darius passed not into ii. Adyos. Greece, before that he had seized that country; but Example. when he had seized it, he passed across; so that the present king, should he seize Egypt, will pass over; on which account he is not to be permitted.

4. Illustration.

6. Fable.

Illustration is of the nature of Socrates's discourses for instance, were one to say that it is not fitting that magistrates chosen by lot should be in office; for it is just the same thing as though one were to pick out wrestlers by lot; not taking such as are able to contend, but those on whom the lot may fall or as though men were to draw lots for that person of the crew whom it might befit to take the helm; as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art.

But fable is such as that of Stesichorus in opposition to Phalaris, and that of Esop in behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the citizens of Himera had chosen Phalaris general with absolute powers, and were on the eve of assigning him a body guard, after other things which he said, related to them a fable: "That a horse was sole master of a meadow; but that on a stag's coming in and spoiling the pasture, in his wish to be avenged of the stag, he asked some man whether he should be able, in

1 He here applies the generic term to the species first mentioned, viz. the citing actual matters of fact.

66

2 Bentley seems to suspect this story as applying to Phala. ris, "because," says he, Conon, a writer in Julius Cæsar's time, gives us the very same narrative; but, instead of Phalaris, he says it was Gelon that Stesichorus spoke of. And the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon; for Gelon was in great favour and esteem with the Himeræ. ans." Conon, Narrat. 42. Bentl. in Phalaris. p. 38.

conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris.”

And Æsop, when pleading at Samos in behalf of 6, a demagogue who was tried for his life, said, “That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, 'Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains. But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public money."

to the de

But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and 7. Fables possess this advantage; that to hit upon facts which are suited have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard liberative to fables it is comparatively easy. For an orator orator: ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical

easy.

8. being turn of mind3. Cases, then, in the shape of fabies, are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past*.

He who

has en

9. He who It will, moreover, be right for one who has not has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive enthymems will proofs; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech use exam- will be produced by them: but one who possesses ples as proofs, [enthymems] should employ them like evidence, putand put ting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a them first. conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in thymems few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in at the end, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which nies, and account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on puts them him who puts them first of citing many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.

uses ex

amples as testimo

fast.

The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to be used, has been stated.

3 He again remarks on the facility here ascribed to minds of a philosophical turn, when, in speaking of metaphors, he remarks, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολύ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν, εὐστόχου, lib. iii. cap. xi. § 5.

This is the principle on which he has all along recommended example as more peculiarly available to the views of the deliberative orator. At the end of his illustrations of the subject of demonstrative rhetoric, after stating amplification to be more proper to it than either of the other common means of persuasion, he says, τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίvoμev, lib. i. cap. ix. § 40. Neither, says he, (cap. iv. § 8,) ought the orator to rely on the result of his own observation, ἀλλ ̓ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι, πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Moral Sentirents,-what they are, and of how many species, how they are to be employed,—and what advan

tages they possess.

On the subject of the use of maxims, after it has 1. Maxim, been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily be- yvwun. come clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.

Now the maxim is an assertion, and yet not re- 2. Its defi specting particulars, as what kind of person Iphi- nition. crates was, but on some general subject; neither is it on every general subject1, as, that what is straight is opposed to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning Conclunearly [confined] to this description of subjects, both sions of the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, thymems after the syllogistic form has been done away, be- are maxcome maxims 2. Take an instance: "A man who is

! Having told you that maxims are certain general propositions, he cautions you against supposing that every general proposition deserves this appellation. For example, mathematical truths are asserted in propositions, general enough it is true, which however do not come up to the notion which Aristotle would have you form of the yvwun. I hardly know whether it be allowable to attempt an explanation of Aristotle from a popular comedy; but those readers who remember the School for Scandal, may probably derive some illustration of this subject from the sentiments' there put in the mouth of Joseph Surface; e. g. "The heart that is conscious of its own integrity, is ever slow to credit another's treachery." Act iv. scene 3.

? In other words, the maxim is to the enthymem what propositions are to syllogisms. Not to every enthymem does the yuwun hold this relation, but to such only as are cnversant with "the actions and passions of common life." Aristotle has not ventured to tell us that all enthymems relate to these subjects; he says only that "nearly" all of them are so conversant; περὶ τοιούτων ἐστὶ σχεδόν.

most en

ims.