preferred 13," and of Evagoras, as Isocrates says, that must needs be virtuous, "since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras."

the enu

Another element arises from an enumeration of 13. parts; as in the Topica, "what kind of motion the xii, From soul is; it is either of this, or that description." And meration an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: of parts. "Toward what temple hath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured?"

the conse

Another consists in, Since, in the generality of in- 14. stances, it happens that on the same circumstances xiii. From somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the quents. exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic 14, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other [universal means of proof], as they have been stated, consists the system of Calippus.

the di

Another occurs, when we want to exhort or dis- 15. xiv. From suade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the foremen- lemma. tioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker ;

13 See book i. chap. vi. § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two in

stances.

14 It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so fallacious, that we may say with Ovid,

-careat successibus opto Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

Phyllis Demoph.

16.

xv. From the differ

ent motives of

because, said she, "If on the one hand you speak what is just, men will hate you; if what is unjust, the gods." [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, "if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men 15" And this is equivalent to the proverb "of buying dirt as well as salt." And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.

Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable; but within mankind. themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.

17.

xvi. From analogy.

18.

the simi

larity of

conse

Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that "if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children." And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, "Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?"

Another arises out of the argument, that if the rexvii.From sult be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that "they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist." And generally

quents.

15 See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, Phoenissæ, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: "If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it." Acts v. 38, 39.

assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration]: "Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one's self to philosophy." And this, "that the giving earth and water is the being slaves." And "that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined.” Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.

xviii.

From the

men.

Another may be deduced from the circumstance, 19. that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for in- inconsiststance, this appeal:-"If, when in banishment, we ency of fought that we might return; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight 16?" For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.

xix. From

end as the

real one.

Another element which may be resorted to is, the 20. assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, assuming for the sake of that for which it might have existed or a possible been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, "To many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may receive the more conspicuous calamities 17." And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: "Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager's valour." And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, "that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior." For it is very possible that he did so on this account.

Another, common both to the judicial and de- 21. liberative orators, is the consideration of the motives xx. From 16 From an Oration by Lysias.

"Evertêre domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles.

consider

ing the motives.

22. xxi. From

that

yet true.

which stimulate or retard men, and the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them; or if the loss be less than the object proposed 18. And it is upon these considerations that orators exhort, and on their opposites that they dissuade; moreover they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort 19. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.

Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbawhich is ble, on the ground that they would not seem to be incredible facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true 20; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment

18 ПIpayua: by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor.

19 That is to say, those very same faculties which the deliberative orator would employ in exhorting a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under accusation, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, vice versa, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be employed to dissuade from its attempt, might be alleged in defence of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable.

20 The argument may be formally stated thus: Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, therefore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completely slurred over.

of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, "The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;" and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. "Nay, the olive lees require oil,” and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil."

ment.

ation of

Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration 23. Refuof contradictions; if there occur any contradiction tative ele under all the circumstances of time, conduct 21, say- i. From ings, and the like. And this independently, respect- considering your adversary, as “He tells you that he loves contradic you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants];" tions. or independently respecting yourself, “He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;" or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, "This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of you."

explana

Another, applicable to those who have been calum- 24. niated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is ii. From the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for tion. there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which caused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does

not seem so.

Another is derived from the cause, if that be in 25. existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should iii. By arguing it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, from

"Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, "quod aut prius se injuste condemnassent; aut postea tantos honores non recte tribuissent." Aur. Victor. de viris illus.