vice versa.

cause to and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, effect, and and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leoda mas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, "that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence in him, while his hatred toward the democracy remained inscribed in public."

26.

the fact could have been

Another is, the observing whether the thing reiv. From specting which the party is deliberating, or acting, observing whether or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one vodone bet- luntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. This, however, involves a fallacy; for in many cases it becomes clear [only] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was before unknown.

ter.

27.

v. From

the anomaly of

the present act to

the past.

28.

errors be

Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea 22 or not, "if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice." Another element is, the accusing or defending on vi. From the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming; for, respecting the sending away her children, Medea was in fault: she, however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one], she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.

fore com

mitted.

29.

vii. From

Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles 22 Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata a Græcis, Matuta habetur a nostris ? Cicero, Tusc. i. 12.

tion of

says, "Steel in truth you are, and bear the name." the And as they are wont to say in their praises of the equivoca gods 23; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, the term. "rash in counsel," (Oparißovλos); and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, “You are always rash in fight, (Oparipaxos); and Polus, "You always are a colt," Θρασύμαχος); Iλos); and Draco the legislator, that "his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon24; for they were harsh." And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, "The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly 25." And as Charemon says, "Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities 26 awaiting him."

more in

Refutative enthymems, however, are more in re- 30. Reasons why pute than the confirmative; by reason of the refutative refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together; enthyand because things when put in contrast are more mems are palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, repute however, as well confirmative as refutative, those than conproduce the greatest effect 27, which are of such a de- firmative. scription that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 28, in having of themselves anti

23 Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in punning on their respective appellations as often as the case admitted it.

24 In this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author's meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others.

25 Folly, in Greek appoσúvn. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of 'Appodíтn to suit his purpose. However, there are no liberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the Troades, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, " Begun in Folly, closed in Tears." Giaour.

* Πένθεα.

27 Oopuẞouvтaι; respecting this word, see a note, book i. chap. 2.

26 For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see b. i. .1, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facili

cipated it; and [next to these may we class] all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated.

cious en

thymems. may

CHAP. XXIV.

Elements of Apparent Enthymems.

1. Falla JUST as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.

the dic

tion of

2.

ing a conclusion not inferred.

But the elements of these apparent enthymems are, 1st. From one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition two kinds. with all the air of a conclusion, although you have 1. Assert- deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, "So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is." And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated] "the result of the style of the diction;" but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, "that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people." For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that

ii. Ambiguous terms, etc.

tated, and our admiration excited; and § 27 on the principle that τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker.

"the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;" for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, “O blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess." Or the arguing, that "it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog in the house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable." And the assertion, that Mercury is "communicative" above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called "common." And the stating that λóyos, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λóyos, esteem, not of wealth: for the words (λóyov åžiov) are not used in a single sense.

division

Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting con- 3. jointly what is true separately; or separately, what 2nd. From is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same and comthing, what though in many instances it be not the position. same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that "he knew there was a galley in the Piræus1," for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, "that he knows the verse 2;" for the verse is the same thing. Again, the saying that as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious." Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refutation; but thus it is confirmative; "for two evils do not constitute one good," etc. But the whole topic

66

An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking conjointly what is true only separately: Euthyde. mus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Piræus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Piræus, i. e. he being in the Piræus, 2 Of this nature was the sneering recommendation of a Dictionary as a book of general information.

4.

exaggera

tion.

is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants 3;" for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, "It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father. Now, are not these the very things that have been done?" for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained "by whom [she should be put to death]."

Another element is the doing away or establishing 3rd From a point by exaggeration 4: and this occurs when, without having shown that [the prisoner] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. then there is no enthymem; for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.

5.

Ο σημεῖον.

Thus

Another is the argument drawn from a sign5, for 4th. From this also is illogical; as if one were to say, "Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus." And if one were to say, "Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man; for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.

3 The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty distinct tyrannies, where as he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which happened to be shared between thirty different individuals.

This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction,

real or material fallacies.

Meaning of course the specific onusov, for no fallacy can result from the TEKμńρtov, vid. book i. chap. ii. § 16. This faliacy he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἄγια τοῦ ἐλέγχου·