the acci

Another is the arguing from an accidental cir- 6. cumstance; exemplified in that which Polycrates 6 5th. From said about mice, that "they lent their aid by gnaw- dents of a ing through the [enemy's] bowstrings." Or sup- thing. posing one to declare, "that the being bidden to supper is the most honourable; for Achilles was wroth, on account of his not being invited by the Greeks at Tenedos:" he however was enraged, as though he was treated with disrespect, and this occurred upon his not being invited.

6th. From

Another arises from establishing the consequent; 7. as in the oration respecting Paris, [it is contended] asserting that "he is of a noble spirit; because, despising that as a the society of many, he abode on Ida by himself;" logical for, because the noble-spirited are thus disposed, which is property he, too, it should seem, is noble-spirited. Again, not. "Since he is both foppish in his dress, and strolls about by night, he is an adulterer;" because adulterers are persons of such habits 7. Similar to this is also the argument, that "the poor, because they dance and sing in the temples; and that exiles, because it is permitted them to dwell where they list, [are happy.]" For as these advantages belong to those who appear to be happy; they too would appear to be happy, to whom they belong. Moreover, the case varies with the circumstances of the transaction; on which account, the argument falls under the charge of omission.

assume that what occurs 66

7th. From

Another arises from stating as a cause that which 8, in fact is not; [arguing], for instance, on its having asserting happened "simultaneously," or "after;" for men do that as a subsequently," [occurs] by means of" [that which preceded], and more not a especially those engaged in state affairs; just as cause. Demades [insinuated] "that the administration of

66

This Polycrates was one of the Sophists; he was mentioned above (§ 3). The circumstance respecting the mice is recorded by Herodotus, ii. 141.

7 The fallacy in this instance arises from taking the simple converse of a universal affirmative proposition; as also in the instance cited § 5.

cause which is

9.

8th. From the omission of

lars.

Demosthenes was the cause of all their misfortunes ; because a war happened after it."

Another, from the omission of the "when" and manner how;" for instance, the argument "that Paris carried off Helen justly; because free choice particu- had been given her by her father;' for very possibly it was not [granted] for a continuance, but at first merely; because so far only was she at her father's disposal. Or if any one were to say, "that the striking free men was an insult:" because under all circumstances this is not the case, but when one begins the violence.

10.

Again, as in the disputations of the Sophists, there 9th. From arises an apparent syllogism from stating things abarguing. solutely or not absolutely, but conditionally; as [it is contended] in logic, that "what is a nonentity, does exist; because a nonentity exists as a nonentity;" and that "what is unknown is known, for it is known to be unknown 9;" just so in rhetoric also, we have an apparent enthymem from what is not absolutely probable, but conditionally probable. This, however, is not universally the case; as in truth Agatho remarks, "Perhaps some one will be inclined to assert this to be probable, that many improbabilities will befall men :" for that which is contrary to probability does occur; so that even what is contrary to probability is probable 10; this, however, is not the case absolutely; but just as in sophistical disputations, it is the omission of the circumstances of extent, relation, and place, which produces the imposition; so also here [in rhetoric], it results from the things being probable not absolutely, but conditionally pro11. bable. The system of Corax is constructed upon this topic: for supposing your client, without being open to the charge, as for instance, being infirm,

See Euripides, Iphig. in Aul. 66.

See the epigram, which, alluding to Socrates's declara tion, "that he knew nothing," concludes thus,

Hoc aliquid nihil est, hoc nihil est aliquid.

10. Compare the words of Sir Philip Sidney, that " a wonder is no wonder in a wonderful subject.'

should be under a charge for an assault, [you have grounds for your defence,] because the case is not probable: and if he be open to the charge, from his being, for example, a powerful man, [still you may defend him] on the ground that it is not likely, because it was sure to seem to be likely11. And so also respecting all other cases, for he needs must be either open to the imputation or not. Both cases then appear to be likely; but the one is likely [absolutely], the other not absolutely, but so as has been explained. And this is [the secret] "of making the worse, the better side 12" And hence mankind were justly in- Sophistry dignant at the annunciation of Protagoras 13; for it is an imposition, and not the real, but an apparent probability, and has a place in no art except rhetoric, and the art of disputation. And now the subject of enthymems, as well real as apparent, has been discussed.

of Prota

goras.

CHAP. XXV.

The Solution of Arguments.

tion of ar

guments

Ir follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging 1. Soluone's self from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an two ways. objection1. Now as to the meeting them with counter Contra

Η Compare lib. i. cap. xii. § 5, τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερώ, κ. τ. λ. 12 There were some persons who charged Socrates with doing this, and thence concluded that he was a person dangerous to the state-ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, ἀνὴρ σοφός, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆν πάντα ἀναζητηκὼς, ΚΑῚ ΤΟΝ ΗΤΤΩ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΚΡΕΊΤΤΩ ΠΟΙΩΝ. Plato Apol. Socr. § 2. Compare also the dialogue of the two λóyo, in the Clouds of Aristophanes.

13 Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Ceius, Hippias Eleus, aliique multi docere se profitebantur arrogantibus sane verbis, quemadmodum causa inferior, ita enim loquebantur, dicendo fieri superior posset." Cicero, Brut. c. viii. Τῶν ἄλλων τεχ νῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, i. i. § 12. L'AUTIσvìλoɣiouòs is a syllogism, whose conclusion is con

dictory.

arguments. Objections.

arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, 2. and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

3. Objec

tions are fourfold.

the same source.

cularly.

5.

Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics,) are started in four ways: 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4. 4. or from points already decided. By deriving your 1st. From objection from the same source, I mean that, supposing the enthymem were respecting love, "that it was a good feeling;" there would be a twofold obi. Gener- jection; for it [might be started] asserting generally ally. that "every want is bad:" or particularly, that "the ii. Partiproverbial expression Caunian loves2, would not have arisen had there not been some wicked loves." Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as, if the enthymem was this, "The good man benefits all his friends;" [and the objection,] “But 6. the bad man does not hurt all his." And on the 3rd. From ground of similar cases3; if the argument be, "Those who have been treated ill always hate;" [the objection,] that "those who have been treated well do not 7. always love." And again, the decisions of men of 4th. From celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the arpoints decided. gument, that " we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorantly 5" this objection [may be started], that "Pittacus

2nd.From

a contra

ry.

a similar case.

tradictory of that adduced by your opponent: voTaois is the showing that his reasonings are fallacious either in matter or form.

2 Alluding to the loves of Byblis and her brother Caunus. See Ovid. Metaph. ix. 453.

3 Or to use the English phrase, "by parity of reasoning." • Victorius remarks, that "however at first sight this instance would seem to be one of ἔνστασις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εναντίου, it is not inapplicable to the present case, inasmuch as the injured stand to the injurers in a relation similar to that in which the benefited stand to their benefactors.

The question how far dyvówv may be considered a free agent, is discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics lib. iii. cap. i 5; and Hooker, book i.

is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated."

i. Proba

bility.

iii. TεK

But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived 8. Reasonings from four sources, and these four are probability, ex- derived ample, proof positive (Tɛкμńριov), and signs; and as from four the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears sources: to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, ii. Éxamwhether in one or more instances, (when the speaker ple. embracing what is general, then infers particulars,) univ. exist by virtue of example; while those again which iv. onare inferred from what is necessary and fact, are μεῖον. founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether universally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what usually occurs; it is plain that it is, in every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, how- 9. Soluever, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; tion of for the objector does not do it away on the ground of its not being probable, but on that of its not being times falnecessary. Wherefore it always happens, that the lacious: defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of more of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser con- service to structs his proof by means of probabilities (the task defendant of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no plaintiff. means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, is invariably open to an objection; (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above;

The orator must therefore show on which side the greater probability lies. "There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, against a plenum, and objections against a vacuum; yet one of them must be right." Whately.

εἰκὸς

some

10. and is

than