because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, "that he will decide to the best of his judgment;" wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be proba11. ble in a higher degree; (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars ;) for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

12. Speci

Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, fic signs may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Ana lytics that every sign is illogical.

are refutable.

13. Solu

The same method of solution applies to reasonings tion of ex-grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for amples. if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered, [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

the pre

14. τεκτ But proofs positive (TEKμnpia), and the reasonings μήρια irgrounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of refutable, except by at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is assailing clear to us from the Analytics: it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration.

mises.

That is to say, by a λúois paivoμévn.

As we cannot object to the form of the reasoning, our only resource is to attack the matter: to deny the premises.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Amplification and Extenuation.

mems.

AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of 1. Amplification enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same and its opthing,) since the element and the topic is that under posite not which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification Too, but enthyand extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or falls under either of the other denominations. And 2. these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.

mems of

are the

Neither, again, are the topics which are available 3. Enthyto solution of enthymems, at all different in species refutation from those employed in their construction: for it is and conevident that he effects solution who either proves firmation [something contrary], or states an objection, and they same in establish a counter proof of the contrary; thus, "If kind. one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not ;" or "if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymems to show that it is, or is not the case.

But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as 4. Objec was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion tion is not an enthyfrom which it will appear that no legitimate inference mem. Dehas been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has as- finition of sumed some false proposition.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and 5 maxims, and enthymems1, and, in a word, all the

In taking leave of a series of terms which have occurred hitherto so frequently, we may as well remark that examples, maxims, enthymems, etc. denote the particular modification of the proof, or the shape in which it is served up, without refer

ἔνστασις.

means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution 2. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement 3.

ence to its degree of validity: while probability, signs, Tɛkμńρια, etc. refer to its degree of validity, without regard to the shape or manner in which the proof is conveyed.

2 Having now despatched the first and most important of the three grand divisions of his work, viz. the subject of πioris, it only remains to discuss the remaining two, λέξις and τάξις. In fact, having told the speaker what he is to say, he has now only to tell how he is to say it.

* The subjects of πίστις, λέξις, and τάξις, it will be recoilected, constitute the widest and most general arrangement of his work. See book iii. chap. i. § 1.

BOOK ITI.

CHAP. I.

Of the Parts of Rhetoric.

λέξις.

treated.

As there are three points which ought to be handled 1. Three respecting a speech; one, as to the sources out of points in a speech. which will arise means of persuasion; a second, re- TiGTIs. specting the style; a third, how we ought to arrange éis. τάξις. the parts of a speech. On the subject of the means The two of persuasion much has been said, as well as to how last to be many the sources are out of which [they arise], namely, that they are three; also, what is the nature of these sources, and why they are no more: for all those who decide, are persuaded either by being themselves impressed in a certain way, or from conceiving the speakers to be men of a certain character, or from the matter of fact having been proved'.

It has been stated also with respect to enthymems, whence we are to furnish ourselves with them; for [of those sources], some are elementary propositions, peculiar [to the several branches of rhetoric]; others are places [of universal applicability]. It follows that 2. we treat of the subject of style; for the mere being in possession of what one ought to say is not enough; but it is moreover necessary that we deliver it as we ought; [and the doing this] contributes much to your speech's appearing to be of a certain character. Now that by which its nature is first, was, con- 3. πÓкρI formably to nature, investigated the first; viz. whence is not these things derive their persuasive efficacy: next to dled. this, was the disposition of them in the speaking: and thirdly, [arose an inquiry] of the greatest con

See book i. chap. ii. § 3.

yet han

sequence, but which never yet has been handled, on the subject of delivery; for it was introduced into tragedy and the public recitations at a late period, since at first the poets used themselves to sustain the dialogue3 in their tragedies. It is therefore plain that some such power exists in relation to rhetoric, as well as to poetry; which [as connected with the latter art] Glauco the Teian, and some others, have 4. It con- treated of. And it depends on the voice, as to how sists in we ought to manage it in reference to each several three things. passion; when, for instance, we should employ a loud, MyOos. when a low, and when a moderate pitch of voice; duovia. and on the manner in which we should employ its ρυθμός. tones, viz. the acute, the grave, and the intermediate; and on certain rhythms in reference to each; for the points, in reference to which they conduct their inquiries, are three, viz. the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm. Now these proficients bear away nearly all the prizes in the disputations; and as in the other contests the actors now produce a greater effect than the poets, so likewise do they in civil causes, owing to the depravity of 5. No at states. There is not yet however any system com

yet com piled on

it.

piled respecting these points, (since even the subject of style was brought forward at a late period,) and, if rightly conceived of, it appears an ornament adapted to vulgar tastes; but as the whole subject of rhetoric

2 That the two departments of author and actor were united in the same person, is asserted also by Horace, Art. Poet. 277, and by Plutarch, ἐθεάσαντο τὸν Θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς.

66

3 That TоKρITǹs came to designate an actor from the circumstance of his sustaining the dialogue with the chorus, may be evinced by reference to the etymology of the word. Its successive meanings have been clearly traced in the Quarterly Review: Ὑποκριτὴς, Qui respondet, ab ὑποκρίνεσθαι, respondere, Homer, Herodot. Histrio, quia primo tragœdiæ statu histrio Choro respondebat. Suidas, ὁ ὑποκρινόμενος τῳ χορώ. Simulator, quia histriones fictas partes tuebantur." No. xliv. Art 2, p. 326.

Those for the prize in the tragic games.

5 PopTikóv. It appears from I wining's excellent illustra tions of the meaning of this word, that it is used to imply any thing extravagant, violent, overcharged, outré :-as applied to