20. Two different sorts of enthy mem. 1st. Tó TOL. cases come under the same general premiss 15, that he who is laying schemes to set up a tyranny, asks a guard. Now then the points have been stated out of which the proofs which have an air of demonstration are adduced. The difference of enthymems is considerable, and has remarkably escaped nearly every writer: it is, too, a difference the very same as exists between syllogisms in logic: for some enthymems there are of applicability equal to that of rhetoric itself, in the same way that in logic some syllogisms are; others, according to the extent of other arts and faculties, existing, some already, and others not yet comprised by rules. And hence those who employ them both escape the observation of their hearers, and if they handle them more than is right, pass out of their pro21. per characters as mere orators. This however will become clearer, if stated more in detail. I call those forms of reasoning 16 properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which, I use the expression places; such are those which apply with equal advantage to questions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other subjects which differ in species. The place for instance, of greater and less; for there will not be a whit more advantage in deducing a syllogism or an enthymem from this place, on a question of justice or of natural philosophy, than on any other subject whatsoever; 2nd, elon. and yet there are questions specifically distinct. But I call peculiar, all those reasonings which arise out of propositions conversant with each species and genus of subjects; for instance, there are propositions on subjects of natural philosophy 17 out of which neither 15 By the Tò avrò yέvos is understood a common circumstance and property of nature; by the Tò avrò kałóλov, the general proposition in reference to all such cases. 16 Διαλεκτικοὺς καὶ ῥητορικοὺς, i. e. so exactly corresponding, in point of extent, to these arts, as to be applicable as often, and with as little limitation, as they are themselves. 17 This appears evident enough; yet the whole system of judicial astrology and the planetary influences was nothing more than an attempt of the kind. rhetorical one were to say it was a sign that a man has a fever, because he breathes thickly. But this, even granting the premiss be true, may be done away for it is very possible that one who has not a fever should breathe thickly. Now what is probability, what sign, and what TEKμnpiov, and in what they differ, has been explained: but in the Analytics [these several gradations of proof] as well as the reasons why some are not correctly inferred, and others are, have been distinctly stated with greater clearness 13. As to ex- 19. Example, it has been stated that it is an induction, and ample, or induction on what kind of subjects; and its ratio is inducneither that of a part to a whole, nor of a whole to a tion. part, nor of a whole to a whole but example is in s μépos the ratio of a part to a part 14, of a similar case to a πρὸς μέσ similar, when, both coming under the same genus, the one case happens to be better known than the other. For instance, you assert that Dionysius, in asking a guard, has views of setting up a tyranny, because Pisistratus before him, when designing this, began to ask for a body guard, and when he got it, established himself as tyrant; so too did Theogenes, at Megara. And all other persons who have acted in this way, and with whom your audience are acquainted, become examples against Dionysius, with respect to whom they do not yet know whether he be asking a guard with this intention: and all these " In the Analytics, he says, " the εἰκὸς is πρότασις ἔνδοξος, but the σημεῖον professes to be πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ, whether necessary or probable. Now an enthymem (he continues) is an imperfect syllogism, consisting of ɛikóτa and onμɛĩa, and the latter are assumed in three ways, according to the number of the figures of syllogism (for Aristotle made only three), the first, second, and third of logic. In all these the onusov is the Hérov (i. e. the argumentum, or minor proposition), but the first alone is aλUTOV." Analytic. Prior. lib. ii. c. xxix. Edit. Bipont. Not as a part to a whole, for that would be onμstov; nor as a whole to a part, for that would be TEKμńpiov: nor as a whole to a whole, for that would be waywyn (which, when perfect, reasons from a whole taken individually to the same taken collectively). Example therefore is in the ratio of a part to a part. ρος. 20. Two different sorts of enthy mem. 1st. Tó TOL. cases come under the same general premiss 15, that he who is laying schemes to set up a tyranny, asks a guard. Now then the points have been stated out of which the proofs which have an air of demonstration are adduced. The difference of enthymems is considerable, and has remarkably escaped nearly every writer: it is, too, a difference the very same as exists between syllogisms in logic for some enthymems there are of applicability equal to that of rhetoric itself, in the same way that in logic some syllogisms are; others, according to the extent of other arts and faculties, existing, some already, and others not yet comprised by rules. And hence those who employ them both escape the observation of their hearers, and if they handle them more than is right, pass out of their pro21. per characters as mere orators. This however will become clearer, if stated more in detail. I call those forms of reasoning 16 properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which, I use the expression places; such are those which apply with equal advantage to questions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other subjects which differ in species. The place for instance, of greater and less; for there will not be a whit more advantage in deducing a syllogism or an enthymem from this place, on a question of justice or of natural philosophy, than on any other subject whatsoever; 2nd, ɛion. and yet there are questions specifically distinct. But I call peculiar, all those reasonings which arise out of propositions conversant with each species and genus of subjects; for instance, there are propositions on subjects of natural philosophy 17 out of which neither 15 By the Tò autò yέvos is understood a common circumstance and property of nature; by the Tò avrò Kałóλov, the general proposition in reference to all such cases. 16 Διαλεκτικοὺς καὶ ῥητορικοὺς, i. e. so exactly corresponding, in point of extent, to these arts, as to be applicable as often, and with as little limitation, as they are themselves. 17 This appears evident enough; yet the whole system of judicial astrology and the planetary influences was nothing more than an attempt of the kind. enthymem nor syllogism could be constructed respecting morals; and on this subject, again, there are others out of which will arise no reasoning respecting natural philosophy; this is also the case equally on every subject. Now the first-mentioned reasonings (the Tóno) will render a man informed on no class of subjects, for they are about no distinct subject-matter: as to the other (idea), the orator, in proportion as he makes the better 18 selection of propositions peculiar, will imperceptibly produce a science different from mere rhetoric or logic 19; for, if he light on first principles, thenceforth, it will no longer be rhetoric or logic which he is employing, but that science whose principles he embraces. The greatest number of enthymems are constructed 22. out of these peculiar propositions, which are particular and limited; and from the universal ones, the Tess. Just then as I did in the Topics, so here must I make a distinction of the peculiar 20 propositions and places of enthymems, whence we are to deduce them. Now I mean by ɛion, those propositions which are peculiar to the several kinds of rhetoric; by róTOL, those which are common alike to all. Let us then id first treat of the special propositions before the others. discussed. Let us, however, first ascertain the kinds of rhetoric itself; in order that having distinguished them as to 18 BEλTíw,. ie. better, quà the art in question is concerned; -though as regarded by the logician or rhetorician, they will be in fact worse, inasmuch as they tend to merge these faculties, whose characteristic is universal applicability, in that particular art from whence the pоráσεis happen to be deduced. 19 We may here mention that diaλɛкTikǹ is not quite what we understand by logic, but seems rather to have been the faculty of conversation, which the ancients cultivated as a science, and of which logic was a species. Zeno, the Eleatic, divided his dialectics into three parts: on consequences, ¿púτησις and ἐριστική. Whately's Logic. Diog. Laert. in Platone, 52, § 87. 20 He here designates, by the name sion, those propositions of limited applicability which he had before called da; those, in fact, which he considers as contradistinguished from the TÓTOL or general arguments, which he tells us are applicable to a range of subjects as little limited as the subjects of rhetoric itself their number, we may separately ascertain the elements of persuasion and propositions peculiar to each 21. CHAP. III. tion presupposes three things: 1st. a speaker: 2nd. a subject: 3rd. a hearer. ers of three sorts. He shows that there are three kinds of Rhetoric; what is the end of each; and on what subject we must provide ourselves with propositions. 1. An ora- THE species of rhetoric are three in number, for of so many descriptions are the hearers of orations; because an oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom; and to him it is that the end of the speech has its reference; I mean to the hearer. The hearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge; and a judge 2. Hear either of things past or to come; one then acts as judge respecting what is yet to happen, as the member of a popular assembly; the other respecting what has already taken place, as the president of a court of justice; the other respecting the abilities of the orator, as the unconcerned hearer1. Thus, then, there will necessarily result three kinds of orations, kinds of the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative2. Delibera- business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly tive, Ju- dissuasion; for invariably those who in their indiviEpideic dual capacities simply advise, and those who publicly harangue, effect one of these objects. The business Business. of judicial rhetoric is partly accusation, partly defence; for the litigants must of course do one or the other of these things. Of demonstrative the business is partly praise, partly blame. Moreover the 3. Hence three rhetoric; } dicial, tic. 4. Time The 21 Cf. lib. ii. c. 22, § 13: στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυ· μήματος τὸ αὐτό : and lib. ii. c. 26, § 1 : τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον. 1 Both hearers are interested; but the Jewpòs is a specula. tive, the Korns a practical, auditor. Vide Quarterly Review, July, 1822, No. liv. vol. 27, p 391. |