law for a delibera tive ora there is the law as the basis of reasonings; but for cial oraone who has something wherewith to begin, it is tory has easier to discover means of proof. Neither has [de- basis. liberative rhetoric] many opportunities of digression; iii. The none, for instance, in reference to an adversary, or respecting one's self, or in order to excite passion; tor cannot but it possesses these opportunities least of all the digress so three branches, unless it depart from its proper proeasily. vince. If, then, you are at a loss, you should do what the rhetoricians at Athens do, and particularly Isocrates; for in the course of deliberative speaking he accuses the Lacedæmonians, for instance, in the panegyric, and Chares in the speech about the alliance. But in demonstrative speaking, you should 11. insert praise in the speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does, for he all along keeps introducing something. And that saying of Gorgias, "That he never failed of something to say," is nothing more nor less than this for if he be speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Æacus, then his goddess mother, and so, too, valour in the abstract; or he does something or another in this strain. thymems Now the language of one who possesses proof, 12. If you should be both fraught with the impress of charac- have enter, and fitted to convey the proof. But if you pos- speak sess not enthymems, let it convey an impression of hous your character; and the show of goodness more befits and aroa virtuous man, than accuracy of speech. δεικτι κως. But of enthymems the refutative are more ap- If not, onproved than the confirmative1: because in the case 13. Refuly ἠθικῶς. of as many as produce reductio ad absurdum, it is tative en more plain that a conclusion has really been arrived thymems at; for opposites, when set by each other, are more than conclearly recognised. Now, according to the early part of this work, all this is done easily enough in judicial cases, since there the judge has no personal interest, and easily resigns himself to the speaker; but in deliberative rhetoric, every one addressed is supposed, more or less, to have an interest in the question at issue, and is therefore more jealous of the speaker's artifice. Book i. c. 10. See book ii. chap. 23, § 30. better firmative 14. Mode of replying to our adversary. The first speaker must give his proofs and anticipate objec tions. Touching reasonings directed against the adversary, they are not in any thing different in species; but it belongs to the province of proof to do away his arguments, some by starting an objection, others by contrary inference. And the speaker who begins, ought, both in deliberative and judicial rhetoric, first to state his own proofs; and subsequently to meet objections by doing them away, or by treating them with contempt beforehand. But should the points objected to be many, first he must confront the objections, as did Callistratus in the Messeniac assembly; for previously having swept away what his adversaries would be likely to allege in this way, he then 15. The spoke on his own part. But the last speaker should last speak- speak first what makes against the adversary's speech, refute the doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences; and particularly should his arguments have been well sary's ar received. For just as one's mind does not cordially guments, and draw receive a person on whom a slur has been previously opposite cast; in the same way neither does it favourably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer's mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his er must adver infer ences. The reason why. 16. Cha racter of In this she first lays hold of the most silly point.Thus much, then, of proof. But as to the effect of character, since the saying • Compare book ii. chap. 25, § 1, 2. See the Troades of Euripides, 969, where Hecuba, reply. ing to the defence made by Helen, lays hold of that part of it which seemed to insinuate that the three goddesses had been instrumental to her abandonment of her husband;-a point which, it wil readily be perceived, was E'Y'Eaerkton. son. some things respecting one's self, either is invidious, the speak. or involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; er best conveyed and respecting another, either slander or rusticity;- by introit behoves one to introduce another as speaking: the ducing a third perthing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting Philip, and in the Antidosis; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying, in an iambic line respecting his daughter, "There is not any thing which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath ;" and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, "I regard not the wealth of Gyges;" and as Sophocles introduces Hæmon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking. into max But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of 17. Enthymems our enthymems, and to make them into maxims 10: are occafor example, "It behoves men of sense to come to sionally to reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will be altered they be the greatest gainers." But, in enthymematic ims. form, it is thus: "If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful." CHAP. XVIII. Of Interrogation and Ridicule. When to BUT respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time 1. Interfor employing it when an admission has been made rogation. in such a way, that a single further question being be emput, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lam- ployed. i. When pon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] the protectress; and on his saying, "That it was not surdity possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it," will re--he asked "Whether he knew himself?" when 10 See book ii. chap. 21, § 2. an ab sult. 2. your con clusion will be establish he said he did, [Pericles subjoined,]" And how do you know who are uninitiated ?" Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] ii. When one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by ed by it. inquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate further respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked "Whether he asserted the being of any demon?" When he allowed that he had, Socrates asked, "Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or something of divine nature?" And when he allowed it, "Is there, then," said he, "one who thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves?" 3. Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to nent must general opinion. iii. When the oppo contradict Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself himself. 4. of the question otherwise than by a sophistical aniv. When swer for if he answer in this way, that it is, and is we reduce not, or partly is, and partly is not,-or, one way nent to is, another way is not; the hearers hoot him off, besophisti- ing at a loss for his meaning. our oppo cal an swers. Caution as to interrogations. 5. How it Under any other circumstances do not attempt interrogation; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear to have been overcome: since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer. Ön which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems. But one must give his answers to equivocal questo answer tions with a distinction', and not concisely; and to an equivocal ques- what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an tion. explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can i. By distinction. put the next succeeding question, or draw the inii. By an- ference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to ticipation. See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,-" What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or not?" Matt. xxii. 17-22. ?" foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, 6. iii. By explanaif his question produce that conclusion, you are to tion. assign the cause: as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, "Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred," acknowledged that it had.-"But how," rejoined the other, "seemed it not to you to be wrong?" He said it did. "Did you not, then, do that which was wrong "Yes, forsooth," replied he, "for I had no better alternative." And as the Lacedæmonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, "Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly," said they did." Then," retorted the other, " did you not enact the same things as they?" And when he acknowledged that he had, "Would not you also," asked the other, "justly perish?" "No, indeed," said he, "for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment." Wherefore one ought not No quesafter the conclusion to put a further question, nor to tion to be put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the the contruth lies abundantly on our side. put after clusion. to be used But with respect to Ridicule, inasmuch as it seems 7. Ridito possess a kind of use in disputation 2, and as 66 one cule, how ought," says Gorgias, " to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness," making the remark justly enough,—it has been stated in the Poetic3 how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another. "Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius plerumque secat res." HOR. Sat. i. 10, 14. |