time proper to each of these respectively is, to the deliberative orator, the future; for in exhorting or dissuading, he advises respecting things future3. The time proper to a judicial pleader is the past; for it is ever on the subject of actions already done, that the one party accuses, and the other defends. Το the demonstrative orator the present time is the most appropriate, for it is in reference to qualities actually possessed that all either praise or blame. Orators, however, do very frequently avail themselves of other times; as well by awakening a recollection of what has already happened, as by anticipating what is likely to happen. The end of each of these 5. and end branches is different, and, as belonging to three sub- peculiar jects, is itself triple. to each. The object of the deliberative orator is the expedient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, advises you to adopt the better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice, of honour or disgrace, he adjoins by the way, in addition to these two. The object of the judicial pleader is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those other considerations. The object of those who praise and blame is honour and disgrace; and these also refer other considerations to these two. But we may take as a sign that what I have stated 6. Proof is the particular object of each, the fact that there are times when they will not feel inclined even to raise a question about the other: the litigant, for example, will not always deny that the fact has taken place, or that it has hurt the other party; but he 3 "Passion may be as much excited by the orator's reasonings on a future event, as on one past; and indeed the future, cæteris paribus, produces the greater effect on us, as that to which we are approaching, and what every moment gives us the added interest in, which it takes from the past. But then the past has the counterbalancing privilege of being susceptible of infinitely better testimony and evidence, from memory, present effects, etc.; memory, indeed, the great eye of the mind, unlike that of the body, sees all we have left behind, and nothing before it." Campbell, Phil. of Rhet of this from fact 7. The orator in each class must have KоLvai τάσεις. 8. never, under any circumstances, would admit that he has been guilty of injustice toward him; for then would there be no need of a judicial decision. In the same way the deliberative orator very often abandons the other considerations; but as to the point that he is advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is useful, this will he never admit ; but it frequently happens that (on a question of invasion) they do not trouble themselves to make out that the subjugating a neighbouring people is not inconsistent with justice. Just so those who praise and blame do not consider whether the person's conduct has been advantageous or disadvantageous; nay, they, in many instances, set it down on the score of praise, that, overlooking his own interests, he wrought some deed of honour: thus they praise Achilles, because he came to aid the cause of his comrade Patroclus, with full knowledge that himself was fated to die; it being in his power, [by withholding that aid,] to live. To him, however, a death such as this was the more honourable prize: but to live would have been advantageous. From what has been said, it is plain that the orator must first be in possession of propositions on the subject of each of these divisions, separately; for the TEKμnρia, the probabilities and signs, are degrees of proof available to rhetoric generally. It is necessary because syllogism, in general, is made up of propositions, and the enthymem is a syllogism made up of the propositions which have been mentioned. And as it cannot be that what is impossible should ever heretofore have been done or should ever be done hereafter, but what is possible, only: as again it cannot be that what has not happened, or that what is never about to happen, ever should, the one have been already done, the other be about to be done it becomes necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator to have propositions on the subject of possibility and impossibility; and on the questions, whether a fact has or has not hap9. pened, will or will not take place. And further, since all, as well in praising as in blaming, as well in exhorting as in dissuading, as well in accusing as in defending, attempt to evince not only the points I have mentioned, but likewise to prove respecting this good or bad, this honourable or dishonourable, this just or unjust, that it is, moreover, either great or small, whether speaking of the things independently, or comparing them respectively one with another: as this is the case, it is plain that it will be necessary to have propositions respecting the degrees of great and small, of greater and less, as well general, as peculiar to each division: what good, for instance, is greater or less, what deviation from justice, or what conformity to it; and so in the same way also respecting the other subjects. The points then have been stated, respecting which it will be absolutely necessary to get at propositions. We must, after this, make a distinction between each of these respectively; the questions, for instance, about which deliberation is conversant; those, too, about which demonstrative rhetoric is concerned; and, thirdly, those about which judicial. CHAP. IV. The Questions relative to which that Orator should be in possession of Propositions, who is about to advise on points of the highest concernment. delibera FIRST, then, we must ascertain what kind of good 1. The or evil it is respecting which the deliberative orator tive orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about advises on every kind, but about such as may or may not befall subjects, us. Such however as either has or will have an 2. not neexistence of necessity; such, again, as it is impossible cessary, should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any ! This limitation was established in cap. ii. § 12. velopes this point more fully, Nich. Eth. iii. cap. 3. de He de all that are con tingent; 3. nor on liberation: neither, in fact, is there about every one even of contingent subjects; for of goods which may or may not accrue2, some exist naturally, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is con fined to subjects] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred but where to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation we appre- is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry power of on our views thus far, viz. till we shall ascertain perform- whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not 3. hend a ance. 4. Minute Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to divide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter moreover into minute distinctions conformable to the standard of truth to the very utmost that the subject admits it; these inquiries it is not necessary, on the rhetoric, present occasion, to institute, by reason that they belong not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of 5. which is made up of the 2 Τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή. It may be well to remark of this expression, which has occurred so often already, and will much more frequently in the sequel, that it is Aristotle's usual appellative for things contingent, things which may as well happen as not. He has himself defined it thus-λyo δ ̓ ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ ̓ ἀδύνατον. Anal. Pri. lib. i. c. 13. I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such a supposition. 3 "Inciditur omnis jam deliberatio si intelligitur non posse fieri, aut si necessitas affertur." Cicero de Orat. ii. For an account of things, dvvarà nulv, vid. lib. ii. c. 19. Such minute research, as it tends rather to bewilder, must of necessity be excluded from rhetoric, which is always supposed to address an audience of ordinary abilities; o kρITÈS VTÓKEITαι Elvaι anλous, cap. ii. § 13; whereas such distinctions could only be appreciated by the philosopher and man of education. normative values? 29 litical sci whoever but a sci ence, de logic, and of that branch of the science of social life analytical which recognises the subject of morals; and it partly and poresembles logic, partly the declamations of the so- ences; phists: and in exact proportion as one shall attempt 6. and to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are general treats it faculties, but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly not as a do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act faculty of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain definite subject-matter, and not of words alone. Let us, viates however, even on the present occasion, discuss such from the points as it is worth while to enlarge upon, and 7. which still reserve the more full consideration for the science of social life: for nearly all the questions sions for on which men deliberate, and on which the delibera- the emtive orator harangues, those at least of the highest ployment of delibeconcernment, are in number five; and these are rative oraquestions of finance, of war and peace, and again re- tory., 1. πόροι. specting the safeguard of the territory, and respect- 2. Toléing imports and exports, and also respecting legisla- μo. 3. ture. art. Five occa φυλακή. 4. τροφή. So that it will be fitting that the orator, who is 5. vóμo. about to give his advice on the subject of the finance 8. i. πóof the state, be acquainted with its revenues, both pol. Fi5 The analytical science seems to have been the analysis of arguments. 6 All society supposes law (vóμoi); the first object of which is the support of its inhabitants internally (pop); and the second its territory externally (øvλaкn); in maintaining which war (wóλɛμos) must some time or other be unavoidable, and to carry that on, fixed revenues (ópoi) are requisite. We may observe, then, a regular gradation in these five questions; though in his examination of them Aristotle proceeds analytically, and takes that which first presents itself in civilized society; namely, the ways and means. Xenophon also, in his Memorabilia, represents Socrates as using nearly the same five subjects and arrangement, when dissuading Glaucon, a young Athenian, from attempting politics too early. Perhaps Aristotle may have borrowed the hint from him. Cf. Xenoph. Mem. lib. iii. c. 6: and a translation of the whole passage in the posthumous works of Dr. Franklin, vol. v. p. 77. Lond. 1819. The reader will find an instance of Tpoon practised by: the piratical states of Greece, in Thucydides, lib. i. c. 5, and of Tópot in the first tax levied at Rome, when the militia were turned into a standing army, during the war with Veii. Livy, lib. iv. nances. |