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A BRIEF

OF THE

ART OF RHETORICK.

BY

THOMAS HOBBES.

BOOK I.-CHAP. I.

That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving
the Passions of the Judge; but chiefly in Proofs.
And that this Art is Profitable.

This

WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by chance; but some by method. method may be discovered: and to discover Method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stir up the Judges, Anger, Envy, Fear, Pity, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Commonwealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the question. And that which the pleader is to shew, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: 'Tis so: or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, 'tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the Ruler he

means to use.

It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofs; which are Infer ences: and all Inferences being Syllogismes, a Logician, if he

would observe the difference between a plain Syllogisme, and an Enthymeme, (which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all Syllogismes and Inferences belong properly to Logick; whether they infer truth or probability and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of natural abilities, would arry an evil cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long Scientifical proofs, drawn from the principles through many Syllogismes; and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the vertue of well expressing the mind.

CHAP. II.

The Definition of Rhetorick.

RHETORICK, is that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to win belief in

the hearer.

Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.

The belief that proceeds from our Invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofs of what we alledge.

Proofs are, in Rhetorick, either Examples, or Enthymemes, as in Logick, Inductions, or Syllogismes. For an Example is a short Induction, and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of publick business needlessly 1.

And it might be added, in order to gratify the pride of the auditor by leaving it to him to supply the deficiency.

CHAP. III.

Of the several kinds of Orations and of the Principles of Rhetorick

IN all Orations, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also. If he hear only, that's one kind of Gration, and is called Demonstrative.

If he judge, he must judge either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, there's another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.

If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called Judicial.

So there are three kinds of Orations; Demonstrative, Judicial, Deliberative.

To which belong their proper times. To the Demonstrative, the Present; To the Judicial, the Past; and to the Deliberative, the time to come.

And their proper Offices. To the Deliberative, Exhortation and Dehortation. To the Judicial, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstrative, Praising and Dispraising.

And their proper ends. To the Deliberative, to Prove a thing Profitable, or Unprofitable. To the Judicial, Just, or Unjust. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dishonourable.

The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn; are the common Opinions that men have concerning Profitable, and Unprofitable; Just, and Unjust; Honourable, and Dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of Orations questionable. For as in Logick, where certain and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proof, the Principles must be all infallible Truths: so in Rhetorick the Principles must be common Opinions, such as the Judge is already possessed with: because the end of Rhetorick is victory; which consists in having gotten Belief.

And because nothing is Profitable, Unprofitable, Just, Unjust, Honourable, or Dishonourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, Unprofitable, Just, Unjust, Honourable, and Dishonourable; an Orator must be ready in other Principles; namely, of what is done and not

done; possible and not possible; to come and not to come; and what is Greater, and what is Lesser; both in general, and particularly applyed to the thing in question; as what is more and less, generally; and what is more profitable, and less profitable, etc. particularly.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Subject of Deliberatives; and the Abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of Business of State.

IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the Subject, wherein, and the Ends whereto the Orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The Subject is always something in our own power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to Rhetorick, but for the most part to the Politicks; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.

1. Of levying of Money. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before-hand, the revenue of the State, how much it is, and wherein it consisteth; and alsc how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same This knowledge is gotten partly by a man's own experience, partly by relations, and accounts in writing.

2. Of Peace and War. Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be: and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and relations at home; and partly by the sight of wars, and of their events abroad.

3. Of the Safeguard of the Country. Wherein he only is able to give counsell, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.

4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.

5. Of making Laws. To which is necessary so much Political, or Civil Philosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from with

out or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the several Governments in times past, by History; and partly by observing the Government of the times present in several Nations, by Travel.

So that to him that will speak in a Councell of State, there is necessary this; History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to export or import.

CHAP. V.

Of the Ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.

AN Orator in Exhorting always propoundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto : and in Dehortation the contrary.

By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prosperity with vertue, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

1. Nobility. Which to a State or Nation is, to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a private man, to have been descended lawfully of a Family, which hath yielded most antiently, and in most number, men known to the World for vertue, riches, or any thing in general estimation.

2. Many and good Children. Which is also publick and private. Publick, when there is much youth in the State endued with vertue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance). Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The vertues commonly respected in Women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Houswifery, without Sordidness.

3. Riches. Which is, Money, Cattel, Lands, Housholdstuffe; with the power to dispose of them.

4. Glory. Which is, the reputation of Vertue, or of the

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