possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.

5. Honour. Which is, the glory of benefiting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another man's safety, or riches. The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publick Pensions, Adorations, Presents.

6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.

To

7. Beauty. Which is to different Ages different. Youth, strength of body, and sweetness of aspect. To Full Men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To Old Men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.

8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.

9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in height, breadth, and thickness of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hindrance to the quickness of his motion. 10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, and with the least trouble.

11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good. 12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.

13. Vertue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of Praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.
Dehortation is from the contraries of these.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Colours or common Opinions concerning Good and Evil.

IN Deliberatives, the Principles, or Elements from whence we draw our Proofs, are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Comparative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, or Indisputable.

The Indisputable Principles are such as these: Good, is that which we love for it self.

And that, for which we love somewhat else.

And that which all things desire.

And that to every man which his reason dictates.

And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied. And that which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of these.

And that which preserves any of these.

And that which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the Good, and reject the Evil, is Good.

And to take the greater Good, rather than the less; and the lesser Evil, rather than the greater.

Further, all Vertues are Good.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautiful.

And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence; and other like Habits.

And Health, Beauty, Strength, etc.

And Riches.

And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or do; also Towardliness, Will, and the like.

And whatsoever Art, or Science.

And Life.

And whatsoever is Just.

The Disputable Principles are such as follow: That is Good, whose contrary is Evil.

And whose contrary is Good for our Enemies.

And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.

And of which there cannot be too much.

And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed. And that which many desire.

And that which is praised.

And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise.

And what good we prefer.

And what we do advise.

And that which is possible, is Good (to undertake).
And that which is easie.

And that which depends on our own Will.
And that which is proper for us to do.
And what no man else can do.

And whatsoever is Extraordinary.

And what is suitable.

And that which wants a little of being at an end.

And what we hope to master.

And what we are fit for.

And what evil men do not.

And what we love to do.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evi, comparatively.

THE Colours of Good comparatively depend partly upon the following Definitions of Comparatives.

1. More, is so much, and somewhat besides.

2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much. 3. Greater and more in number are laid only Comparatively to Less, and Fewer in number.

4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is ex ceeded by the Most of the same kind.

Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely. Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively, then, are these.

Greater Good is Many, than fewer, or one of those many. And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good than another good, whose kind is greater than another's kind. And Greater is that from which another Good follows; than the Good which follows.

And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.

And that which causes the greater Good.

And that which proceeds from a greater Good.

And Greater is that which is chosen for it self, than that which is chosen from somewhat else.

And the end Greater than that which is not the end.
And that which less needs other things, than that which

more.

And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another.

And the Beginning, than not the Beginning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or Evil, than that which is not the Beginning; and the End, than that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both ways: as Leodamas against Chabrias, would have the Actor more to blame than the Advisor; and against Callistratus, the Advisor more than the Actor.] And the Cause, than not the Cause.

And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause. And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good or Evil. And that which is Scarce, greater than that which is Plentiful; because harder to get.

And that which is Plentiful, than that which is Scarce; because oftener in Use.

And that which is easie, than that which is hard.

And that whose Contrary is greater.

And that whose Want is greater.

And Vertue than not Vertue, a greater Good. Vice, than not Vice, a greater Evil.

And greater Good, or Evil is that, the effects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful.

And the effects of greater Vertues, or Vices.

And the Excess whereof is more tolerabl, a greater Good. And those things which may with more honour be desired. And the desire of better things.

And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And that which wise men prefer.

And that which is in better men.

And that which better men chuse.

And that which is more, than that which is less delightful. And that which is more, than that which is less honourable. And that which we would have for our selves and Friends,

a greater Good; and the contrary a greater Evil.

And that which is Lasting, than that which is not Lasting. And that which is Firm, than that which is not Firm.

And what many desire, than what few.

And what the Adversary, or Judge confesseth to be greater,

is greater.

And Common than not Common.

And not Common than Common.

And what is more Laudable.

And that which is more Honoured, a greater Good.
And that which is more Punished, a greater Evil.

And both Good and Evil divided than undivided, appear greater.

And Compounded than Simple, appear greater.

And that which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantagious, greater than otherwise.

And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto. And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less.

And that which is nearest to the end designed.

And that which is Good or Evil to ones self, than that which is simply so.

And possible, than not possible.

And that which comes toward the end of our Life.

And that which we do really, than that which we do for show. And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be.

And that which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.

And that which serves us in great necessity.

And that which is joyned with less trouble.

And that which is joyned with more delight.

And of the two, that which added to a third, makes the whole the greater.

And that which having, we are more sensible of.
And in every thing, that which we most esteem.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the several Kinds of Governments.

BECAUSE Hortation and Dehortation concern the Commonwealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil; as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we