must speak of them also in the Concrete; that is, of what is Good or Evil to each sort of Commonwealth in special.

The Government of a Commonwealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy, or Monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.

Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Laws prescribe for best.

Oligarchy is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which Government, if he limit by Law, is called Kingdom; if by his own will, Tyranny.

The end of Democracy, or the Peoples Government, is Liberty.

The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that govern. The end of Aristocracy is good Laws, and good ordering of the City.

The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his own Authority.

Good therefore, in each sort of Government is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade or diswade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their designs; and their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politicks.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.

IN a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise. or Dispraise; the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Honourable and Dishonourable.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whether it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same Principles. Which are these:

Honourable, is that, which we love for itself, and is withal laudable.

And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good. And Vertue.

Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.

The kinds of it are these;

1. Justice; which is a Vertue whereby every man obtains what by Law is his.

2. Fortitude; which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself Honourably, and according to the Laws, in time of danger.

3. Temperance; which is a Vertue whereby a man Governs himself in matter of pleasure according to the Law.

4. Liberality; which is a Vertue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.

5. Magnanimity; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.

6. Magnificence; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.

7. Prudence; which is an Intellectual Vertue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.

And Honourable, are the Causes, and effects of things Honourable.

And the Works of Vertue.

And the signs of Vertue.

And those actions, the reward whereof is Honour.

And the reward whereof is rather Honour, than Money. And that which we do not for our own sakes.

And what we do for our Countries good, neglecting our own. And those things are Honourable, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.

And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living.

And what we do for other men, especially for Benefactors. And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but with ut fear of Adversary.

And of the more Honourable and better men, the Vertues are more Honourable.

And more Honourable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit, than those which tend to ones own.

And Honourable are those things which are Just.
And Revenge is Honourable.

And Victory.

And Honour.

And Monuments.

And those things which happen not to the living.
And things that excel.

And what none can do but we.

And possessions we reap no profit by.

And those things which are had in honour particularly in several places.

And the signs of praise.

And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or mechanick. And that which seems Honourable; Namely such as follow. Vices confining upon Vertue.

And the extreams of Vertues.

And what the Auditors think Honourable.

And that which is in estimation.

And that which is done according to custom.

Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must shew, that he whom he praiseth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly, and willingly.

And he does so, who does the same often.

Praise, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a Vertue, Action, or Work.

But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular proof.

To Magnify and to Praise, differ in themselves, as Felicity and Vertue. For Praise declares a mans Vertue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.

Praise is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Do it be cause 'tis good, is a Precept. But to say, He is good because he did it, is Praise.

An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of Amplifi cation; such as these:

He was the first that did it.
The only man that did it.

The special man that did it.

He did it with disadvantage of time.

He did it with little help.

He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honours for such Actions.

Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others ; especially with such as are renowned.

And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration, than to any other. For here the Actions are confessed; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster.

СНАР. Х.

Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.

IN a Judicial Oration, which consists in Accusation and Defence, the thing to be proved is, that Injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three:

1. The causes that move to Injury.

2. The Persons apt to do Fnjury.

3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.

An Injury is a voluntary offending of another man contra ry to the Law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion.

The causes of Voluntary Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from the doers disposition, or

not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Natural necessity. Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by Custom, or upon Premeditation, or in Anger, or out of Intemperance.

By Chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done nei.

ther orderly, nor always, nor most commonly after the same

manner.

By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly, and always, or for the most part after the same manner.

By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.

By Custom those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.

Upon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose to Revenge.

Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.

In sum, every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit or Pleasure.

The Colours of Profitable are already set down.
The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next.

СНАР. ХІ.

Of the Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Pleasure.

PLEASURE is a sudden and sensible motion of the Soul, towards that which is Natural.

Grief is the Contrary.

Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion. And to return to ones own Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not violent.

Unpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity,

as Cares, Study, Contentions.

The contrary whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour and Care: also, Play, Rest, Sleep, are Pleasant.

Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.

Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual; as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Reason.

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