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And to remember better the Good received, than the Ill. And to endure injuries patiently.

And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, than of the Sword.

And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, rather than of a Judge.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Colours or Common Opinions concerning Injuries

comparatively.

COMMON Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are

such as these:

Greater is the Injury which proceed from greater Iniquity. And from which proceedeth greater damage.

And of which there is no revenge.

And for which there is no remedy.

And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischief to himself.

He does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.

And he that does it often.

Greater Injury is that, against which Laws and Penalties were first made.

And that which is more brutal, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.

And that which is done upon more premeditation.

And by which more Laws are broken.

And which is done in the place of Execution.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.

And which is committed against well deservers.

And which is committed against the unwritten Law; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.

And which is committed against the written Law; because he that will do Injury, neglecting the penalty set down in the written Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at ali.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Proofs Inartificial.

OF Artificial Proofs we have already spoken.

Inartificial Proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

1. Laws. And those are Civil, or written Law: the Law or Custom of Nations: and the universal Law of Nature.

2. Witness. And those are such as concern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present. 3. Evidences, or Writings.

4. Question, or Torture.

5. Oaths. And those be either given, or taken, or both, or neither.

For Laws, we use them thus:

When the written Law makes against us, we appeal to the Law of Nature, alledging,

That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.

That the Law of Nature is immutable; the written Law mutable.

That the written Law is but seeming justice; the Law of Nature very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.

That the Judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Justice.

That they are better men that obey unwritten, than written Laws.

That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that is the true one, which makes for us.

And that the cause of the Law being abolished, the Law is no more of Validity.

But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must alledge,

That a man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judge against the Law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the Law.

That men seek not Equity because 'tis good simply, but because good for them.

That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law. That as in other Arts, and namely in Physick, fallacies are pernitious; so in a Common-wealth 'tis pernitious to use pretexts against the Law.

And that in Common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the Laws, is prohibited.

For Witnesses, we must use them thus:

When we have them not, we must stand for Presumptions, and say,

That in Equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probability.

That Presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed.

That they cannot lye.

When we have Witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say,

That Presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished. That if Presumptions were enough, Witnesses were superfluous.

For Writings, when they favour us, we must say,

That Writings are private and particular Laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences, abolisheth the Law. That since Contracts and Negotiations pass by Writings, he that bars their use, dissolves humane Society.

Against them, if they favour the Adversary, we may say, That since Laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less Writings.

And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is just, than what is in the Writing.

That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.

That the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civil, or Natural; or to Justice; or to Honesty.

That 'tis repugnant to some other Writing before, or after. That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implyed cunningly).

For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we

must say,

That 'tis the only testimony that is certain.

But if it make for the Adversary, we may say,

That men inforced by Torture, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.

That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain. For Oaths; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may alledge,

That he makes no scruple to be forsworn.

That by swearing, he will carry the cause; which not swearing, he must lose.

That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, than of the Adversary.

He that refuseth to take the Oath, may say,

That the matter is not worth so much.

That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carryed his cause.

That to try it by swearing for a religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combate.

He that is willing to take the Oath, may pretend,

That he had rather trust himself, than his Adversary; and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.

That 'tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn Judges.

He that offers the Oath may pretend,

That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.
That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.

That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Judges to be sworn.

And of these are to be compounded the Forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.

But if one have sworn contrary to a former Oath, he may pretend,

That he was forced.

That he was deceived, and that neither of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.

But if the Adversary do so, he may say,

That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane Society.

And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge our cause; when we will not stand to that we swear ourselves.

And so much for Proofs inartificial.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The Introduction.

Or Belief proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in Proof, is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the Speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.

The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions upon which a mans belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning Vertue, book i. chap. 9, partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Passions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for Good Will: of which among the Passions.

The Principles concerning Belief, arising from the Passion of the Hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several Passions in order.

In every one of which three things are to be considered: 1. First, how men are affected.

2. Secondly, towards whom.

3. Thirdly, for what.

CHAP. II.

Of Anger.

ANGER is desire of Revenge, joyned with grief for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.

The object of Anger is always some particular, or individual thing.

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