And is to an Enthymeme in Rhetorick, as any Proposition is to a Syllogisme in Logick.

And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a Conclusion, and both together make an Enthymeme. As for Example,

To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, proTherefore he that's wise will not suffer his Chil

cures envy.

dren to be over-learned.

Of Sentences there be four sorts.

For they either require Proofs, or not: that is, are mani fest, or not.

Such as are manifest, are either so, as soon as they are ut tered; as,

Health is a great good.

Or as soon as they are considered; as,

Men used to hate whom they have hurt.

Such as are not manifest, are either Conclusions of Enthymemes; as,

He that's wise will not suffer his Children, etc.

Or else are Enthymematical; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as,

Mortal Men ought not to carry Immortal Anger.

A Sentence not Manifest, ought to be either Inferred or Confirmed.

Inferred thus:

'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envyed by ones fellow Citizens. A wise Man therefore will not have

his Children over-learned.

Confirmed thus:

A wise Man will not have his Children over-learned, seeing too much Learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.

If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence let it be short. Sentences become not every Man; but only old Men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young Man speak Sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant Man speak Sentences, is absurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denyed, when any laudable custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.

The commodities of Sentences, are two.

One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a Man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.

Another is, that Sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good Sentences, he shall be esteemed a good Man; and if evil, an

evil Man.

Thus much of Sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Invention of Enthymemes.

SEEING an Enthymeme differs from a Logical Syllogisme, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a Man may argue, ought to be certain, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a Syllogisme Rhetorical, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make War or no, must know what their Revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, etc. It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.

Proper, I call those things which are least common to others; as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him, and Diomedes; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the War young, and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one general Place, from that which is proper.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.

FORASMUCH as Enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.

An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.

That Enthymeme which brings a Man to an impossibility, is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, Evil, Just, Unjust, Honourable, and Dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applyed to Particular Subjects, or in Concrete.

Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the Abstract or Universal.

The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtful, neither is Temperance profitable.

Another Place may be from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Just be Good; then what is justly is well: but justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.

A third from Relatives; as, This Man has justly done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives, for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him. A fourth from Comparison, three ways.

From the Great to the Less: as, He has stricken his Father; and therefore this Man.

From the Less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less Man.

From Equality: as, If Captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a Victory; why should Sophisters?

Another from the Time: as Philip to the Thebans: If 1 had required to pass through your Country with my Army, before I had ayded you against the Phocæans, there is no

doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you.

A sixth from what the Adversary says of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a Bribe to betray the Army; and he answering no; What (say he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?

This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation than the Accuser.

A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; a Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.

An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.

A ninth from Division: as, If all Men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.

A tenth from Induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, etc. And therefore every where.

An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.

A twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.

A thirteenth from two contrary Consequences'; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease Men: If he speak falsely, he shall displease God.

Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth, you shall please men: therefore by all means be an Orator.

A Fourteenth from the quality that Men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all Men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no Liberty ; but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will

approve.

A Fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalize

strangers for their vertues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?

A Sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.

A Seventeenth from that, that Men change their mind: as, If when we were in Banishment, we fought to recover our Country, why should we not fight now to retain it?

An Eighteenth from a fained end: as, that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another; but as one that would partake less of the Glory.

A Nineteenth from the Cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had Cause to do it.

A Twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that Laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt Water, may need salting.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.

LET the first Place be from inspection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, or of the Speaker, or both. Of the Adversary; as, He says, he loves the People, and yet he was in the Conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the Speaker; as, He says, I am contentious, and yet I never began Suit. Of both; as, He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Money.

A Second, from shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen embracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she embraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation.

A Third, from rendring of the cause; as, Leodamas, t whom it was objected, that he had, under the Thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand: