thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants, by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred. A Fourth, from better Counsel; as, He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact. A Fifth, from Incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddess, they ought not to Mourn; and if they thought her a Mortal, they ought not to Sacrifice. A Sixth, (which is proper to Judicial Orations,) from an Inference of Errour; as, If he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it1. Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility, please more than Ostensive for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Auditor. Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the Speaker. CHAP. XXVI. Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes. Or seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the Form of speaking; as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his Conclusion, as if it followed necessarily, though it do not. A Second from an ambiguous word. A Third from that which is true divided, to that which is false joyned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death, and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned, to that which is false Aristotle mentions a seventh element, derivable from puns upon words. This however our analyst entirely overlooks; from the consideration probably that it could contribute but little to the argumentative strength of an oration; or because it may be applied no less to confirmation than to refutation. divided; as, one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful. A Fourth from Amplification of the Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his Accusation. A Fifth from signs; as, when a Man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life. A Sixth from that which comes by chance, as if from this, that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a Man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boys were profitable. A Seventh from the Consequence, as Banishment is to be desired, because a banished Man has choice of places to dwell in. An Eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his Government, the War began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Pelponnesian War be gan the Plague, therefore Pericles that persuaded that War, did ill. A Ninth from the Omission of some circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawful, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Father's consent to choose her own Husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen. A Tenth, from that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, 'Tis probable, he foresaw, that if he did it, he should be suspected; therefore 'tis probable he did it not. From this Place one may infer both ways that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected. Upon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse; and the worse the better. CHAP. XXVII. Of the Wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary. AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme, or by an Objection. The Places of opposite Syllogismes are the same with the Places of Syllogismes, or Enthymemes: for a Rhetorical Syllogisme is an Enthymeme. The Places of Objections are four. First, from the same, as, To the Adversary that proves love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet Love is want; or particularly thus: The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good. The Second from Contraries: as, if the Adversary say, A good Man does good to his friends, an Objection might be made, that then an evil Man will do also evil to his friends. The Third from Similitude: as thus, if the Adversary say, all Men that are injured, do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then, all Men that had received Benefits should love their Benefactors, that is to say, be grateful. The Fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a Man shall say, that drunken Men ought to be pardoned those Acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such Acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkenness. And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Example, or from a Sign Fallible, or from a Sign Infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability may be confuted really, by shewing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but apparently or sophistically, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judge thinks the Probability not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon. [The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the Fact proved probable, conceives it as true. For the Understanding has no Object but Truth. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false: and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is, he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.] An Enthymeme from a fallible sign, is answered, by shewing the sign to be fallible. An Enthymeme from an Example, is answered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary. If the Adversary have more Examples than we, we must make appear that they are not applycable to the Case. An Enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable. CHAP. XXVIII. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which Arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the Matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes. THE first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places, appears by this, that Amplification and Extenuation do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore Enthymemes, to be drawn from Common Places, and therefore are not the Places themselves. The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other. The third, that an Objection is no Enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more but an Opinion, Example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude. Thus much of Examples, Sentences, Enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or answered. There remains Elocution and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Book. BOOK III. CHAP. I. Of the Original of Elocution and Pronuntiation. THREE things being necessary to an Oration, namely, Proof Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows. As for Action, or Pronuntiation, so much as is necessary for an Orator, may be fetcht out of the Book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the Action of the Stage. For Tragedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the magnitude, tone, and measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to Art, than is either Proof, or Elocution. And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for Poetry. But Oratorical Action has not been hitherto reduced to Art. And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and feigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a Stile, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words. But when the Poets changed their Stile, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words, and a Government of the Voice and Measures proper to themselves. Seeing therefore Pronuntiation, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the Art of Poetry. [In the mean time this may be one general rule. If the |