CHAP. XV.

Of the Narration.

THE Narration is not always continued and of one Piece; but sometimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.

For there being in a Narration something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, which the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for Example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his Wisdom: whereby your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary always that the Narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self, and blameable in ones Adversary: As, I advised him but he would take no Counsel.

In Narrations, a Man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers Books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his Wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, setting his Arms a kenbold, he answered, etc. by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.

In an Oration a Man does better to shew his affection than his Judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; than to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But Favour follows Goodness; whereas Wisdom procures Envy.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason

or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not dishonourable.

3. A third from the Recompence, as, I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.

4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Errour, Mischance, or Constraint.

5. A fifth from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.

6. A sixth from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father, Kinsman, or Friend.

7. From the Comprehension of those that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good Men.

8. From Comparison with such as have been falsely accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.

9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be believed.

10. From that the Judgment belongs to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this Matter.

11. From Crimination of the Crimination; as, It serves only to pervert Judgment.

12. A twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation, and is taken from some sign; as Teucer is not to be believed, because his Mother was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's Enemy.

13. A thirteenth, proper to Crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixt: as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, coming both to Crimination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: for he that purgeth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that Criminates, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, Diomedes chose him for his Companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardice, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honour.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Narration.

THE Narration is not always continued and of one Piece; but sometimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.

For there being in a Narration something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, which the Orator inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for Example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Valour, and from others his Wisdom: whereby your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary always that the Narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self, and blameable in ones Adversary: As, I advised him but he would take no Counsel.

In Narrations, a Man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers Books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his Wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, setting his Arms a kenbold, he answered, etc. by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.

In an Oration a Man does better to shew his affection than his Judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; than to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But Favour follows Goodness; whereas Wisdom procures Envy.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason

must be rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, She loved her brother better than her Husband or Children; she added, for Husband and Children I may have more; but another Brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For 'tis not easily believed, that any Man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.

Besides in a Narration, not only the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his Narration a Man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A Narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.

In Deliberative Orations; that is, where soever the question is of things to come; a Narration, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that Men may deliberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proof; for 'tis Example.

There may also be Narration in Deliberatives in that part where Crimination and Praise come in: But that part is not Deliberative, but Demonstrative.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.

PROOFS are to be applyed to something controverted. The Controversie in Judicial Oration is, Whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Just, or no.

In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty, (for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse,) and therefore the Fuct is chiefly to be insisted on.

In Demonstratives, the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the Fact are to be proved.

In Deliberatives, the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so great: or whether it be just; or whether it be profitable.

Besides the application of the Proof to the question, a Man

ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a sign he does the same in the Cause.

The Proofs themselves are either Examples, or Enthymemes. A Deliberative Oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather Examples, than Enthymemes.

But a Judicial Oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together, for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a Man to endeavour to prove every thing by Enthymeme, least like some Philosophers, he collect what is known, from what is less known.

Nor ought a Man to use Enthymemes, when he would move the Hearer to some affection: For seeing divers Motions do mutually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the Enthymeme, or the affection that he would move.

For the same reason, a Man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would express Manners.

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Manners, he may withal use Sentences.

A Deliberative Oration is more difficult than a Judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a Judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from principles, than without.

Besides, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary; of speaking of himself; of raising passion. He therefore that wants matter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some person to praise or dispraise.

And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise some body else, as his Father, or Kinsman, or the very vertues or vices themselves.

He that wants not Proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his Manners: but he that has no Proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his Manners. For a good Man is as acceptable, as an exact Oration.

Of Proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the com

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