sidered it as the rò réλos of the deliberative? (chap. x. 19.) Do I understand you to say, that he introduces it because it is the end of human action? You have before stated that the εὐδαιμονία was the σκόπος of human pursuit, and now state that the ovupέpov and άyaðòv are the rò TÉλos of actions; explain the meaning of the words σκόπος and τέλος. Give the definition of ἡδονὴ and λύπη. How would you infer the definition of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν Are these definitions the oroxea from which Aristotle deduces the ion in this chapter1? CHAP. XII. What division does Aristotle make and premise of the s ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι ? What are the three subdivisions of the ὅταν οἴωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν ? Why does Aristotle refer the discussion of the duvaròr Tрaxovaι to the second book of Rhetoric? Explain why the second part of the division, viz. avrois duvarov, should belong more especially to the judicial species, when the δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι is considered as a τύπος. Enumerate the threefold subdivision of the Orav oirraι ἑαυτοῖς δυνατόν. To what things do those persons trust who rely on the punishment being less than the gain, if detected? (third inember of the subdivision.) Enumerate the things to which those persons trust who hope to escape punishment if detected: (second member of the subdivision.) CHAP. XIII. Why should right and wrong be defined in reference to two kinds of law? Why is the twofold distinction of persons (πpòs ous) in reference to whom right and wrong is defined, necessary? (3.) The reader is referred to Hobbes' Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, for an enumeration of the Tómo throughout this treatise. How many species of law does Aristotle enumerate? Give the definition of το ἀδικεῖσθαι. From whence does Aristotle infer this definition? (chap. x. 3.) What is the threefold division which Aristotle makes of ἐγκλήματα, or accusation ? Why does Aristotle decline treating of the ykλýμara dià Táboç in this chapter? In what kind of cases do men, generally and specifically speaking, manifest the πpoaípeσis in action? (chap. x. 4.) Is it necessary for an accuser to lay great stress on the προαίρεσις ? Under what circumstances, or with what dispositions, do men act by deliberative choice? (chap. xii. 1.) Do you consider that the depravity and injustice of an act is manifested by the poaiperis of the agent? Are they a σημεῖον oι τεκμήριον of deliberate choice ? Is the προαίρεσις ἃ σημεῖον οι τεκμήριον of depravity and injustice? How many distinctions of right and wrong (dikala kai dyalà) are there? Why is this twofold distinction made? Into how many species does Aristotle divide the subaltern genus ἄγραφα ? Can you give a reason why the species "remarkably virtuous and vicious," (тà μèv кať vπeρßoλǹy, &c.,) is not included in the written law? When Solon was asked why he had not enacted a special law against parricide, what was his answer? Does not this answer give the reason why ädika of this species are not included in the written law ἑκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν ? Mention some virtues, which as falling under the species кaľ vερßоλǹν, &c., are not noticed in written laws? Is it because they are so universally acknowledged and required, that they are not noticed in written laws? What is the second species of τὰ δικαία and ἄδικα ? What is the cause of this defect in the written law of states? Give the definition of equity. CHAP. XIV. What is the standard by which the degrees in criminality may be ascertained? With what view does Aristotle infer εἴδη, ὁσὰ ἂν ᾖ ἀπὸ pei Sovos ádıkías? (vide chap. ix. 39, with respect to the avenous, and Book ii. 26.) What kind of injuries are comparatively the more severely felt? You stated in reply to questions in the first book, (chap. x.) that Kakia generally, and dkparía specifically, were the causes of acts of injustice characterized by the πpoaipɛois, how then would you ascertain the comparative enormity of adiknμara? (vide Annotationes Schrader.) Are adiknμara of this description estimated by the hurt done, or the poaipeσic of the agent? (xii. 5.) If the hurt done be irremediable, is the act of injustice capable of being amplified ? Will the definition of αδικήματα depend on the πρόνοια of the agent? (vide Annotationes xiv. 5.) Am I then to understand that adiknμara which are irremediable, incapable of being adequately punished, of being revenged, which are done frequently, and K povoias, may be considered μείζονα ? CHAP. XV. How many distinctions of the riotεis åteɣvai are there? Into how many species is the distinction vóμo subdivided? Into how many subaltern genera is the distinction μáprupes (chap. xv. 13) divided? Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus παλαιοὶ μάρτυρες subdivided ? What kind of persons and things constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων) οι the μáρrupes Taλaloì? (vide chap. xv. 13, 14.) What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων) of the μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ ? (chap. xv. 14.) Is the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν τῶν yɛvoμévwv,) viz. poets and illustrious men, most adapted to the judicial species of oration? Is the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν Twv éσoμévwv,) viz. soothsayers, oracles, and proverbs, equally serviceable in the deliberative as in the judicial species of oration? Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus μáρrνρes πрóσpаro divided? (chap. xv. 13.) What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου) of the μáρrupes Tрóoparoi? (chap. xv. 15, last line.) What kind of persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (οἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς κινδύνου) of the μάρτυρες πρόσφα TOL? (chap. xv. 15, first line.) Which of the two lowest species (viz. the oi yvúpiμoi, and oi âv dókwor Peúdεσ0αι, or viva voce evidence,) is most entitled to credit? Aristotle has hitherto treated of the different kinds of μáρrupes, and he then proceeds to consider the manner in which their credit is to be amplified and extenuated by the orator; if the orator then has no witnesses to support his case, by what arguments must he diminish the credit of testimony? (chap. xv. 17.) To what circumstances does testimony speak? (18.) Is the impeachment of the veracity of a witness by an enthymem (EiKÓTwv) a solid objection to his testimony? Am I then to understand, that if the orator has no testimony to adduce, he must, 1st. Insist on the propriety of the judge deciding, yvwun Tй úpíorη. (vide Book I. chap. xv. 5, 12, 17. Book II. chap. xxv. 10.) 2nd. That koтa are better than witnesses, as they are never open to corruption. 3rd. That iкотa are never convicted of falsehood? If the orator has witnesses to support his case, by what arguments should he corroborate their testimony, and extenuate the εἴκοτα ? What two precepts does Aristotle give with respect to the extenuation and amplification of the συνθῆκαι and βάσανοι ? What is the fourfold division with respect to oaths? GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL SPECIES OF ORATION. IN treating of the judicial species of oration, what does Aristotle propose that the orator should first consider in his accusation? If the question be simply whether his adversary has committed an injury, the orator must prove,-what? (chap. x. 2.) If an act of injustice has been committed, but that act of injustice has not been defined by the written law, under which species of law must he prove his case? (chap. xiii. 14; xv. 4.) Am I then to understand, that in inquiring whether his adversary has committed an act of injustice, the orator's first business is to prove that he has acted for some end; secondly, that he was a likely person to commit it; and thirdly, that the object injured was a person likely to be injured ? Are these the three general points which he must prove against his adversary? What is the specific point he must prove against his adversary? Why is the general question, Whether the adversary has committed an act of injustice, (chap. x. xi. xii.) and the specific question, Whether he has acted unjustly, (chap. xiii.) distinguished? (vide chap. x. 7.) Το prove that his adversary has acted unjustly against the state, or a private individual, what must the orator urge against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 7.) If the act is clearly done by a voluntary agent, on what principle must the orator prove his adversary to have acted? (chap. xiii. 7.) |