If the act is clearly done by deliberative choice, what is the next question an orator must prove against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 9.) To prove simply that his adversary has acted unjustly, how many specific questions arise for the orator's consideration? Are they not three? 1st. Whether he has violated the written law? (chap. xiii. 9.) 2nd. If he has not violated the written law, whether he has acted with depravity so excessive as not to be defined by the written law? (chap. xiii. 12.) 3rd. Whether he has acted in violation of equity? (chap. xiii. 12, 13.) ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS ON ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC. BOOK II.-CHAP. I. You stated in reply to questions in the first book, that Aristotle had made three distinctions of πίστεις, viz. διὰ τοῦ ἤθους, διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, διὰ τῶν λόγων: which of these three distinc tions has he already treated of, and which is he now proceeding to discuss? What is the end of Rhetoric, or the object which an orator in speaking has always in view? (vide Annotationes, chap. i. 2.) How does the investment of one's self with moral character effect persuasion in the auditor? (vide Schrader's note, 1, 3.) Must the qualifications by which the speaker invests himself with moral character, be perceived from the speech as existing in him, (vide Book I. chap. ii. 4,) or known to have existed in him before? From the three distinctions of πiores, what do you infer to be the three great accomplishments of a perfect orator? Do I understand you to say, proof by enthymem, investment of himself with moral character, and the excitement of the passions in his auditors? What are the three causes of a speaker's effecting persuasion through moral character ? If a speaker appears to be a man capable of imparting benefits to the state, does he effect persuasion through moral character, by his virtue? (vide chap. ix. 4, definition of virtue.) When Demosthenes in the oration for the crown makes use of the following words, ̓Αλλ ̓ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκεῖνος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐκείνη οὗ μόνον εὔνουν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρα ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀρθῶς τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦτ ̓ ἔπραττεν ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ταῦτ ̓ εἰδὼς μηδ' ἐξητακὼς πόῤῥωθεν ἐπιμελῶς, οὔτ ̓ εἰ εὔνους ἦν οὔτ ̓ εἰ πλούσιος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἤμελλεν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν εἴσεσθαι οὐδ ̓ ὑμῖν ἕξειν συμβουλεύειν. ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγώ, καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον εἰς ὑμᾶς, ἅ μου δυοῖν ἕνεκ ̓ ἀκούσατε προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν, ἑνὸς μέν, ἵν ̓ εἰδῆτε ὅτι μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμην τὰ δέονθ ̓ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς, ἑτέρου δέ, ὅτι μικρὸν ἀναλώσαντες χρόνον πολλῳ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς πάσης πολιτείας ἔσεσθ ̓ ἐμπειρό τεροι, to which distinction of πίστεις does he recur, and through which of the causes φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ, or εὔνοια, does he endeavour to effect persuasion ? CHAP. II. What are the three questions which Aristotle proposes for consideration in treating of the passions? (Book II. chap. i. 9.) With what view was this threefold division necessary ? Is it possible to obtain Tóπo calculated for the excitement of the passions without a knowledge of these three questions proposed by Aristotle? (Book II. chap. i. 9.) Give the definition of anger. Is this definition proposed as a στοιχεῖον from which the τόποι are afterwards inferred ? Does not Aristotle explain this definition by two propositions, viz. 1st. Anger is against some individual on account of contempt to one's self or friends. 2nd. Pain is not so much the consequent of anger as a certain pleasure? Explain the reference which these two explanatory propositions have to the definition of anger. To what cause do you attribute the sensation of pain in anger? To what causes (which are two) do you attribute the sensa tion of pleasure in anger? Can you give any other reasons why pleasure should be a consequent? (Book I. chap. x. 17, 18; chap. xi. 10, 12, 13.) Could you infer a reason from the definition of dóvŋ in the first book? Is the ǹopy a generic or specific term? Under what generic term do you class the ἡ ὀργὴ ? What is the cause of auger ? How many species of the oλywpia are there? Does not Aristotle prove that the Karappóvnoic is a species of ὀλιγωρία from the definition of ὀλιγωρία ? Do you consider the inpearμos to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία ? Explain how Aristotle from its own definition proves the ἐπηρεασμὸς to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία. Is slight attended with a certain pleasure? You have before stated in reply to questions in the former book, that all actions done by men ἑκόντες are ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα : can you show that if the ολιγωρία be a voluntary act, it must be consequently ἡδύ ἢ φαινόμενον ἡδύ ? Why should it not be ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν ? (Book I. chap. x. 18.) To what cause do you attribute the pleasure which the ỏ υβρίζων feels ? How then are men affected when they feel anger? With what kind of persons do they feel angry ? What are the causes of this passion? What is it incumbent on the orator to prove, to excite anger against his adversary? What kind of person must he prove his adversary to be, tc merit anger? When Eschines uses the following arguments in his oration against Ctesiphon, does he endeavour to excite anger against Demosthenes? and by which of the causes olyopia, or its species, does he endeavour to excite it against his adversary? Δεύτερον δὲ καὶ πολὺ τούτου μεῖζον ἀδίκημα ἠδίκησεν, ὅτι τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχαις συνθέμενος· καὶ τηλι καύτην αὐτὸς αὐτῷ δυναστείαν κατεσκεύασεν, ὥστ ̓ ἤδη παριὼν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα πρεσβεύσειν μὲν ἔφη ὅποι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, κἂν μὴ ὑμεῖς ἐκπέμπητε, εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντείποι, καταδουλούμενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ συνεθίζων μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιλέγειν διαδι κασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῶ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατηγεῖον· πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεπονθέναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγείου. μισθοφορῶν δ' ἐν τῷ ξενικῷ κεναῖς χώραις, καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ χρήματα κλέπτων, καὶ τοὺς μυρίους ξένους ἐκμισθώσας ̓Αμφισσεῦσι πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ σχετλιάζοντος ἐν ταῖς ἑκκλησίαις ἐμοῦ, προσέμιξε φέρων αναρπασθέντων τῶν ξένων τὸν κίνδυνον ἀπαρασκεύῷ τῇ πόλει. τί γὰρ ἂν οἴεσθε Φίλιππον ἐν τοῖς τότε καιροῖς εὔξασθαι; οὐ χωρὶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν χωρὶς δ ̓ ἐν ̓Αμφίσσῃ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους διαγωνίσασθαι, ἀθύμους δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας λαβεῖν τηλικαύτης πληγής γεγενημένης; καὶ τηλικούτων κακῶν αἴτιος γεγενημένος Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ δίκην δέδωκεν, ἀλλ ̓ εἰ μὴ καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθήσεται ἀγανακτεῖ· οὐδ ̓ ἱκανόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν κηρύττεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον ἀναῤῥηθήσεται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ἀγανακτεῖ. οὕτως, ὦ ἔοικε, πονηρὰ φύσις μεγάλης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβομένη δημοσίας απεργάζεται συμφοράς. CHAP. III. As the ἡ πράϋνσις is the contrary to the ἡ ὀργὴ, and the τόποι are therefore inferred ratione contrariorum, it will be necessary to propose many questions on this chapter. What is the definition of the ἡ πράϋνσις ? You stated in reply to a former question, that pain and pleasure were consequent to the τὰ πάθη and σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις, (chap. iv.) but are they both consequent to the ἡ πράϋνσις, and which is the σημεῖον of the βούλησις in this passion? CHAP. IV. What is the definition of the τὸ φιλεῖν ? Can you infer from this definition that a friend is perceived from the indications of the ἡ βούλησις ? What are the σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις ? (3.) How many species of the ἡ φίλια are there? (28.) What are the causes which give occasion to the ἡ φίλιο ^ |