What is the difference between the ἡ ὀργὴ and the ἡ ἔχθρα ? How many differences does Aristotle enumerate?

How many, and what are the causes of the exopa which Aristotle enumerates? (30.)

You have stated that the pyn is felt on a count of the oyopia and its species; but if a man is habitually addicted to the oλyopia and its species, are our sentiments those of the ἡ ὀργὴ or ἡ ἔχθρα ?

Do anger and hatred ever differ with respect to the objects against whom they are felt? (xxxi. line 3, 4.)

Can you class both these passions under the genus opéčεis ἄλογοι ?

Does the sensation of the ἡ λύπη accompany the ἔχθρα ? (xxxi. line 10.)

Which of the two passions, the ǹopyǹ and the exopa, does Aristotle consider as incurable?

You stated in a former chapter that the Tuwpia was the object of the ἡ ὀργὴ, what is the object of the ἡ ἔχθρα ? (xxxi. line 6.)

What kind of person will an orator describe his adversary to be, when he endeavours to excite feelings of hatred against him in his auditors?

CHAP. V.

Give the definition of the ὁ φόβος.

Does it follow from this definition that all the rà κaκà are the objects of the ὁ φόβος ?

What kind of evils then excite the ὁ φόβος ?

Is it absolutely necessary for the sensation of the ỏ póßos that the evil should be close at hand?

Can you mention any circumstances, or characters in life, which excite the ò póßos in others? (vii. et seq.)

What is the reason that men are not afraid of such evils as death?

Am I to understand that some hope of safety is essential in the sensation of the ὁ φόβος ? (xiv.)

Is deliberation also essential in the sensation of the ò dóßos? If the rà Kakà be of such a description as to annihilate all hope of safety, and prevent all deliberation in the sufferer, what is the rò Tálos which under such circumstances is felt?

In what chief respects do the sensations of the ỏ póßos and τὸ δεινὸν differ ?

Do I understand you to say, "In the feeling of hope and anxiety, and excitement of deliberation, which accompany the one, but are annihilated in the other?"

Do they differ also in any other remarkable respect? (chap. v. 12, line 4; chap. viii. 13, line 4.)

Do I understand you to say, "In the sensation of the ò ëλeos if the rà κaka were to happen to others and not to ourselves?" Is the difference discoverable in the case of Amasis? Give the definition of the τὸ θαῤῥεῖν.

What is the twofold division which Aristotle makes of the men who feel the rò Jápoos? (xviii.)

What illustration does Aristotle give in support of this distinction?

To which of the three species of oration do you consider appeals to the o póßos most peculiar?

Give me a reason why you consider them most peculiar to the eïdos σvμẞovλEUTIKÒV. (Confer Book I. chap. iii. 4, with the definition of the ὁ φόβος.)

In which of the three species do you consider appeals to the ἡ ὀργὴ, ὁ φθόνος, and ὁ ἔλεος, most likely to occur ?

Does Aristotle approve of such appeals to the ò dikaotñ;? (Book i. chap. i. 5.)

CHAP. VI.

Give the definition of the αἰσχύνη.

Do only acts of depravity, or do the onμeia of such specific vices as illiberality, flattery, &c., ever excite the ǹ aioxúvn? Give me a σημεῖον of the ἡ κολακεία ?

CHAP. VII.

Give the definition of the ἡ χάρις.

Has this word two distinct significations? (vide Schrader Annotationes.)

Which of these two significations is expressive of the ro πάθος ?

With what view does Aristotle explain the xápis as im plying gratuitous benevolence?

Is it for the purpose of showing how it may be amplified? What division of the ai opées does Aristotle make in this chapter? (iii.)

To which division do you consider such invμíaι as hunger and thirst belong?

Is it necessary that the party benefited must be év ry Tolaútη δεήσει to constitute the ἡ χάρις ?

Is it necessary that the party benefiting should assist the other ἐν τῇ τοιαύτη χρεία ?

CHAP. VIII.

Give the definition of the ὁ ἔλεος.

What kind of persons are most sensible of the ỏ λeos? What reason does Aristotle give that the οἱ παντελῶς απολωλότες do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ?

Why do not the οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι feel the ὁ ἔλεος ? What reason does Aristotle give that the οἱ ὄντες ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ θάῤῥει do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ? (vi.)

Can you give another reason drawn from the definition of the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος ?

Can you class the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος under the genus ὄρεξεις ἄλογοι ?

What kind of persons do men pity?

Give me a reason why you except the σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι.

In what respects do the rò devov and ỏ λɛos differ? (xii.) Can you give a reason why certain characters, when represented on the stage, excite pity?

CHAP. IX.

What passion is directly opposed to the ὁ ἔλεος ?

Can you class the ǹ véμɛois and ỏ λɛos under the same genus of the τὰ πάθη ?

What is the logical difference which when added to the generic term, gives the specific terms ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος ? (i. line 4.)

Does not Aristotle define the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ φθόνος by a comparison of each with the ὁ ἔλεος ?

Do you consider the ǹ véμeois and ỏ λɛos to proceed from the same virtuous dispositions? (áñó roũ avroũ žlovs.)

If they do not proceed from the same virtuous dispositions, could they be classed under the same genus of the rà áoŋ? Is the 8 p0óvos opposed in a measure only, or does it differ entirely from the ὁ ἔλεος ?

In what respects do they agree, and in what differ?

Can you infer that the opposite feelings are consequent to these passions?

What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ỏ 40óvos ? What is the opposite feeling and consequent to the ỏ ëλɛos? Do you consider that the ó póvos and ǹ véμeois dispossess us of pity?

What kind of person must the orator show his adversary to be, when he wishes to excite indignation against him in his auditor?

Can you infer from its definition that the ǹ véμɛois is felt at the virtues? (viii.)

You have stated that the véμɛois and the ỏ ëλɛoç are directly opposed to each other, and are under the same genus; can you infer therefore, that if the véμeous is not felt at the virtues, the ò λeos is not felt at the vices of others?

СНАР. Х.

Give the definition of the ὁ φθόνος.

What are the three distinct parts in this definition, which should be distinguished, to obtain a clear understanding of the τόποι ?

When Aristotle says that such persons are likely to feel envy as have equals, from which part of the definition does he infer this τόπος ?

What kind of a person must an orator represent his adversary to be when he wishes to excite the ỏ q¤óvos in the judge?

CHAP. XI.

Give the definition of the ὁ ζῆλος.

Does the ὁ ζῆλος differ from the ὁ φθόνος ?

In what respects do they differ?

Can the ỏ λos be felt at the vices of others?

To what genus of the rà rán does the ỏ λos belong? (i. line 5.)

Is the Karappórnois opposed only, or is it the contrary to the ὁ ζῆλος ?

CHAP. XII.

Why is it necessary that an orator should consider the rà on of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes?

Does Aristotle use the expression rà non as implying only a certain disposition peculiar to men at a certain time of life, or as implying the ai ees, or the virtues and vices?

Are the rà on the effects, or are they only consequent to the αἱ ἡλίκιαι and τύχαι of men ?

You have stated that the orator should consider the rà on of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c.; under which of the three distinctions of πiores would you place this part of Rhetoric? (vide Riccobon in cap. xii. hujus libri.)

Do you consider that, when Aristotle treats of the rà đáơn, αι ἔξεις, and τὰ ἤθη, he considers them to have a relation to the three species of oration?

You stated in reply to a question in the former book, that the ai îλíxiaι and rúxaι of men were not the true causes of actions, but when added to the true causes, give additional weight to an argument in judicial inquiry, (vide Book I. chap. x.) do you consider that the orator should adapt his oration to the Tà non of his auditors in reference to their passions, habits, &c., in the demonstrative and judicial species?

What, generally speaking, are the rà non consequent to youth and old age?

What are the rà 0ŋ consequent to the middle-aged? Why does Aristotle treat of the rà 0n of the young and old before those of the middle-aged?

What, generally speaking, are the rà non of the noble, the rich, and the powerful1?

For a distinct enumeration of the rà on as far as the seventeenth chapter, the reader is referred to Hobbes' Brief, as a distinct exposition would swell these questions to an unnecessary length.