are productive in three ways. 4. Indis putable goods. 5. three ways; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health, or as food is so of health, or as exercise is, because usually it does produc health. These things being laid down, it must be of course that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the non-possession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently. And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the 6. greater above the less. The virtues also must of course be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, 7. must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honourable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure; while, of things honourable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of 8. choice on their own account. So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good. Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it 9. we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, 3 First, continuous; second, discrete; third, contingent. We may observe of Aristotle's several enumerations of elon, that he usually refers a few instances of earliest occurrence to the respective definitions or axioms at the outset of the subject, by virtue of which they belong to the class to which he assigns them. Thus, in the enumeration of good here instituted, he refers to his general canons of good which have just been admitted; e. g. virtue may be classed among goods, by virtue of def. 5 and 7. It would be useful to pursue the comparison, if not through all the instances quoted, at least through the greater part of them; since it will at once serve the purpose of impressing on the memory his leading examples, and of helping us to a fuller acquaintance with his theory. magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that 10 19. But in the case of questionable goods, your reason- 18. Dis ings will be deduced from these formulæ,-that of putable goods. which the contrary is an evil, is itself a good; as is that of which the contrary is expedient to an enemy: for example, if your being cowards be above all things expedient to your enemies, it is plain, that to the citizens your courage will be above all things beneficial. And, in a word, whatever be the things 20. which the enemy desires and in which they rejoice, the contrary of those things appear beneficial; and hence was it well said ; "Priam surely would exult," etc. Il. ά, 1. 255 3. 5 See Otho's speech to the soldiers on Vitellius's usurpation after the murder of Galba :-Si Vitellio et satellitibus ejus eligendi facultas detur, quem nobis anim: m, quas mentes imprecentur; quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam opta. bunt? Tacit. Hist. i. 84. And yet this case does not always hold, though it does generally; for there is no reason why the selfsame things should not, at times, be expedient to two hostile parties; from which comes the saying that evils bring men together, when the same thing hap21. pens to be injurious to both. That too is a good, which is not in excess7; but whatever exceeds what 22. it ought, is an evil. And that on account of which much toil or expense has been bestowed, for already will it have appeared to be a good; and we already conceive of every such thing as of an end, and as ar end of many efforts; but the end is a good; and on this principle rests the force of that appeal, "It were in accordance forsooth with Priam's heartiest and of this, "Base indeed is it to remain so long;" Il. ß, 1. 298. and that of the proverb of "Breaking the pitcher at the very door." Vide Erasmi Adagia II. i. 75. 23. That too of which many are desirous, and which appears to be disputed for; because that of which all are desirous, was laid down to be a good; the generality, however, have the appearance of being all. 24. And that which is recommended; because no one recommends that which is not good. And that which your enemies and the bad recommend; for all, as it were, already acknowledge it when even they do who are ill affected; for solely on account of its being plainly such will these acknowledge it9: and in ex So Shakspeare quotes the proverb, "Misery makes a man acquainted with strange bedfellows." 7 A good which requires no qualification; e. g. moral truths. To desire evil as evil, and feel pleasure in it as such, is perfectly unnatural. Hence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, ch. i. ver. 32, sums up the iniquity of the Gentile world in this one word; that not only did they in person commit the enormities, but "had pleasure in them that do them." Virgil therefore could not have praised Æneas more than when he makes Diomede say, Stetimus tela aspera contra, In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. En actly the same way they are held to be but paltry characters [and with these even their friends find fault, and all good men] with whom their enemy finds no fault on which very principle the Corinthians conceived themselves to have been scandalized by Simonides introducing in his verses, "Troy finds no fault with the Corinthians 10." And that is a good which any who are practically wise, 25. whether among men or women, have preferred; instanced in Minerva's choice of Ulysses; Theseus' of Helen; and the Goddesses' of Paris"; and Homer's of Achilles. In a word, all objects of determined 26. choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends; and those which are possible-these are varied in two ways; such as may be done, and such as may easily 27. be done 12. Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time; for difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish ; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling: and such actions as are 28. peculiar; as no one has done; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater: and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family, and power. Things too which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else; for 10 Glaucus the Lycian, who was of Corinthian descent, assisted the Trojans, consequently Simonides meant to praise them; but from the known bias of this writer to "censure in disguise," (of which another instance may be found, lib. iii. ch. 2.) the Corinthians might very fairly suspect his purpose. H Vid. ii. c. 23, § 12, sub fin. περὶ ̓Αλεξάνδρου, “ ὃν αἱ θεοὶ προέκριναν.” l Vid. c. xii. § 1, εἴτε ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἢ, μὴ λαθόντες, μὴ δοῦναι δίκην, κ.τ.λ. be they ever so trifling 13, they in no less degree de 29. termine on putting them in execution: and things easily brought about; for they are possible, inasmuch as they are easy but things easily brought about, are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gra tifies one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Every thing, too, which they whom we admire deliberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have experience; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things too which no bad man does; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favour30 able light 14. And men more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory; the avaricious, if it be money; and other characters in the same way. On questions then of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence. 1. The greater Zood must be discussed. CHAP. VII. On the subject of the greater Good, and the more expedient BUT as the advocates of opposite measures, while they in many instances allow both to be expedient, dispute nevertheless on the question which is the more so; we shall have next to speak of greater good, 2. Defin- and what is in a higher degree expedient. Let extion of the cess, then, be defined to be, as much and yet more: the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised excess and the exceeded. Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum! 14 If seen through the deceitful medium of desire |