the saying any thing irrelevant; but there in deliberative assembles the judges are, of themselves careful enough of this the logi be the But as it is plain that an artificial system is con- 11. Res versant about the means of making credible, and as sons why this is a sort of proof, (because we are then most per- cian will suaded when we conceive that the point has been probably proved,) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymem, (and best rhe this, to speak generally, has the most sovereign effect torician. of all the means of persuasion ;) and the enthymem is a sort of syllogism; since too it is the province of logic to consider equally every sort of syllogism, whether of that art as a whole, or of some particular branch of it; then, these points being admitted, it is evident that the man best able to consider the question, out of what sources and how the syllogism arises, will moreover be in the highest degree capable of employing enthymems; provided he make himself acquainted, besides his logic, with the kind of subjects about which enthymems are conversant, and what differences they exhibit as compared with the syllogism of logic. Because it belongs to the same faculty of the mind to recognise both truth and the semblance of truth; and more than this, mankind have a 15 tolerable natural tendency toward that which is true; and, in general, hit the truth; wherefore an aptness in conjecturing probabilities belongs to him who has a similar aptness in regard to truth. It is plain, then, that other rhetoricians embrace in their systems, points foreign to the subject, and what reasons they have for inclining to the subject of judicial pleading in preference to the other branches of rhetoric. But rhetoric is useful, because truth and justice 12. Utiliare in their nature stronger than their opposites; so ty of Rhetoric V that if decisions be made, not in conformity to the proved. rule of propriety, it must have been that they have ist. been got the better of, through fault of the advocates themselves: and this is deserving reprehension, Fur- 2nd. 15 Πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς, have naturally a considerable aptitudo toward what is true. thermore, in the case of some people, not even if we had the most accurate scientific knowledge, would it be easy to persuade them were we to address them through the medium of that knowledge; for a scientific discourse, it is the privilege of education [to appreciate], and it is impossible that this [should extend to the multitude 16]; but we must construct our means of persuasion, and our addresses, through the medium of ordinary language; as in fact I stated in my Topics, "on the manner of communicating with 3rd. the multitude." Again, too, we ought to be able to persuade on opposite sides of a question; as also we ought in the case of arguing by syllogism: not that we should practise both, for it is not right to persuade to what is bad; but in order that the bearing of the case may not escape us, and that when another makes an unfair use of these reasonings, we may be able to solve them.17 Now, of all the other arts, there is not one which embraces contraries in its conclusions; but logic and rhetoric alone do this; for they are both in an equal degree 18 conversant about contraries; not, however, that these contrary subjects present equal facilities: but the true and better side of the question is always naturally of a more easy inference, and has, generally speaking, a greater tend4th. ency to persuade. To illustrate further the utility of rhetoric, it were absurd, if, while it is disgraceful 16 The communication of ideas requires a similitude of thought and language: the discourse of a philosopher would vibrate without effect on the ear of a peasant. Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 1. note 90. 17 In the words of Falconbridge, let the orator resolve to Which, though I will not practise to deceive, 18 Riccobon remarks, that a person may at first be inclined to doubt the truth of the assertion that Rhetoric and Logic alone recognise contraries; seeing that music, for instance, recognises harmony and discord; grammar, the improprieties and the proprieties of language, etc. This doubt is however removed, he says, by the word ouoíws, for these alone recognise with equal propriety each of the two contraries; whereas other arts apply more strictly to one than to another. against swered. for a man not to be able to assist himself by his person, it were not disgraceful to be unable to do this by his speech, which is more a peculiarity of man than the exercise of the body 19. If, however, [any one 13. Obshould object 20] that a person, unfairly availing him- jection self of such powers of speaking, may be, in a very the abuse high degree, injurious; this is an objection which of it anwill lie in some degree against every good indiscriminately, except virtue; and with especial force against those which are most advantageous, as strength, health, wealth, and generalship. Because, employing these fairly, a person may be beneficial in points of the highest importance; and, by employing them unfairly, may be equally injurious. of Rheto That rhetoric, then, is conversant not with any one 14. End distinct class of subjects, but like logic [is of universal and duty applicability], and that it is useful, is evident; as also ric. that its business is not absolute persuasion 21, but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it; just as is also the case in every 19 This is an à minori argument, to understand the full force of which we ought to bear in mind the great importance attached to the δύναμις αγωνιστική by the Greeks. 20 Non tamen idcirco crimen liber omnis habebit: Ovid. Trist. lib. ii. 1. 265. 21 Having told us what we may expect from Rhetoric, he now tells us what we are not to expect from it. Persuasion, though the end, is not the duty of rhetoric: "Officium ejus facultatis videtur esse, dicere apposite ad persuadendum: Finis, persuadere dictione." (Cicero de Inv.) In the arts whose foundation is conjectural [στοχαστικαὶ τέχναι], among which we must class rhetoric, if the artist had done all that the case admitted, his duty was conceived to have been fulfilled, and he was entitled to commendation though he had entirely failed of success. other art for neither is it the duty of medicine to render its patient healthy, but to bring him on as far as the case admits: for it is nevertheless very possible to treat properly even such as may be incapable of again partaking of health and besides this [it is evident] that it belongs to the self-same art to observe both the real and seeming means of persuasion; just as it is incumbent on logic to consider syllogisms and apparent syllogisms. And this is the case, because the character of sophist does not consist in the faculty 22 22 [for the logician possesses this as well as he], as regards but in his fixed design [of abusing it 23]. Here [in Difference in Logic and 22 That he is consistent in thus classifying characters according to their moral principles, will appear from his application of the appellation 'Aλav by the same rule in the Ethics: Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζὼν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. Ethics, iv. c. 7. 23 In order more fully to illustrate the nature of rhetoric, Aristotle has considered it throughout this chapter as analogous to logic. Each, he says, is founded on a faculty naturally possessed by all men; each is useful, and applicable with equal propriety to any class of subjects whatever. Besides this, logic and rhetoric alone, of all arts, are equally conversant with opposite inferences; and of course with sound and specious arguments (whether in the form of syllogism or enthymem). Now as logic and rhetoric are in their own nature indifferent to truth or falsehood, it must require an act of choice in either case to select the former or the latter, and the constant repetition of that choice will ultimately form a corresponding habit. Hence the διαλεκτικός may be considered as δυνάμει σοφιστὴς, and the σοφιστής as δυνάμει διαλεκτικός. But when logic is prostituted to the support of false propositions, by the bad principles (the poαípɛσis) of its professors, it is branded with the name of sophistry, and the persons who so misapply it are called sophists: whereas, in the case of rhetoric, no such distinction in reference to the principles of its professors ever obtained; but the name of orator is enjoyed equally by all who are masters of the art, whether they exercise it fairly or not, ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ἔσται μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, Ρήτωρ. A reason for this distinction may per haps be furnished from the nature of the subject-matter respectively. The subject-matter of logic is aXn0ès, which is uniform, absolute, and admits not of degrees. Hence the sophistical logician may fairly be supposed aware of the fallacy he uses, and is stigmatized accordingly. But the subject-matter of rhetoric being τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ, (v. § 11,) or πιθανὸν, has many and various degrees, from the lowest presumption of the profess ors. rhetoric, however, the one who is considered in re- the name ference simply to his knowledge of the art, as well as he who is considered in reference to his moral principles, is indiscriminately designated an orator. But in logic, a sophist is called so in reference to his moral principles; a logician, however, without reference to his principles, simply as regards the faculty he is master of. However, commencing from this point, let us at- 15. tempt to treat of the system both from what sources and in what manner we shall be able to attain the proposed objects; having then once more, as at the outset, defined what this art is, let us treat of what remains. CHAP. II. Definition of Rhetoric.—Εἰκὸς :-Σημεῖον :-Τεκμήριον : their differences.-Example. Rhetoric. LET us define rhetoric to be, "A faculty of consider- 1. Definiing all the possible means of persuasion on every sub- tion of ject;" for this is the business of no one of the other arts, each of which is fit enough to inform or persuade respecting its own subject; medicine, for instance, on what conduces to health or sickness; and geometry, on the subject of relations incidental to magnitudes; and arithmetic, on the subject of numbers; and in the same way the remaining arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, seems able to consider the means of persuasion on any given subject whatsoever. And hence I declare it to have for its province, as an art, no particular limited class of subjects. Now 2. Two of the means of effecting persuasion, some originate πίστεις in the art, others independently of it. By inartificial classes of TEX νοι, ἄτεχ up to moral certainty. Here then a fallacy is not so easily vol. discoverable, even by the orator himself; and candour requires us not to brand as moral what after all may be merely mental imperfection in the speaker. |