as many forms of government as there are, so many are the authorities. cracy. Now there are four forms of government; demo- 3. Four cracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. So that forms. the authoritative and judicial functions will be merely one constituent of these, or the whole. Democracy 4. Demois a form of government2, in which men apportion cracy. out the magistracies to themselves by lot. But an Oligaroligarchy, in which those only who, from the valua- chy. tion of property, are entitled. Aristocracy, in which Aristothose bear magistracy who can conform to the constitutional plan of education. By such education I mean that established by the law: for those who adhere to the principles of the law, are the men who, in an aristocracy, hold magistracies; and it must be that these should appear the best, whence this form of government took its name. Monarchy is that form Mon in which, conformably to its name, one man is suarchy. preme; and, of monarchies, those which are held by conformity to some limitations are kingdoms, but the unlimited are tyrannies 3. of each Neither should the ends of the respective forms of 5. Ends government escape us; for men choose whatever con- governduces to the end. The end then of a democracy, is ment liberty; of an oligarchy, it is wealth; of an aristocracy, the institutions relating to education and the principles of the law; the end of a tyranny, is the protection of the tyrant's person. It is evident then, if 2 In the Ethics (lib. viii. c. 10) democracy is not stated as a distinct form, but merely as a deviation (Tapéкßaσis) from timocracy, or πολιτεία ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. 3 Παρέκβασις βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι. Ibid. We find a remarkable proof of this in the account given by Herodotus of the anxiety of the Persians for the personal safety of Xerxes after the battle of Salamis;—οὐκ οὕτω περὶ τῶν νεῶν ἀχθόμενοι, ὡς περὶ αὐτῷ Ξέρξῃ δειμαίνοντες, viii. 99. A remarkable expression occurs in Sophocles from which the same inference may be drawn; Edipus, asking Creon why the murder of Laius had not been more fully investigated, thus expresses himself: Κακὸν δὲ ποῖον ἐμποδὼν, ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΔΟΣ “Ουτω πεσούσης, εἶργε τοῦτ' ἐξειδέναι ;-dip. Tyran. 128. 6 The speaker must al forms men fix their choice by reference to the end, that we must accurately distinguish the respective practices, laws, and interests of each form. But as means of persuasion originate not in argumentative oratory alone, but in such also as bears an know impress of character; for it is from the speaker's apthese con- pearing a man of certain character that we trust him; stitution- that is to say, if he appears an honest man, or well in order affected5, or both: as this is the case, it will be neto impress cessary for us to be masters of the character of each the hear- form of government; for the character which is pegood-will culiar to each, must needs be most available to persuasion in addressing each. These points, however, will be ascertained by means of the same information ; for the character will manifestly be conformable to the choice; now the settled choice has reference to the end. ers with a towards him. 7. Thus then have the objects which we ought to aim at in exhorting and dissuading, as probable or actually in existence; the sources, too, out of which we must draw our means of proof on the subject of the expedient, and on the subject moreover of the character and legal principles belonging to the forms of government; and the means by which, and the manner how, we shall have facilities on such questions: all these points have been discussed, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion. For accuracy of detail on these points has been observed in the Politics. Where we may observe, that not simply is the person of the tyrant spoken of, but the very government itself, as though it had fallen with him. 5 It is required (lib. ii. c. 1) that he be further possessed οἱ φρόνησις. Let it be remembered that these qualities must be evinced by the speech, and not simply be taken for granted from a previous knowledge of the man. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. p. 5. СНАР. ІХ. On the subject of Virtue and Vice, the honourable and disgraceful-Out of what considerations praise and blame are derived. LET us next speak of virtue and vice, and of the 1. The honourable and disgraceful; because these are the subjects of Epideicobjects of the orator who praises or blames1; and tic oratory because it will happen that, in speaking of these discussed. subjects, we shall at the same time throw light on the means by which we may ourselves be conceived to be of a certain turn of character, which was stated to be the second means of effecting belief; since we shall be able, by the application of the same points, to render ourselves or others deserving belief on the score of moral excellence. But as there frequently 2 are instances, as well in sober earnest as without it, of praising not men or gods only, but even inanimate objects, and any animal whatever, as it may happen; we must here, in the same way as before, ascertain propositions on these subjects also. Let us then, so far as may serve for a specimen, discuss these subjects. fined in That then is honourable, which, while it is an 3. Tò̟ Kaobject of choice on its own account, is commendable du dealso; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply be- two ways. cause it is good. But if the honourable be this, virtue must necessarily be honourable; for, being good, it is commendable. And virtue, as it should 4. Perfect seem, is a faculty tending to provide us with goods its conand preserve them to us; a faculty moreover capable stituent of benefiting in many and important cases; of bene- parts are fiting, in a word, every object in every respect2. able. As praise is the proper reward of virtue, so are blame and disgrace proper to vice; in order that the world may be warned by the example of the one, and excited to emulate that of the other: ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινεομένη, δένδρον ὡς, ἀέξεται. 2 Aristotle never omits an opportunity of inculcating this wholesome lesson, that the practice of virtue conduces to our true interest. Its necessity in bodies politic, as being emi virtue and honour 6. The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, 6. placability, prudence, wisdom; and it must needs be, that those virtues are the highest which are the most beneficial to others, if at least virtue be (as it was defined) a faculty capable of benefiting on this account, men honour in the greatest degree the just and brave; for justice and courage are useful to them, the one in war, and the other in peace3. Next is liberality; for the liberal are profuse, and do not wrangle with people about money, the object which the rest of the world hanker after more than any 7. thing. Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own, as the law prescribes: injustice, however, is that habit by which some take the property of 8. others in contravention to law. Courage, that by which men are ready to achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger, conformably to the direction of and in subservience to law 4: cowardice, however, 9. is its contrary. But temperance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law directs; intemper10. ance, however, is its contrary. But liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters; stinginess is its 11. contrary. Magnanimity is that virtue which is apt to confer important benefits; narrowness of soul nently τὸ σώζον τὴν πολιτείαν, is thus stated in another of his works: Εστι δ ̓ οὔθεν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποῖον τίνα εἶναι, λέγω δὲ οἷον σπουδαῖον. Τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἐστὶ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. Magn. Mor. lib. i. c. l. 3 In the Ethics he places liberality first ;—φιλοῦνται σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ ̓ ἀρετῆς ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ τοῦτο δὲ Ev Ty dóσεL. Eth. Nich. iv. 1. Courage may be ranked first, because on occasions we may be disqualified from the exercise of other virtues if this be wanting. 4 Consistently with the doctrine held in the Ethics, he does not admit every sort of daring to the praise of courage. For of some persons, whose daring is at first sight not inconsider. able, it is true, as Juvenal remarks Justa pericli is its opposite. Magnificence is the virtue which 12. ated. Enough has been said on the subject of virtue and 14. vice in general, and of their constituent parts, to suit the present occasion: respecting the other points, ta kaλà there is no difficulty in discerning what they are; for enumerit is plainly necessary both that the productives of virtue should be honourable (because they have reference to virtue), and also the fruits of virtue; of which kind are both the indications and actions of virtue; but as the indications and all actions or suf- 15 ferings of a good man are honourable, it will necessarily follow that all exploits of courage whatever, and all indications of courage, that all conduct, in a word, which has been marked with courage is honourable; and so of things just and conforming to justice, so far at least as actions are concerned : (but as relates to sufferings this is not the case; for in this single instance of all the virtues, does it occur that what is conformable to justice is not invariably honourable, but in the case of suffering punishment, that which is justly suffered is in a 5 Alluding to the division made in the Ethics of virtues into those of the ἐπιθυμήτικον and λόγον ἔχον μέρος of the soul ; the former whereof is the subject of the moral, the latter of the intellectual virtues. Vid. Eth. i. 13. * Ἡ μὲν φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ποιητέα ὅρους αὐτοῖς τιθεῖσα. Philo, p. 35, Allegor. ed. Par. 7 Those who have not read the Ethics will be surprised to hear that the virtues which he here despatches in one section, should there occupy a book and a half. This popular discussion of them is, as far as it goes, conformable to the more philosophical view taken in the other treatise, except in respect to the criterion which is assigned of the comparative excellence of each virtue, viz. μέγιστας εἶναι ἀρετᾶς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις σιμώτατοις; and that stated § 23αἱ ἀπολαύστικαι ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ. Such a test, however inadequate to the views of the philosopher, is good enough for the orator, since it is one in which nine-tenths of the world will acquiesce. χρη |