know what a man ought to do, and what kind of per- 36.
son he should be, it is necessary, if we would state
this in the form of advice, to transpose and change
the sentiment in its diction: for instance, suppose we
are aware that we are not to think highly of goods
obtained by chance, but of those obtained by our own
means. Thus expressed the sentiment has the force
of a suggestion; but thus, of commendation, "think-
ing highly, not of goods which were his by chance,
but those obtained by his own means." So that,
when you wish to commend, see what you would
suggest in advising; and when to advise, see what
you would commend. But the diction will of neces- 37.
sity be reversed, when there has been submitted to
change an idea which in one form is prohibitive, in
another is not prohibitive.

to be

We must avail ourselves also of amplification in 38. Ammany cases: thus, if a man has done a thing alone, plification or first, or with few to share it, or even if it be a used; thing which he has done more than any other; these all are circumstances of honour. The topic also which is deducible from times and seasons; these are circumstances contrary to what is natural. Also if a man has often succeeded in the same thing; for this is a feature of greatness, and originates not in chance, but will appear to arise through his own means. Also if orations commendatory and exhorting to emulation have been founded and got up on his account; if also he be one on whom an encomium was first passed, as it was on Hippolochus; and the having a statue set up in the forum first occurred to Harmodius and Aristogiton: and in the same way we use amplification with opposite views; and should you not abound in topics bearing on your subject himself, you should set him in comparison with others; which Isocrates used to do from his familiarity with judicial pleading. You should compare the and com

juncta proficiscuntur, quæ sane laudum formula Principibus et Viris quibuscunque dignioribus debetur: Laudando præcipere: cum scilicet apud illos prædicando quales sint, humiliter moneas quales esse debeant. Bacon's Essays, De Laude.

parison of person of whom you speak, with men of character; character. for it is a feature of amplification, and honourable, if he be better than the good.

39. Am

oratory.

Amplification falls in easily with demonstrative plification oratory; for its essence is the being above medisuits epideictic ocrity. On which account we should make a comparison with the generality of men, if we cannot with men of character; since the being above the 40. average seems to indicate virtue. In a word, of all the formulæ common to each branch of rhetoric, amplification best suits demonstrative; for the orator takes the actions for granted, and it thus remains Example only to invest them with greatness and beauty. Exsuits de- ample 22, however, suits deliberative; because we liberative, enthy- there decide, by arguing of the future from what has mem ju- gone before. Enthymem, however, suits judicial; dicial ora- for by reason of its not being clear, the past most especially leaves room for assignment of reasons and demonstration.

tory.

41.

Nearly all the sources out of which praise and blame are deduced, and on what sort of things we ought to have an eye in praising and blaming, the means too by which encomia and reproaches are produced, are these: for being possessed of these points,

22 For the general principles upon which EXAMPLES influ ence us, and their peculiar adaptation to deliberative cases, see book ii. chap. 20. Meanwhile let us anticipate our author's discussion of the subject, and quote a few words of a modern writer to show how completely this vehicle of proof is adapted to the purpose of the orator, whose demonstrations should always be as little laboured as possible.-" Our lives in this world are partly guided in rules, and partly directed by examples. To conclude out of general rules and axioms by discourse of wit our duties in every particular action, is both troublesome, and many times so full of difficulty, that it maketh deliberations hard and tedious to the wisest men. Whereupon we naturally all incline to observe examples, to mark what others have done before us, and, in favour of our own ease, rather to follow them, than to enter into a new consultation, if in regard of their virtue and wisdom we may but probably think they have waded without error. So that the willingness of men to be led by example of others, both discovereth and helpeth the imbecility of our judgment." Hooker, Ecc. Pol. v. § 65, p. 307.

their contraries are plain; for blame is deduced from the opposite sources.

СНАР. Х.

The number and nature of the Sources out of which the
Orator must construct his reasonings in Accusation and
Defence.

recog

cial oratory con

persons

fined.

of law.
i. Gene-

It will be for me next to speak of the number and 1. Judinature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and de- sidered in fence. Now we must ascertain three points; one, three what and how many are the objects for the sake of ways, 2. i. The which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves motives. are disposed; and the third, towards persons of what ii. The disposicharacter and of what disposition they do so act. tion of the Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, agents. speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly iii. Thebe defined to be, the voluntary commission of hurt injured. in contravention of law. Now law is either general 3. Inor peculiar. The peculiar law I call that, by whose justice de. written enactments men direct their polity: the Division general, whatever unwritten rules appear to be nised among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. ii. Par Men, therefore, do not every thing on fixed princi- ticular. ple, which they do wittingly: but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on principle. Now, the principles by whose motion men de- 4. Twɔ Rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill; without which respect, though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt and not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, which is the root of all his actions, there groweth variety n the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done. Hooker, i. § 9, p. 239.

2

ral.

i. De

pravity.
ii. Incon-

tinence.

causes of liberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention injustice. of law, are depravity and moral weakness 2; for if any are depraved either in one or more respects, it is in reference to that point, on which they are so depraved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illiberal man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger; (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in danger ;) the ambitious man, on the score of honour; the hasty man, by reason of anger; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing to his being mistaken on points of right and wrong; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other characters in the same way each [goes wrong] respect5. ing his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward whom, men do commit injustice.

6. The

from

First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects, motives of which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about ininjustice proceed justice because it evidently should be considered by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbours, have an existence on the side of his adversary; and by the defendant again, what, and

2 Cf. James, chap. i. 15.

3 How complete an insight into the nature of man does this disquisition display; and how admirable a key is here afforded to all the operations of the human heart! This branch of knowledge has always been insisted on as essential to those employed in judicial investigations. Thus, Bolingbroke, speaking of the education of lawyers, says, "They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reason of all laws," etc. Stud. of Hist. p. 353: edit 4to.

human

number:

what number of these things do not so exist. Now 7. the mo all men do all things either of themselves, or not of tives of al themselves. The things which they do not of them- action. selves, they do either by chance, or from necessity; and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion, or by nature. So that all things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now the act of 8. wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for any thing other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason, are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they ne- These are cessarily do from seven causes; by chance, compul- seven in sion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But i. Chance to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, ii. Comor whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were su- pulsion. perfluous. For, granting that it happens to young ture. men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their iv. Cusyouth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and appetite: neither is it by motion either of wealth or vi. Anger. vii. Appepoverty, simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on tite. account of their neediness that it happens that they 9. cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles; for they on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this par- 10. ticular character principles of action the same in

iii. Na

tom.

v. Will.