:

character are consequent ; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures; but on the intemperate, the con11. trary on these same subjects. For which reason we must wave distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider, on what conditions, what principles of conduct are wont to follow for it is not ordained, (in the nature of things,) that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let 12. us now treat first of the remaining points. Things i. Chance. proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite 5, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition 13. of chance. All those things exist naturally whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, too, that chance is the cause of such results. All

ii. Nature.

14.

iii. Compulsion.

4 He here first informs us that he shall not make his exclusion so rigid as he had above stated, but will admit youth and age, etc. to a particular consideration, as holding an important influence over character, though that influence ought philosophically to be referred to one of the seven above-mentioned principles; while every thing else which people choose to fix upon as a principle of conduct will, on examination, prove to be merely secondary, and to act mediately through one or other of the seven.

* Vid. chap. v. § 17

tite.

things originate in compulsion, which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habit 15. iv. Habit. originates every thing which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed what- 16. ever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, v. Will. either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium 17. of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. vi. Anger. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflicting it, in order that he may be satiated. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists, will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as ap- 18. pear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse vii. Appeof appetite. But that which is familiar and has become habitual, is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant naturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to These speak in one word comprehending the whole, every are briefly thing whatsoever which men do of their own proper compremotion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, hended or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily word in whatever they do of their own motion, and invo- pleasure. luntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily, will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things

6 Revenge is a kind of wild justice. Bacon's Essays.

motives

in one

9. What objects are pleasant,

must be

less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

We have therefore to ascertain the number of things pleasant and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already therefore, said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

discussed.

tives of

nition of

3. A re

CHAP. XI.

What things are pleasant.

1. Imme- LET it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain diate mo- motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its own proper nature; injustice consider and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be a ed. Defi- thing of this nature, it is plain that whatever is propleasure. ductive of the disposition I have described, is plea2. Pain is sant; while every thing of a nature to destroy it, or Taris. produce a disposition the opposite to it, is painful. Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both version to that the being in progress toward a state conformnature is able to nature, should be pleasant; and that, in the pleasant. highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature; and habits, because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it were; for, in a certain way, custom is like nature, because the idea of frequency is proximate to that of always; now nature belongs to the idea of always, custom to that of

7 In all judicial questions a knowledge of the constituents of pleasure will be of essential service; for they all suppose some wrong done, and there is no man doth a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure, or honour, or the like. Bacon's Essays.

from con

pleasant.

often. What is not compulsory, also, is pleasant; for 4. All compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of freedom necessity are painful; and it has been truly remark- straint. ed, "Every act of necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure, listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of things pleasant; for none of these has any thing to do with necessity. Every thing of 5. Appe which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for tites are appetite is a desire of what is pleasant. Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I call all those irrational, which men desire, not from Irrationany conception which they form of this kind are all al. which are said to exist naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind. And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and, in fact, objects of touch generally; the appetite of fragrant odours, too, as connected with smelling, and hearing, and sight. Appetites Rational. attended by reason, are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion for many things there are which they desire to behold, and possess, on hearsay and persuasion. Now, as the being 6. Hope pleased stands in the perception of a certain affec- and metion, and as imagination is a kind of faint perception, pleasant. there will attend on him who exercises either memory or hope, a kind of imagination of that which is the object of his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise memory or hope, certainly feel pleasure, since they have also a perception. So that every thing pleasant consists either in the 7 perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for men exercise perception

on present, memory on past, and hope on future ob8. jects. Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not only such as at the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honourable and good; and hence this saying, "But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when preserved, to remember his toils ;" and this, "For after his suffer. ings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is gladdened at the recollection." But the reason of this is, that to be exempt from evil is 9. pleasant1. And all objects are pleasant in hope, which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great degree; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem, "That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it drops;" for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems impracticable to his revenge; nor with those far their superiors in power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree. 10. There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a certain pleasure: thus men possessed by fevers feel delight, amid their thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the hope of drinking 11. yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing, writing, and composing something, ever about the object beloved; because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of the object they love. Criterion And this is in all cases a criterion of the commenceof love. ment of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the presence of the object, but are enamoured also of it when absent, on memory; wherefore, even when 1 Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, Alterius procul e terra spectare dolorem, etc.

12. Sorrow.

Lucretius