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been made for the maintenance of so large a force. Cæsar pressed closely upon them, and gave them no opportunity of supplying themselves. Constant skirmishes took place between the parties detached on each side for procuring provisions or intercepting them. When the Afranians pitched their tents for the night and formed their entrenchments near the river, Cæsar determined to confine them to the spot, and prevent them from reaching the water, by drawing a complete line of circumvallation around them. He had persevered for two days in this arduous work, which was already nearly completed, when the Pompeian leaders felt the necessity of interrupting it, even at the risk of provoking the enemy to a decisive combat. But Cæsar also was anxious on his part to avoid the risk and bloodshed of a general engagement with an opponent whom he expected to reduce ultimately

upon much easier terms. It was only the mutiThe armies are drawn up nous importunity of his own troops, to all appearopposite each

ance, that induced him to put his men in battle

array and confront the beleaguered Afranians in the attitude of defiance. The mode in which the two armies were drawn up, the main strength of each consisting equally of five Roman legions, shows how much the Cæsarian was superior in efficiency. The five legions of Afranius were ranged in two lines, each numbering twenty-five cohorts, instead of the more usual array of three; for the cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries were of so little value that the general extended his centre to the utmost, and dispensed altogether with wings for the protection of his flanks. A third line was formed of the native auxiliaries, and their leader depended for his reserve upon those very battalions in which he could place least reliance. Cæsar, on the other hand, disposed his forces according to the approved system. The legions were arrayed in triple line; four cohorts of each legion, twenty in all, formed the first, three of each the second, and an equal number the third. The intervals between the cohorts were occupied by the light troops, the bowmen and slingers, and

other in battle array.

capitulate.

the flanks were protected by the redoubtable squadrons of Gaulish horse.

But the day passed without a blow being struck. The Afranians had not courage to begin the attack, while their opponent checked the ardour of his own forces. The Pompeian The next morning the retreating army, which had lieutenants are succeeded thus far in keeping Cæsar's lines open, made a demonstration upon the side of the river,' with the desperate intention of crossing a difficult ford in the face of an active

enemy. But the dispositions Cæsar made for covering the spot with his cavalry soon satisfied Afranius that escape in this direction was impossible. The moment had evidently arrived when the want of provisions for men and cattle, the discouragement of his soldiers, and the inferiority of his strength, demanded the unreserved capitulation which his adversary had so long anticipated. The terms required by the conqueror were, that the lieutenants of Pompeius should abandon the province, laying down their military command, and therewith disbanding their forces. At the same time he engaged not to press any of the soldiers into his own service against their inclinations. To those who had families and possessions in the country he gave permission to remain in the country; the rest he promised to escort safely to the frontiers of Italy, and there release them from their military engagements. With his accustomed policy he pledged himself also to abstain from any harsh treatment of their officers. Nor did he fail to display his wonted generosity, in satisfying from his own resources the demands for pay, which the soldiers were clamorously pressing upon their unfortunate generals.” The campaign was thus brought to a termination at the end of forty days, and the brilliant success which Cæsar achieved added more lustre to his military reputation than even his great exploits in Gaul. He had fairly out-manæuvred a Roman army, not inferior to his own in strength, not indifferently commanded, and backed by all the strength and resources of the country in which it was engaged. The impregnable position of Ilerda, and the extraordinary swelling of the Sicoris, had contributed, in no slight degree, to the difficulties with which the assailant had had to contend; and, whether we look to the splendour of the victory or the importance of the result, the day of Cæsar's triumph over Afranius and Petreius deserved equally to be marked in the Imperial calendar, and its memory celebrated, in after ages, by a festive anniversary.

* Cæsar gives no intimation where this ford was: it must have been at some point below Ilerda, and by this time the floods had no doubt entirely subsided.

Cæs. B. C. i. 86, 87. * See Curio's speech to his soldiers (B. C. ii. 32.).

· Orelli (Inscript. ii. 396.) gives fragments of four ancient Kalendaria which record this circumstance: e. g. “Kal. Capranicorum, iii. Non. Sext. feriæ quod hoc die imp. Cæsar Hispaniam citeriorem vicit.” The same day was the anniversary of the subsequent defeat of Pharnaces. “Kal. Amitern. iv. Non. Sext. feriæ, quod eo die C. Cæs. C. F. in H[ispan. citer. et] quod in Ponto eod. die. r[egem Pharnace]m devicit.” The true date of the event is June 9, B. C. 49. See Fischer, Römische Zeittafeln.

CHAPTER XVI.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MASSILIA.CÆSAR RECEIVES THE SUBMISSION OF

VARRO, AND ESTABLISHES HIS POWER THROUGHOUT THE SPANISH PROVINCES. CAMPAIGN OF CURIO IN AFRICA: HIS DEFEAT AND DEATH.-DISASTER TO CÆSAR'S FORCES IN ILLYRICUM.-ADMINISTRATION OF ROME BY LEPIDUS AND M. ANTONIUS. CÆSAR IS CREATED DICTATOR IN HIS ABSENCE.-HE QUELLS A MUTINY AMONG HIS TROOPS AT PLACENTIA, AND HASTENS TO ROME.-HIS FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES.-HE IS ELECTED CONSUL, AND RESIGNS THE DICTATORSHIP.-PREPARES TO FOLLOW POMPEIUS ACROSS THE SEA. ADVANTAGES OF HIS POSITION COMPARED WITH THAT OF HIS ADVERSARIES. A. U. 705, B. C. 49.

W

Massilia.

A. U. 705.
B. C. 49.

VHILE these operations were in progress in Spain, the

success which D. Brutus had recently obtained over the Massilian fleet had given the besiegers a su- Situation of periority at sea, and Trebonius was conducting his operations against the city by land with every resource the military art could supply. Mamurra, the chief of the engineering department, had merited Cæsar's unbounded favour by the skill he displayed in his profession.' But the defenders of Massilia were provided, on their part, with abundance of military engines, which it had been the policy of the state to provide long beforehand for such an emergency. Accordingly, both the attack and defence of their city exhibited the most consummate application of the principles and resources of warfare as then practised. The

Catullus speaks of the enormous wealth Mamurra had reaped from his services in Gaul, and makes it the ground of a gross charge against him and his commander (Carm. lvii.) Pliny (H. N. xxxvi. 7.) commemorates his profuse magnificence.

· The power of the engines used in defence of a city may be estimated

name.

Massilia of antiquity bore but little resemblance, even in its external features, to the city which has inherited its site and

Cæsar describes it as washed by the waters of the sea on three sides; but the port which then bounded it on the south is now surrounded by streets and houses. The French antiquaries assert moreover that a considerable part of the ancient city in its western quarter has been long since covered by the encroachments of the waves. The site of the temple of Diana, upon which the modern cathedral stands, was originally in the middle of the city, but is now on the margin of the sea. The lazaretto occupies the eminence on the north, upon which, according to Cæsar's description, the citadel stood; and the side on which alone the city was exposed to attack from the land stretched from the base of this rugged elevation to the innermost angle of the port, along the line probably of the Cours St. Louis and the Rue Cannebière, which are now in their turn the most central regions in the whole assemblage of buildings.

While Trebonius was conducting his first operations against the city, by the construction of an immense rampart, eighty

feet in height, over against the wall on the land side throughout its whole length, the besieged ventured to make another attempt upon the ele

ment in which they were wont to confide.' L. Nasidius had been sent by Pompeius with a squadron of sixteen vessels to throw succours into the city. He had directed his course from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, through the straits of Messana, either unobserved by or in defiance of Curio, the Cæsarian commander in Sicily. Indeed he had ventured to enter the port of Messana, and cut out one vessel from the dockyard. From thence he made sail

Result of a naval engage ment disas. trous to the Massiliane.

from Cæsar's statement, that the beams of wood, twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, which were hurled from them, pierced through four successive screens of wood-work, behind which the besiegers sheltered themselves while engaged in filling the ditch before the walls. Cæs. B. C. ii. 2. They were obliged to construct these vinece of solid beams a foot in thickness.

· Cæs. B. C. ii. 1-7.

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