from recurrent outbreaks of disease, public-health specialists constructing sanitation and sewage systems, teams of agricultural specialists adapting their knowledge to the differing farm conditions, advising and constructing the necessary equipment and systems needed for efficient food production-all these efforts are within the realm of possibility. Entire school systems could be established; adequate communications with centers of safety and Government could be devised and strengthened in methods and procedures for administering to local needs.

Regardless of the conditions in Vietnam in the months ahead, such a proposal expressing our true concern for the people of southeast Asia should be aired before the nations of the world. For what cannot be fully accomplished in the military turmoil of Vietnam immediately can now be undertaken in the more secure nations in that part of the world.

We know that the developed nations in the past have displayed an amazing capability to undertake the infinitely complex tasks of war. Cannot the harnessing of equal energy for these peaceful purposes also be achieved?

To the extent that we leave Vietnam one day with more to mark our presence than destruction, we will have met our true commitment to the Vietnamese. And to the extent that we plan and act now to assure against a recurrence of a Vietnam elsewhere in southeast Asia, we will have met the challenge of the future in Asia.

Senator MORSE. I interpret that article of Senator Kennedy to imply, at least, that he did not find the South Vietnamese Government doing for the people of South Vietnam what he thought they ought to be doing. They didn't seem to indicate interest in the mass of people. He told a story, as I recall, and I paraphrase him, but I think accurately, of how blankets were distributed to the refugees while he was there, but he was advised that after he left they were all picked up again by the South Vietnamese Government.

Yet this morning you testify that you seem to think that there is a growing support of that Government.

What did you find when you were over there indicating that the Government was giving the assistance to the refugees that it ought to be giving?

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, Senator Kennedy obviously can speak for himself. I happened to have discussed this matter with him just yesterday afternoon at some considerable length and I believe we see it very much the same way; namely, that the Government of Vietnam now, in contrast with the situation 6 months or a year ago, has indeed mounted a major program. Of their 1966 civil budget of about 20 million piasters, 1.3 billion piasters is for refugee work. This is a substantial share of the budget obviously, and is for the approximately 440,000 refugees out of the 15-16 million total population of South Vietnam. That is not a small figure.

Senator Kennedy and I are also in thorough agreement that this is not enough. This program does and will provide food and shelter. blankets, the minimum welfare arrangements, you might say, for the refugees. But it does not yet provide sufficiently for the education of the children in the refugee camps, for the vocational training of the adults, and for the resettlement of the refugees, either back to their own home villages when that becomes possible under the security situation, or in jobs in normal employment in new locations.

Senator MORSE. How many refugees are there?

Mr. BELL. There are about 400,000 in camps at the present time. There were some 700,000 in all during the last year, and the difference-nearly 300,000-have either been resettled back in the villages from which they came or have joined the urban population and found jobs and housing there.

REASON FOR INFLUX OF REFUGEES

Senator MORSE. How many of them become refugees as a result of the Vietcong terrorism and how many of them become refugees as a result of American bombings, a scorched earth policy, napalm bombing, the poisoning of rice fields and other shocking actions of conducting the war?

Mr. BELL. I am not sure we have precise figures on that, Senator, but there is no question that the vast majority of them are refugees from Vietcong terror and not from the incidental damage of our own military operations.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, at this point

Senator MORSE. I am not yielding to the Senator from Ohio. He is going to get his turn in due course of time.

REVENUES FROM IMPORT DUTIES

Mr. Bell, what portion of the South Vietnamese budget comes from import duties?

Mr. BELL. Import duties, sir?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Mr. BELL. May I ask Mr. Poats to give you the precise figure on that?

The total budget of the Vietnamese Government is 55 billion piasters in the present year. Of that about 21 or 22 billion piasters is Vietnamese Government revenues and of that 21 or 22 billion piasters a substantial part of their revenues are import duties.

Senator MORSE. Will you supply the figures for the record in the interests of time?

Mr. BELL. Be glad to.

(The figures referred to follow :)

VIETNAM BUDGET REVENUES DERIVED FROM IMPORT DUTIES AND
AID-FINANCED IMPORTS

Budget revenues in calendar year 1966 are estimated at 49.8 billion piasters. Revenues derived from all import duties are estimated at 13.9 billion piasters, of which 8.9 is attributable to U.S.-financed imports. An additional 27.7 billion piasters is estimated to accrue as counterpart from U.S. economic aid.

Senator MORSE. And also, unless you have it at tongue's point would you also supply the figure as to how much of this income in their budget is attributed to imports under our aid program?

Mr. BELL. Well, the counterpart, the local currency which is received by the Government of Vietnam in the form of an indirect grant under our commercial import program, is not included in the 21 or 22 billion piaster figure that I gave you. The United States is supplying that part of the Vietnamese Government budget-will amount in calendar year 1966 to about 24 billion piasters.

Senator MORSE. Do they impose import duties on our aid?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

The import duties are paid by the consumers in Vietnam, not by the U.S. Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

VIETCONG ATROCITIES

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask at this time there be supplied the figures showing the number of orphans and dead people that resulted from the guerrilla tortures of the Communists? So we will have both sides of the picture.

Senator MORSE. When you supply those figures, we also will you also supply in your 35,000 figure the number of those victims that were in black pajamas.

(The information referred to follows:)

ANNEX I

DOCTRINAL BASES OF THE USE OF TERROR

Terror has played an indispensable role in the operations of the Vietcong since Viet Minh days. Truong Chinh, one of the leading North Vietnamese theorists and third ranking man in the Politburo in Hanoi, described the Viet Minh operations in his book "The August Revolution" in these terms: "The general form of struggle was the armed demonstration, another special form used at this moment was the guerrilla wherever the topography of the country was favorable and yet another, the elimination of traitors in towns and country by picked detachments."

In another book, "The Resistance To Win," he said: "Traitors to the nation, reactionaries, and enemies of the resistance must be immediately eliminated. We should punish those even in the ranks of the resistance who advocated wrong measures or committed harmful deeds."

Who is a traitor? A Vietcong document captured in 1961 cited on page 49 of "A Threat to Peace" gave the working guerrillas a clear definition: “Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors."

Hanoi continued to call for violence, especially directed against Government officials, as shown by an article entitled "The Role of Violence in the Revolution for the Liberation of the South" printed in North Vietnam's leading Communist organ, Hoc Tap, in July 1964.

"The aim of the revolution to liberate our compatriots in South Vietnam is to defeat the aggression and frustrate the warmongering policies of the U.S. imperialists and their lackey. To that end it is necessary to smash the reactionaries administrative machinery and the imperialistic mercenaries' army. This revolution can and should be settled only by the use of revolutionary acts and the force of the masses to defeat the enemy force; it absolutely cannot be settled by laws and accords."

An attack on Saigon's police headquarters, for example, was cited on August 18 by Liberation radio:

"Our troops skillfully and valiantly shot to death the sentinels guarding the gate, rushed into the Saigon police headquarters, and blew it up.

"Let us applaud the people's armed forces in the Saigon military zone for having scored this glorious achievement and for having dealt a heavy and accurate blow to the enemy.

"This bomb explosion has also provided the Saigon compatriots with one more lesson and a rich experience with regard to the ability to use violence in both the political and military fields to topple the country-selling puppet clique and to seize power and put it in the people's hands."

The bombing of the My Canh Restaurant on June 25 which caused numerous casualties among innocent Vietnamese bystanders was the subject of boasting in Communist radio broadcasts, which called it "a new glorious exploit * * claimed "The South Vietnamese people and our compatriots are overjoyed at this feat * * and celebrated "this great victory scored by the Saigon armed forces **

1. EXTRACTS FROM A TYPICAL DAY (MARCH 21, 1965) OF VIETCONG TERROR IN SOUTH

VIETNAM

The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tin Province and kidnaped 10 civilians. A Vietcong squad infiltrated a hamlet in Gia Dinh Province and kidnaped four civilians.

The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tri Province and kidnaped two civilians.

The Vietcong fired mortars into the office of the Hiep Hoa village council, wounding 22 civilians.

The Vietcong entered Phuoc Thuan hamlet in Ba Xuyen Province, kidnaping the hamlet chief and wounding one civilian.

The Vietcong attacked a land development center in Darlac Province kidnaping seven and killing two civilians.

One Vietcong platoon entered a hamlet in Tuyen Duc Province and kidnaped three hamlet personnel and four civilians.

2. VIETCONG TERRORISTS STRIKE PUBLIC FACILITIES

The Vietcong bombed the My Canh Restaurant in Saigon on the evening of June 25, 1965. The result of the two explosions set off by the Vietcong was 42 persons killed, 27 of whom were Vietnamese, and 80 injured, 62 of whom were Vietnamese. A large proportion of the killed and injured were Vietnamese women and children.

On August 10, the Vietcong exploded four mines, destroying a two classroom elementary school and information room and a first aid station at Long Phy village near Soc Trang. Three civil defense members were killed and two civilians injured. During 1962, 80,000 Vietnamese children were deprived of schools because of terrorist action: 636 schools were destroyed, 250 teachers were kidnaped and 30 teachers were killed.

3. COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT PUNISHED

On August 24, U.S. troops entered a Montagnard village 15 miles east of Pleiku to discover that the Vietcong had just executed the aged village chief and the village chief's youngest son. The village chief's wife was still alive but the Vietcong had tortured her by carving flesh from her body and cutting her arms. The Vietcong had also shot the wives of two of the Montagnard soldiers from the village repeatedly in the fleshy parts of their legs trying to force the women to disclose who, among the villagers, supported the Government.

4. POPULATION CENTERS ARE FREQUENT VICTIMS OF VIETCONG ATROCITIES In early August, an American AID provincial representative in Binh Dinh Province told of a Vietnamese Army noncommissioned officer who went berserk and attempted to kill himself following a Vietcong attack on a refugee center. Some 60 children and older people were killed and injured, among whom were relatives of the NCO.

Following the battle of Dong Xoai in June 1965, Mr. Leo Cherne of the International Rescue Committee visited the scene of the fighting. Mr. Cherne reported: "The Vietcong * * left behind about 1,500 of a total population of 3,000 who were dead or injured or maimed or orphaned. These are simple Vietnamese peasants. I learned that the Vietcong, before they withdrew, literally entered every single home, shack, habitation of any kind, and like locusts cleaned every last kernel of rice, every piece of dried fish or any other protein and every last container of Nuoc mam and cleaned out every last piaster."

5. AMERICAN CIVILIANS ARE VIETCONG TARGETS

On March 29, 1965, Vietcong terrorists exploded a bomb at the American Embassy in Saigon. Two Americans were killed. (It is important to note that 19 Vietnamese were also killed and 131 Vietnamese were injured from the blast.)

The Vietcong have threatened to execute Mr. Gustav Hertz, an AID American employee, who was captured while on a "Sunday stroll" in 1964 as retaliation should a Vietcong terrorist who was captured while aiding in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in March be executed. It should be pointed out that Mr. Hertz, unlike the Vietcong terrorist who was engaged in an act of premeditated violence against unarmed civilians, was in Vietnam in a purely nonmilitary capacity and was engaged in work of a constructive nature for the Vietnamese people.

(Source: Department of State.)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Bell, I notice in your statement this morning you are requesting this committee and the Congress to authorize the use of supporting assistance funds for administrative expenses. Mr. BELL. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Would that not be an unusual request?