GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION Senator LONG. Now, are you familiar with the resolution that Congress passed when our ships were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin? General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Senator LONG. Let me just quote from that. Our ships were there and they attacked us. We were there to be helpful in one way or another to the South Vietnamese, no use kidding about that. But we weren't fighting just out there in international waters. When they attacked us they authorized us to first strike back. There are 125 times in history at least when the Armed Forces have been employed in the absence of a declaration of war. We fight first and declare war later, that is the usual case. Now, when they were attacked we fought back, and we passed this resolution by a vote of 400, I think, something to 2, and here is what it says: ** Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Then here is section 2: The United States regards as vital to its international interests and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. It then refers to this treaty here, saying we regard this treaty as binding us to do just what we are doing there, and having done that it then says: that the President is ** to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. SOUTH VIETNAM IS A PROTOCOL STATE Now, if you were President, wouldn't you regard that as a commitment and an order of our Congress to go to the aid of these countries when they are being murdered and killed by Communist aggressors? General TAYLOR. I would, sir. Senator LONG. Now, after that happened the Communists reacted violently and they started marching organized units into South Vietnam and we started putting our units in there to meet this, as I understand it. They're sending in organized units and so are we. QUALITY OF OUR TROOPS I would like to know, General, if you think the quality of the men we are sending there today is equal to those who served before. Do you recall some of the places the 1st Marine Division served before in World War II? For example, where are some of the places they served? General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Senator LONG. I believe you would say Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, those are the boys who put that flag on top of that mountain, they served in Saipan, and I believe, Tinian. Do you recall some of the other places that division served? General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Senator LONG. Do you think the men who serve today in the 1st Marine Division are worthy successors of those men who served in that division? General TAYLOR. I would like to make more general reply if I may because I have seen the quality of almost all of the troops present. I have not seen the last division that has gone in but I think our men are coming extremely well prepared for this unusual kind of warfare. This reflects the intense concentration of interest on preparing for guerrilla wars which has existed in our Armed Forces since early in 1962. They arrive in excellent condition, for General Westmoreland gives them 2 months and as a result I think we can all be proud of all of our troops. Senator LONG. I would like a specific answer. Do you think the men serving in the 1st Marines are worthy successors of those serving in World War II? General TAYLOR. I didn't see them in World War II, I am sure they are. Senator LONG. Would you mention the others? General TAYLOR. I would mention the 101. Senator LONG. Do you think those men there today compare favorably with the men who landed today, in Normandy? General TAYLOR. As good as their forebears in Normandy. General TAYLOR. Again, I have the difficulty of not having personal observation in World War II. But I think we can sum it up by saying indeed our men are worthy of the units which they represent. Senator LONG. Let me just ask you this. CIVILIAN ATROCITIES BY VIETCONG Do you know how many civilians the Vietcong have killed-innocent men, women, and children who are not combatants at all? General TAYLOR. It doesn't have a total figure, it runs in tens and tens of thousands. Senator LONG. The last time I looked at it the figure exceeded 50,000. In one year alone they killed 456 mayors in little villages. General TAYLOR. Senator, I think we should mention also to appreciate a figure like that we should multiply it by 20 and then ask ourselves how we would feel if that many mayors or officials in our country had been destroyed. Senator LONG. Let's take the South Vietnamese boys fighting for their country. The last time I looked at it those boys had suffered some very heavy losses. They had suffered roughly 40.000-35,000 of their men killed in combat against the Communists. How many would that be, just to see the weight of that loss, if you assess that against the United States? If we suffered a relative loss that heavy, fighting against the Communists, how much would that be? General TAYLOR. 700,000. Senator LONG. Now, that would be as though we lost 700,000. Senator Carlson? SIGNIFICANCE OF AIRSTRIKES IN LAOS Senator CARLSON. General Taylor, I regret sincerely that I was unable to be here when you read your prepared statement. I had the honor of attending the President's prayer breakfast this morning and I presided. But I read your statement since coming to the meeting and it does raise some questions. I hope my question will be like Senator Aiken's suggestion, that they add something to this discussion. I think you stated that you were not using your Air Force outside of Vietnam, is that correct? General TAYLOR. I was commenting on the fact that in 1961 although we were perfectly aware that North Vietnam was the source of the support of the insurgency, we did not recommend the air strikes outside of the country, hoping to be able to cope with the situation within the confines of South Vietnam. Senator CARLSON. Well, the reason I bring it up is that I have here a dispatch from Saigon dated February 15. I shall not read it. It is written by Jack Foisie, a Los Angeles Times reporter. It reads this way: The U.S. Air Force has stepped up its attack on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos by using spray planes to destroy foliage and chemicals. My only reason for bringing it up is I wonder if this means an extension or escalation of the war outside of the Vietnam area. General TAYLOR. I am not aware of this operational activity, Senator. We have been flying armed reconnaissance for a long time with the agreement of the Laotian Government. Whether reference is to that kind of activity I am not sure. Senator CARLSON. If this statement is correct, would this be an expansion or escalation of the war, even to another country? General TAYLOR. Escalation, I believe, represents a rather dramatic change in tactics or strategy. I would say it is simply an extension of the kind of thing we are doing in the north, namely the infiltration of men and supplies. Senator CARLSON. Isn't it a fact that much of the materiel and supplies do come from Laos in the northern area? This probably is one section of the war theater that could be helpful if we could prevent the supplies from coming in. The question gets to be again, are we going into Laos and other areas? General TAYLOR. Certainly it would be very important if we could stop the movement of supplies into Laos. Again, we all know the limitations of what air can do even if there are no restrictions placed upon its employment. Senator CARLSON. I notice in your statement, I believe, on page 10, where you said, "It was perfectly clear from the start as it is clear today that air power would not be able to stop infiltration," I was wondering if this is the beginning of an expansion of the air power into those areas? General TAYLOR. I have no knowledge of any change in decision. SOURCES USED FOR TROOP EXPANSION Senator CARLSON. I want to get to another sentence about the expansion of the use of our troops. You say, "I am thoroughly aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Vietnam." Then you ask "if this requirement is open ended." You say you don't "** * believe that anyone can give a satisfactory reply to this question, but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on this matter." There is in progress, I think, of course, an increase in the number of our troop strength and I just want to ask this question: Can we triple, for instance, our troop strength in Vietnam without cutting back on our troop commitments in Europe and Korea? General TAYLOR. That would mean raising the troop levels to around 600,000. Senator CARLSON. Well, a substantial amount at least? General TAYLOR. I would say we would have to call up some of our Reserves. It all depends upon the reaction at home. It could be if we raised additional forces, we could support this strength and also commitment overseas but not with our present military establishment. Senator CARLSON. Would you be required then to call up the Reserves if we should go that far? General TAYLOR. Only Secretary McNamara could answer that officially, but I would certainly assume so if it went up to 600,000 some selected. MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA Senator CARLSON. Here I go back to Senator Aiken again. You don't quote to one general the views of another, but I was interested in the comment of General Gavin. He told us, in his opinion, if we become further involved to the extent of vastly increasing our troop strength, the Chinese would surely open up in Korea. Do you have any comment on that? General TAYLOR. I-it is purely a matter of opinion, neither one of us can prove our case. I would not agree with that. There are so many reasons why the Red Chinese would want to avoid a military confrontation with us, and, of course, on our side we are certainly not seeking one. Since both parties would be against a military confrontation, I would be surprised if it arose. There is always some risk, as I conceded in my statement, but when you look at the problems of China, there are enormous population food problems, their extreme vulnerability to air attack, to the fact that they can't afford to have their own strength diminished in relation to the Soviet Union, with whom they are engaged in a bitter competition, and all these factors, when they are looked at, it seems to me that the likelihood of deliberate military involvement in confrontation of the United States on the part of Peiping is unlikely. DE GAULLE'S REPLY TO NOTE OF HO CHI MINH Senator CARLSON. We read correspondents' reports all over the world, and I was interested to see one from Paris, February 15. This is written by Waverley Root, of the Washington Post foreign service: it is a rather lengthy article, but an interesting article in regard to a letter. Maybe I had better read just a sentence or two. President de Gaulle has told President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam that there is no military solution to the Vietnam war and that France will act to help a peace effort when the time is ripe, which he does not think is now the case. I assume, based on some previous answers you have made, you question whether this is the time. General TAYLOR. I simply don't believe that the Hanoi leadership has got in a frame of mind that they are likely to bring with them to the peace table a sincere determination to seek a solution. Senator CARLSON. Then I shall read the next paragraph. De Gaulle's views were put forth in a letter sent to Hanoi February 8 but published here today. This is Paris It was a reply to a letter from Ho of January 24. This is a lengthy article, which I would like to put in its entirety in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the entire article may be received. (The article referred to follows:) DE GAULLE SEES NO VICTOR IN VIETNAM WAR (By Waverly Root, Washington Post foreign service) PARIS, February 15.-President de Gaulle has told President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam that there is no military solution to the Vietnam war and that France will act to help a peace effort when the time is ripe, which he does not think is now the case. De Gaulle's views were put forth in a letter sent to Hanoi February 8, but published here today. It was a reply to a letter from Ho of January 24. The letter, which contains an implied dig at the Saigon Government, has been the subject of two interpretations here. Some American circles feel the letter blames Hanoi-Peiping and Washington equally for interference in Vietnam-a view already at variance with official American thought. High French circles, however, feel that this is too rosy a view of French feel. ings on Vietnam. They consider the American intervention less defensible than the North Vietnamese intervention and assert that the implied criticisms in the De Gaulle letter are aimed primarily at Washington. Although subject to these differing interpretations, the letter appears to reiterate the position France has consistently maintained on the Vietnam conflict. Those who think the letter was aimed equally at both sides point to two passages: The first calls for a return to the principles of the Geneva accords guaranteeing Vietnam's independence "by the nonintervention of every foreign power under whatever form, and reciprocally by a policy of strict neutrality on the part of Vietnamese authorities." The second assumes that "the engagements taken in 1954 concerning Vietnamese independence and neutrality and against the interference of anyone in Vietnamese internal affairs would be renewed and, naturally, observed-which, very obviously, is not the case in the present situation." In these two passages, however, De Gaulle speaks of "Vietnam," which lets Hanoi out and ignores American insistence on the existence of two Vietnams. Chinese and Russian intervention fall under these terms, but not that of North Vietnam south of the 17th parallel; so does American intervention, but the "policy of strict neutrality on the part of the Vietnamese authorities" hits at Saigon as well as Hanoi. De Gaulle took a further swipe at Saigon by saying that a political solution involves "the possibility for the population of South Vietnam of constituting a representative government without outside intervention." Outside intervention in this case, however, seems to apply to Hanoi as well as to Washington, Peiping, and Moscow. Other passages are difficult to read as referring to any country other than the United States: De Gaulle acknowledges that Ho wrote "on the war which is going on in Vietnam and in particular about the policy and action of the United States of America." Ho had appealed to De Gaulle to "help stop in time any new perfidi |