been hard put to convince Abraham Lincoln that there should be an election to determine the ultimate outcome of the war. I mean, I think-without in any way suggesting that our Civil War was an exact parallel-I think these concepts upon which we rest our policy are subject to very serious question. Now Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir Senator CHURCH. Now, you can look at the war in Vietnam as a covert invasion of the south by the north, or you can look at it as some scholars do, as basically an indigenous war to which the north has given a growing measure of aid and abetment, but either way it is a war between Vietnamese to determine what the ultimate kind of government is going to be for Vietnam. When I went to school that was a civil war. I am told these days it is not a civil war any more. Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I do not follow that point at all because, whatever you call it, there is aggression from North Vietnam against South Vietnam across that demarcation line contrary to the military clauses of that 1954 commitment. UNIFICATION ELECTIONS CALLED FOR IN 1954 AGREEMENT Senator CHURCH. Have all the provisions of the 1954 agreement been adhered to by either side? Secretary RUSK. No; they have not. Senator CHURCH. Were the elections which were called for and generally anticipated at the time the agreement was made, were they held? Secretary RUSK. Neither in North or South Vietnam. Senator CHURCH. Right. So it cannot be said that violations of the agreement have been all one sided, and certainly our case does not rest upon that kind of reasoning. Secretary RUSK. That is correct. The case, the basic fact, is that large numbers of armed men and large quantities of arms have been sent illegally from North Vietnam into South Vietnam to try to take over South Vietnam by force. WHY UNITED STATES DID NOT SIGN AGREEMENT The CHAIRMAN. May I ask what is the explanation of why in 1956, contrary to the terms of the Geneva accords, elections were not held? You have stated several times that the aggression started in 1960. But the events between 1954 when the agreement was signed and 1960 were not without significance. We backed Diem, did we not? Didn't we have much to do with putting him in power? Secretary RUSK. Well, we supported him. The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean. Secretary RUSK. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. And he was, to an extent had, a certain dependence upon us, did he not? Secretary Rusk: We were giving him very considerable aid, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that in 1955, in accordance with the treaty provisions, he was requested by the north to consult about elections, and that he refused to do so. Is that correct? Secretary RUSK. Well, neither his government nor the Government of the United States signed that agreement. The CHAIRMAN. We will come to that as a separate point. But it is correct that he refused to consult with the north on election procedure, is it not? Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Now we will come to your point of our not signing. Why, in your opinion, didn't we sign the agreement? There were nine parties there, and seven signed it. We refused. Why didn't we sign it? Secretary RUSK. I have tried to find in the record a full discussion of that subject. Quite frankly, I have not been able to. I think, my general impression is, that the United States was at that time not persuaded that this was the best way to settle this affair, and did not want to be responsible for all of the elements of the agreement. They did say that they would give it-that they would acknowledge it (and I believe you might want to put in the record here, Mr. Bedell Smith's exact words on it) and would consider any attempt to upset it by force as a threat to the peace. (The document referred to follows:) STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954 As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters: Declaration The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954, between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the People's Army of Vietnam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly." With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position. We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future. The CHAIRMAN. Not having signed it, what business was it of ours for intervening and encouraging one of the participants not to follow it, specifically Diem? PROSPECTS FOR FREE ELECTIONS Secretary RUSK. Well, the prospect of free elections in North and South Vietnam was very poor at that time. The CHAIRMAN. Now, they have always been poor, and will be for a hundred years, won't they? That was not news to you. I mean, this was a device to get around the settlement, was it not? Secretary RUSK. No, no, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe the prospects of free elections, in South Vietnam anyhow, are all that dim. The CHAIRMAN. Have they ever had them in 2,000 years of history? Secretary RUSK. They have had some free elections in the provinces and municipalities in May of last year. The CHAIRMAN. Under our control and direction. Secretary RUSK. Not under our control and direction; no, sir. Secretary RUSK. Multiple candidates, with 70 percent of the registered voters voting, and with results which indicate that people in these local communities elected the people that you would expect them to elect in terms of the natural leaders of the community. Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, will you yield for a question? Senator AIKEN. Are the successful candidates still living now? Secretary RUSK. Well, they are as far as the Government is concerned. The Vietcong continue to kill them, assassinate, kidnap them. Senator AIKEN. Knock them off. Secretary RUSK. I am sure that not all those who were elected are still in office. Senator AIKEN. That discourages candidacies. Secretary RUSK. Yes, it does. The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are a lot of things here that discourage candidacies, too. It is not a very easy life any way you take it. UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY UNITED STATES AT GENEVA CONFERENCE Coming back to 1954, because the President in his state of the Union message said we stood by the Geneva accords of 1954, although we did not sign it, Bedell Smith, who was Under Secretary of State did make a unilateral declaration. Secretary RUSK. Under Secretary of State? The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what he said? Secretary RUSK. I do not have that text here, and I did not The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the sense of it? Secretary RUSK. Well, he said, in effect, that we would accept the settlement and consider any attempt to upset it by force as a threat to the peace. DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING 1954 The CHAIRMAN. Aggression, as you call it, did not start until 1960. Before that the carrying out of the agreement was really abandoned by refusal to hold elections, was it not? We did not encourage them to have elections and apparently the North Vietnamese did not do anything very substantial in objection in that period, did they? I do not know. I am asking you really. Secretary RUSK. Senator, I regret that I did not, in the words of the House of Commons, have notice of this particular questioning on this particular period. I would need to review the record and be much more briefed and detailed on it. The CHAIRMAN. I won't pursue it at this time. Secretary RUSK. But I will be glad to return to the committee and pursue this line of questioning. JUSTIFICATION FOR AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT The CHAIRMAN. I do it for this reason that I tried to state: There is some feeling that, perhaps, we have intervened, as the Senator from Idaho indicated a moment ago, in a family quarrel here, and that this intervention may not be justified on the grounds here presented. This leads me back to the point raised by the Englishman. In all frankness, that doctrine is a more understandable, more simple, and, perhaps, more justifiable reason for our involvement if you rely on the theory that this situation in Vietnam is such a great danger to the free world and to our own security because of either the probability or possibility of Chinese Communist imperialism; that is, of their expanding physically in this area. I think that is the traditional doctrine, at least it is understandable to me. If that is the ground it is more understandable. Whether it is justified or not, I do not know, but it is more understandable. Are you unwilling to put it on that ground? Secretary RUSK. Well, I am unwilling to cast the United States in the role of a policeman of the universe or one who is disposed to try to impose on the world a Pax Americana in every possible situation. The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean every possible Secretary RUSK. Rather than honoring the specific commitments undertaken by this Government and by this Nation by action both of the executive and the legislative branches. SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO VIETNAM The CHAIRMAN. This is what needs discussion. I do not see the specific commitment. I do not see the Southeast Asia Treaty. I think it might be worth while for you to give us, maybe in writing, something to clarify this even further, with specific reference to that part of the treaty and the provisions which require it because I am not convinced of it. I am not sure about it. None of us are very well briefed on this area because, frankly, I did not anticipate years ago that this was a serious situation, I mean anything like it is. I thought of it primarily as another country among many to whom we were giving aid. I really never became concerned about the situation until about the time of the Bay of Tonkin. I had paid no particular attention to it, and that is typical of why there is this unhappiness, as evidenced by-well, you saw in this morning's paper 15 of the Members, many of them newer Members of the Senate, who seem to be unhappy about the expansion of this war. I do not think that they have made up their minds that they are dead set against what your purpose is. I think they are not quite clear what the purpose is, and would like an opportunity to examine the objective further before they have to vote on commitments which are irrevocable. Senator PELL. Will the Chairman yield? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, I yield to anybody. I am just trying to pursue this to develop something that will give us some reassurance. Senator PELL. I think the number of people involved would be more than 15 of those who signed the letter. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Secretary RUSK. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, I am fully at the disposal of the committee and any other Senators that the committee might wish to invite here to take part in your proceedings. I am a little concerned that formal acts of the Government over a period of years in a variety of ways would appear to catch people by surprise at the moment when things begin to get difficult. I would hope the Senate would not ratify an alliance if it did not intend that alliance to be taken seriously. The CHAIRMAN. We have a difference of view of what that alliance. means, you see. That is what has been developed, I think. Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Let me yield to Senator Gore-Senator Mundt wants to ask questions. He has not had a chance, and then I will yield to you. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF SEATO TREATY Senator GORE. I hope, Mr. Chairman, you concur in my view that if this is to be of some value there must be an exchange of views here. The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Senator GORE. Between the executive and the legislative. In preparation I have looked up some of the documents. I have here the SEATO treaty to which you refer and to which, let me remind you, Mr. Secretary, South Vietnam is not a signatory. Secretary RUSK. It is a protocol state. Senator GORE. It is a protocol state, that is correct. But insofar as its being a specific commitment, here is the specific language: If, in the opinion of any of the parties the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply, is threatened in any way other than by an armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area— here is the commitment the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense. Secretary RUSK. That is Senator GORE. If that is a specific commitment to wage war in southeast Asia I do not understand it. |