It should be clear to all, and to us, that the United States-with only 6 percent of the world's population and 7 percent of the earth's land mass cannot alone protect the free world against Communist expansion indefinitely.

Now what of the future?

I supported the bombing lull and efforts to open the door to a solution to the Vietnamese problem by negotiation, but had little hope. At least, doubtful people and doubtful nations were convinced of our continued good intentions and that we actually wanted peace. However, I believe that the hard fact is that we have not yet exerted enough military pressure to force the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese to the conference table. I believe they are convinced at this time that their interests will best be served by continuation of the war. I think the Communist nations of Asia have decided to make the war in Vietnam a test of both our military power and our national purpose to win. This is the basis of much of my thinking. They believe that a long, bitter, and grinding war on the ground, with its attendant blood and sacrifice, will drain our will and capability to the point that we will either withdraw or consent to peace on their terms.

Winning of this war, and stopping the bloodshed, either through a military victory or through an honorable diplomatic settlement, is the first order of business with me, and it should be the first order of business throughout Washington.

This means that those Great Society programs with the billions that they are gulping down, should be relegated to the rear-far to the rear, I think. Certainly they should be secondary to this war.

Regardless of whether we agree with the wisdom of our initial commitment to Vietnam, we must fight this thing through either to a military victory or an honorable diplomatic settlement. We have put the American flag in issue. We have put American troops in the field. Both our flag and our troops have been fired upon. More than 1,800 American lives have already been lost in actual combat. Our commitment is such that we cannot now withdraw without dishonor to our national purpose and our national image. Moreover, to do so would lay the groundwork for almost certain and perhaps even more serious challenges to us and our commitments elsewhere in Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

There are a number of things we must do if we are to win this war. First and foremost, we must make a national decision that it is our purpose to win. If we cannot do this then we must either get out or resign ourselves to the prospect of a long and unhappy stalemate which will be costly both in money and in lives.

Assuming that our decision is to win-and I think it is-we must increase our combat troops to the extent that we can take the war effectively to the Vietcong and their allies from North Vietnam and drive them from the country. As a part of the same movement, we must resume and conduct an air war against North Vietnam in an intensified effort to stop the flow of men and supplies from the north to the south. This means, in my judgment, the removal of the restrictions which have prevented us from waging a hard-hitting and allout air attack in North Vietnam.

The targets for these air attacks could include powerplants, petroleum facilities and ports, and other facilities and installations. Once the President, as Commander in Chief, decides the policy, our professional military men are the ones to select the targets.

In short, I believe that we must be prepared to hit the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese as hard, as often and wherever necessary to make them realize that our purpose is to win and not just maintain a holding operation in the south. If we do less than this, we may well be faced with a long, drawnout and bloody war of possibly 10 or 15 years.

Stepped-up operations against North Vietnam may well raise a very serious question as to whether we will provoke Red China to full intervention in the war. This is an exposed nerve and it is a question which has controlled and influenced many of our actions. However, in view of our commitments, I believe that we must face and accept the risk involved and be prepared to meet Red Chinese military aggression, if it should come, with the requisite military might.

I have no illusions about this thing. For my part, I would never put our boys in mortal conflict against the hordes of Red Chinese coolies without being free to use every weapon we have, when and if necessary.

The position of Russia in this war is not entirely clear but certainly must be reckoned with. They, of course, support North Vietnam but I feel that they are not convinced that this is the time or place to press for a showdown. However, their struggle with Red China for leadership of the Communist world may force them to adopt a strong and unyielding position.

There is another risk we face in pressing for victory in Vietnam. Until recently we were fighting that war on a peacetime budget and under peacetime procedures. As a result, much of the equipment, supplies, material, and other resources sent to Vietnam had to be taken out of the hides of other active military forces as well as from the Reserves and National Guard. The drain was substantial and, as a result, many of our active forces on guard against communism around the world and those at home, including the National Guard and Reserves, are pinched for equipment, repair parts, and supplies. Substantial reduction in our combat readiness has resulted.

My concern about this matter stems from a comprehensive and continuing investigation into worldwide Army combat readiness by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which I am privileged to be chairman. This inquiry already has raised many serious questions about the adequacy of our present and past military procurement and personnel programs brought about by the heavy and unanticipated demands imposed by Vietnam.

We cannot ignore this. It must have immediate attention. We must have military forces ready and capable of putting down any brush fire wars or threat of such wars if we are to prevent Communist aggression from prowling unchecked throughout the parts of the world we must in good judgment protect. Our forces, both active and reserve, must be provided the best and most modern arms, equipment and weapons and in plentiful supply.

The war and the demands associated with it will directly affect the people of Mississippi in many ways.

With the increase in military forces will come a further and added increase in draft calls. This will take many additional Mississippi sons and brothers from their homes.

In my opinion, at least a partial callup of National Guardsmen and Reservists is probable at some date, particularly of units with specialized skills. With a substantial escalation of our strength in Vietnam, a callup of major combat units is possible. So far as I know, there are no present intentions of a callup. If this should occur I am certain that our citizen soldiers will answer the call to arms with the same patriotism and valor they have shown in the many crises of the past.

Increased taxes, if this war continues, are certain.

We may be forced to a choice between guns and butter, which might entail economic controls and rationing of goods and materials with at least a partial disruption of normal business operations. Many major domestic programs may have to be curtailed.

The toll of casualties will go even higher and additional thousands of American fighting men may be called upon to pay the greatest and final sacrifice in defense of their country.

I wish I could end this on an optimistic note, but the realities of the situation are hard and must be faced by all Americans. Let me briefly summarize. There are several alternatives or possibilities which confront us. First, we can withdraw. This is unthinkable. Secondly, without adequate military strength we could be driven out. This, of course, must not happen. Thirdly, the war can develop into a stalemate and a costly and grinding war of attrition. This could last for 10 to 15 years and would be the most costly in blood, money, and tears. Fourthly, we can bring to bear sufficient military might to force our Communist enemies to the conference table or, failing that, to defeat them on the field of battle. Only the last alternative, in my judgment, offers us the chance of peace with honor. Further, I believe that the sooner we undertake this mission, the less will be the cost in time and life.

I cannot close this without paying a special tribute to our brave men who fight and sometimes die in Vietnam. They have done a tremendous job under very difficult circumstances. They fight for the cause of freedom with the same high morale, courage, valor, and skill which have distinguished the American soldier, sailor, airman, and marine in all past battles and wars. They prove once again that a properly motivated American is the finest fighting man the world has ever known.

They deserve the gratitude and the unstinting support of all Americans and freedom-loving people everywhere. We must also give the gratitude of our support to our fine members of the Reserve forces of the National Guard who kept their talents and their training up. And, who, when they are called on, if they are, will use that tremendous reservoir of trained strength and readiness to fulfill their mission.

Now, let's remember we are a powerful nation. We have brave reserves of moral and spiritual strength. We've got to see this thing through and I predict that a strong offense will change this entire picture. Let us stand our ground. I like the spirit of that dying soldier on the battlefield in World War I, lying there mortally wounded-and he knew it himself—when the medics reached him and kneeled down and asked what they could do to help him, he said, "You can't help me. I'm already too far gone. Move forward, move forward on the field of battle and help those who still have a chance for life. As for me, I thank God that he matched me with this fine hour."

So, as benefactors of a great heritage, wonderful spirit of liberty and freedom that we have been able to maintain and keep alive-it is alive yet-as benefactors of all these things, let us face whatever the future holds and thank God that he matched us with this hour even though it is an hour of peril.

May God sustain us and help us as we go. I thank you.

EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

EXCERPTS FROM THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERIM REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM

August 11, 1954 to December 10, 1954, and December 11, 1954 to February 10, 1955 (Source for these excerpts were official reports to Parliament of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom)

FOREWORD

The Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were signed at Geneva on July 20, 1954, and published in "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239. Provision was made in these Agreements for the establishment in each of the three countries of an International Commission, consisting of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, to control and supervise the application of the Agreements.

On January 28, 1955, the Government of India, acting on behalf of the Indian Chairman of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, transmitted to the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov) copies of the First Interim Report of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam. Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government agreed that this report should be published simultaneously in all capitals concerned once copies had been received y all members of the Geneva Conference. It was also agreed that the same produre should be adopted for the Commission's Second Interim Report, of which copies were received at the Foreign Office on March 8, 1955. The present White Paper contains the text of the first report and its appendices as received from the Government of India together with the text of the second report and certain of its appendices.

Although Her Majesty's Government are naturally in no way responsible for the contents of these reports, there is one factual error to which they wish to draw attention, as this concerns a matter for which the Commission are not directly responsible. Paragraph 29 of the First Interim Report states that "In accordance with Article 26 of the Agreement, the costs involved in the operations of the International Commission are to be shared equally between the two parties." In fact, as the House of Commons was informed by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, on December 20, 1954, it was agreed at the final meeting of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (page 8 of "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)," Cmd. 9239) that Sir Anthony Eden and M. Molotov, as the two Chairmen, should submit to the Conference proposals for meeting the costs of the three International Supervisory Commissions in Indo-China. After consultations among the interested Powers, Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government have agreed to recommend to the members of the Geneva Conference a scheme elaborated by the Government of India on behalf of the Three Powers providing the members of the Supervisory Commission: India, Canada and Poland. This scheme provides that a proportion of the costs should be financed by the Supervisory Powers themselves and the remainder from a "common pool" to be established by the members of the Conference. This scheme is now being considered by the members of the Conference, who will also have to agree on their respective contributions to the common pool.

CHAPTER I. ESTABLISHMENT AND MACHINERY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION Chapter VI of the Geneva Agreement, and, in particular, Articles 29, 34 and 36 provide for the establishment of an International Commission composed of representatives of Canada, India and Poland to ensure the control and super

vision of the execution of this Agreement by the two signatory parties. The functions and duties of the Commission have been specified under Article 36 and include the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and, in particular:

(a) The control of the movement of the Armed Forces of the two partieseffected within the framework of the regroupment plan;

(b) The supervision of the demarcation lines between the regroupment areas and also the demilitarized zones;

(c) The control of the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees; and

(d) The supervision at ports and airfields as well as along the frontiers of Vietnam of the execution of the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

2. În accordance with the above Articles, and in accordance with Article 44 of the Agreement, which provides that the Commission shall be set up at the time of the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, the Commission was established in Hanoi on the 11th of August, 1954. The Commission consists of three Members who have the personal rank of Ambassador. The composition of the Commission is as follows:

Chairman: Ambassador M. J. Desai, India.

Members: Ambassador Sherwood Lett, Canada; Ambassador P. Ogrodzinski, Poland.

Alternates: Major-General K. P. Dhargalkar, India; Mr. Marcel Cadieux, Canada; M. M. Bibrowski, Poland.

The representative of India presides over the Commission. For the due fulfillment of its functions of supervision and control, the International Commission has established the following machinery:

NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

3. Each Member of the Commission is assisted by a Delegation from his own country. It consists of an Alternate Delegate and Military and Political Advisers. The National Delegations, besides providing Political and Military Advisers to the Ambassadors also furnish the personnel for manning various Committees and inspection teams of the International Commission.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT

4. The International Commission is serviced by a Secretariat General. The main functions of this Secretariat, which works under the control of SecretaryGeneral, are:

(a) To arrange and organise meetings and to keep the records of the International Commission;

(b) To follow up the decisions of the Commission;

(c) To maintain liaison between the Commission and other bodies which are responsible for implementation of the Agreement;

(d) To assist the Commission in controlling the operations of the Fixed and Mobile Teams;

(e) To examine petitions and complaints; and

(f) To give due publicity to the activities of the Commission.

5. The Indian Member, who is the Chairman of the Commission, is also ex officio Secretary-General, in pursuance of a decision to this effect taken by the three countries constituting the International Commission. He has thus a dual capacity. As Chairman, he presides over the meetings of the Commission, and, as Secretary-General, he controls the executive machinery of the International Secretariat and is the chief executive of the Commission. The advantage of combining these posts in the hands of one person is to maintain a closer link between the making of decisions and their implementation.

6. There are three main Branches in the International Secretariat, each in charge of a Deputy Secretary-General.

7. The Administration Branch deals with all administrative problems-personnel, logistics, &c. It also maintains liaison with the French and the Democratic Republic authorities.