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The Commission, however, regrets to inform the Co-Chairmen that there has been no improvement in this regard.

22. The International Commission wishes to draw the serious and earnest attention of the Co-Chairman to the gravity of the situation that his developed in Viet-Nam in the last few months. Fundamental provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been violated by both Parties, resulting in ever-increasing tension and threat of resumption of open hostilities. In this situation, the role of the Commission for the maintenance of peace in Viet-Nam is being greatly hampered because of denial of co-operation by both the Parties. The Commission, therefore, earnestly recommends to the Co-Chairmen that, with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Viet-Nam, remedial action be taken, in the light of this Report, so as to ensure that the Parties

(a) respect the Zone assigned to the other Party;

(b) observe strictly the provisions of Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement in respect of the import of war material and the introduction of military personnel;

(c) commit no act and undertake no operation of a hostile nature against the other Party;

(d) do not allow the Zones assigned to them to adhere to any military alliance and to be used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy;

(e) co-operate with the International Commission in the fulfillment of its tasks of supervision and control of the implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement.

23. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM-SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

(Saigon, February 13, 1965)

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and wishes to draw their immediate and earnest attention to the following situation.

(While in full agreement that a report should be made to the co-Chairmen, the Canadian Delegation dissents from the terms of this majority Report and has expressed its views in the attached Statement).

On February 7, 1965, a joint communique was issued by the Acting Premier of the Republic of Vietnam (R.V.N.), acting under the authority of the National Security Council, and the Ambassador of the United States, acting under the authority of his Government. This communique announced that military action had been taken against military installations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). A copy of this communique is at annexure 'A'.

On the same day, the Liaison Mission of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) transmitted the text of a communique which was issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam referring to the bombing and strafing of the DRVN; subsequently the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued on February 8, 1965 a communique on these events, which was communicated by the PAVN Liaison Mission in their letter to the International Commission. The Liaison Mission of the PAVN brought to the notice of the International Commission that again on February 8, 1965, bombing and strafing of a number of places had taken place and requested the International Commission "to consider and condemn without delay these violations of utmost gravity and report them to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China". These documents are at annexure 'B'

On February 8, 1965 it was officially announced that further military action on the territory of the DRVN had been undertaken by RVN and US aircraft. This is at Annexure 'C'.

These documents point to the seriousness of the situation and indicate violations of the Geneva Agreement.1

The International Commission is examining and investigating these and connected complaints still being received by it concerning similar serious events and grave developments, and will transmit a report to the co-Chairmen as soon as possible.

In the meanwhile, this Special Report is submitted for the earnest and serious attention of the co-Chairmen in view of the gravity of the situation. The International Commission requests the co-Chairmen to consider the desirability of issuing an immediate appeal to all concerned with a view to reducing tension and preserving peace in Vietnam and taking whatever measures are necessary in order to stem the deteriorating situation.

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China the assurances of its highest consideration. M. A. RAHMAN, Representative of India on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

R. B. STAWICKI,

Acting Representative of the Polish People's Republic on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIETNAM-SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINA

(Saigon, February 27, 1965)
(Excerpts)

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam presents its compliments to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China 1954, and has the honour to state that on the 12th February, 1965, at 1715 hours the Chief of the Liaison Mission of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) asked the Chairman of the International Commission Bureau at Hanoi "to convey to the Commission the request of the PAVN High Command to take steps urgently to withdraw all the Fixed Teams in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). This is because of the tension and the gravity of the situa tion and only taking into consideration the security of the teams".

(While in full agreement that the Co-Chairmen should be informed about the withdrawal of the teams situated in the DRVN, the Polish Delegation considered the terms of this Special Report to be inadequate and expressed its views in the attached Statement).

2. The International Commission immediately on the 13th February, 1965 sent instructions to the Chairman, International Commission Bureau, Hanoi, to request that "if PAVN Liaison Mission maintain decision" they should "present it in writing", and to point out to the PAVN Liaison Mission the "far-reaching implications".

3. On the 13th February, 1965 a telegram from Colonel Ha Van Lau, Chief of the PAVN Liaison Mission, was received (which is at Appendix 'A'). After drawing attention to recent air attacks against the territory of the DRVN, this telegram formally requested the withdrawal of the ICSC Fixed Teams in North Vietnam on security grounds.

4. The request was considered by the International Commission and on 19th February, 1965 a telegram was sent (which is at Appendix 'B') outlining the far-reaching implications of the request affecting the work of the ICSC under the Geneva Agreement, the fact that all controls by these Fixed Teams had been stopped, that the International Commission was prepared to take reasonable risks, but that if the PAVN felt obliged to maintain their decision, the International Commission would have no alternative but to withdraw its Fixed Teams

1 "Miscellaneous No. 20 (1954)", Cmd. 9239.

with great reluctance. (The Statement of the Polish Delegation on this telegram is at Appendix 'D').

5. A reply to International Commission's telegram was received on the 20th February, 1965 from the PAVN Liaison Mission (which is at Appendix 'C') which reiterated their demand. This was further corroborated orally at 1500 hours on the 20th February, 1965 by a representative of the PAVN Liaison Mission to the Chairman of the International Commission Bureau, Hanoi.

6. The Fixed Teams were withdrawn from Dong Dang, Hai Phong and Vinh on the night of 20/21st February, after being informed by the local authorities that immediate evacuation must take place for security reasons; and from Lao Kay and Dong Hoi on the following day. Thus, by the 22nd February, 1965, all the five Fixed Teams of the ICSC had been withdrawn to Hanoi from their locations in the DRVN.

7. As the attached exchange of correspondence will indicate, the International Commission had no alternative but to order with great reluctance the withdrawal of its Fixed Teams from their sites on DRVN territory. The International Commission has informed the PAVN Liaison Mission that it is willing to take reasonable risks in discharging its duties and has indicated to the Liaison Mission that it considers the withdrawal to be a temporary measure. The International Commission intends to discuss with the PAVN authorities the functioning of Mobile Teams and the possibility of controls by the teams temporarily withdrawn from team sites. It will keep the question of the status and functions of its teams in North Vietnam under continuing review in the light of subsequent develop ments.

8. The International Commission takes this opportunity to request the CoChairmen to use their good offices with the members of the Geneva Conference so as to ensure that the implementation of the Geneva Agreement is not impeded, that mobile controls and other operations of the ICSC in North Vietnam continue without interruption, and in particular that appropriate conditions for the return of the Fixed Teams are rapidly created.

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam takes this opportunity to renew to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on IndoChina the assurances of its highest consideration.

J. B. SEABORN,

Representative of the Government of Canada on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

M. A. RAHMAN,

Representative of India on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

SUMMARY INDEX

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(List of witnesses appears alphabetically in contents)

Ability of South Vietnamese to win without U.S. combat forces..
Access of Vietnamese troops to U.S. post exchanges....
Administration policy:

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Clarification of

486

314


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Additional administrative expenses for Vietnam.
Adequacy of programs in Laos and Thailand..
Background of top officials in Vietnam...
Corruption involving program..

Cost to maintain personnel in Vietnam..

Distribution of rice imported under financing by.
Non-American personnel in Vietnam..
Number of personnel in Vietnam.
Relationship of, with the USIA_
Responsibility in Vietnam__.

Aid, possibility that some, is counterproductive_

Aid request for Vietnam, size of

Aid to Vietnam, results of our.

Aiken, Senator George D.:

Examination of witnesses:
Bell, Hon. David E.

Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M..

Kennan, Hon. George.

Poats, Hon. Rutherford M.

Rusk, Hon. Dean__.

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D. (retired).

Airstrikes in Laos, significance of. -

Airstrikes in South Vietnam, effect of B-52_.

37-40, 196-200
249-251
383-385
197

40, 42, 49, 593-597, 674-676
458-462, 514-515

Airpower against North Vietnamese military targets

436

467

484

Allies, contributions of, in Vietnam..

70, 602-

Alsop's interpretation of Gavin's letter to Harper's magazine.

315


269, 354, 407, 450, 481, 682

435

434

20

Alternative courses of action in Vietnam__

American Ground Forces:

Increasing the effectiveness of..

Introduction of, to Vietnam

Possibility of withdrawing, in future. -

American involvement:

Beginning of

In war, increasing-

Justification for..

American military presence abroad, cost of

American presence in Vietnam, dollars generated by.

American Revolution, character of

Anticommunism, majority of South Vietnamese committed to..

25

50

23

11

442

444

I

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