produce the concussion and evolve the mind of nature. If man's mind is the creature of circumstances. as before remarked, so is natures, then where are the circumstances of which it is the creature? If nature be the universe as Mr. M. admits, there is not room even for the echo to answer, where? Again, the mechanism of a man's mind is made up of brain, nerves, and spinal marrow. Where are the brain, nerves, and spinal marrow of nature? Mind enlarges with education, and grows feeble in old age. Does the mind-god of nature go to school, and will the eternal grow feeble with age, like poor human mentality? Moreover, the mind according to phrenology has thirty five bumps. Can Mr. M. lay his hand on, or point his finger to, the bumps of nature? If he can, we may be enlightened with a natural phrenology, as we have been with a natural religion. This scheme might be carried out, but when the ocean came to be classified, Mr. M.'s god would be suspected of water on the brain. Mr. M. does not profess to give proof of his creations, but he must admit the propriety of affording such particulars as will enable "stupid" people to see the connection between the things he speaks so imperatively about. The question might be traced much further, but sufficient has been advanced to show that, as an argument of analogy, it is very incomplete, and consequently, all the inferences are inconclusive in the same degree. Apart from all such investigation; Mr. M.'s god, taken as he is given to us, and considered as a tolerably respectable invention, is not of the slightest use to any body. It is not pretended by Mr. M. that he created the universe, the first job of all former deities-and, if the universe existed independently of him, and could of its own innate power, exist without a god, why not be able to conduct itself with propriety without one? And where came the distinct existence of the mind from? And how ingratiate itself into the good favour of the universe, so as to get the office of perpetual director? Surely the universe, like the Socialists, did not require a Social Father? These questions are put only to show that the new god clears away none of those difficulties by which the old ones have ever been surrounded, but leaves us in all the doubt, suspense, and mystery so peculiar to the whole tribe. Mr. M. strangely misconceives or grossly mistates the position and pretention of the Atheist, which are as far removed from dogmatism, as Mr. M.'s version of them is from truth. He also talks of " pure mind as being the only form in which we can conceive of god." Just as if he, I, or any one else could conceive of that we never saw, nor any one else can describe to us. For a complete exposure of these common errors (it would swell this chapter to an unmerciful length to notice them here), the reader is referred to a 'Reply," just published, price 3d., written by Mr. Southwell, in answer to a Discourse on Deity, by a philosophical inquirer, who falls, with Mr. M., like blind and lame into the same ditches. own. In conclusion, I render to Mr. M. an analogy, which, as far as I shall carry, it will have more points of resemblance than his It is between Newton and himself. Newton was a theorizer on the universe, so is Mr. M. Both have obtained celebrity thereby. But Newton wrote like a driveller on religion. Mr. M. seems travelling the same inglorious road. This says little as a disparagement, but much as a caution, Men accustomed to science, live in the atmosphere of reason, when they descend to write for theology, they are out of their element; acquainted only with the region of fact, they are lost in that of conjecture, in this sense, there are no amphibious philosophers. A priest is more successful, his native element is nonsense, and it is his misfortune to be able to live in it. I cannot, otherwise, account for Mr. M.'s strange production. Next week I hope to expose those "absurdities of vulgar superstition," against which he declaims so prettily on his title page, but falls into so nicely in his book. G. J. H. CORRESPONDENCE. A FEW MORE WORDS IN EXPLANATION. CHARLES DENT has written, urging the necessity of directing special attention to the relations of man with the physical world, in contradistinction to the doctrine of the heaven and soul-mongers. He says: Divines have ever said, and naturalists and others have ever supported them in saying, that man is superior to all animals, not only relatively or locally, which I admit, but in the abstract and absolutely. on this general belief rests their system of absurdities. Destroy this belief, which is comparatively easy, for the religious world, almost without exception, have already done 99 per cent. of the labour, by refusing to admit any of the so-called inferior animals into their heaven. Show that man is identically the same in nature as all other animals, that he is indeed wholly as they are, a natural production; that he is a creature of natural necessity, as well as of societarian necessity; that he, like all animals and plants, springs from the earth, being always essentially a part of the earth; that nature being eternal, knows no superiority nor inferiority, no good no bad, and that man's superiority over all other animals is an assumption of his own, and will go for what it is worth-nothing. By this one of two things would appear: either that the writer has not read, or having read has not perceived, the leading object and drift of the series of articles, "Theory of Regular Gradation." If the writer has not seen or read these papers, it becomes matter of great gratulation that so admirable a train of reflection should have suggested itself apart from, and almost contemporaneously with, that part of the plan traced out for the conducting of the Oracle. If he has read these articles, it may be that they have not been expressed in a sufficiently plain and popular manner to be clear to every comprehension. It would thus devolve on the writers to review what had been done, in order to detect where they had failed in making themselves intelligible. He also says, Infidels "generally content themselves with exposing the craft of the parsonry, instead of doing, as I think they might, cut the ground from under them." This vice has been already strongly insisted on in numbers 8 and 11, by the undersigned. ON DESIGN. M. Q.'R. the universe and all organised beings. The greatest difficulty I feel, is to give my mean ing in a few words, and at the same time to render my views clear and intelligible. I would first observe, that the number of our ideas comprise the amount of our knowledge; our knowledge is derived from a two-fold source, actual experience and tradition: the first, our only true knowledge, the second, either oral or written, being merely belief. Experience being the strongest, we appeal to it in preference to belief. To apply this principle to the argument in question: by our experience we never knew a watch to be formed or fashioned without a watch-maker, and consequently we dare assert, with all the confidence warranted by our experience, that no watch exists but through the designing mind and fashioning power of the watchmaker. Thus far are the designers right, but no farther, for when they attempt to draw a parallel between a watch and the universe the analogy fails them, and I shall endeavour to show in what manner, as the whole strength of the position hinges on this. In the first place, notwithstanding that our knowledge of the properties of matter is very limited, it extends so far as to assure us that the watch to run into the order of cog-wheels, it is not the property of the matter composing each other, in order to answer a certain and springs, &c., which would adapt themselves to definite end; and we, therefore, naturally infer a fashioner, a designer. But the question is, can as much be said of the mat ter composing the universe; or to descend to particulars, can it be said of the animated matter of the embryo, confined in the uterus which forms the nucleus of the future animal? of an animal during the period of gestation, Can we say that it is not the intrinsic, inherent property of this condition of matter to but that it must have had an intelligent derun into the order of an organised animal, signer, who moulded it into the form it comes what becomes of this designing power in cases forth to the world? If so, I would ask, of malformation? We have just as much formed prism of salt required a designer, reason for asserting that the beautifully height the mind of man may soar, man, with though we know that in virtue of certain imall his mental manifestations is, in my opinion, combined chemically with a given alkali mutable properties of matter any given acid but matter; and no one portion of matter, will invariably produce a certain shaped however fine its texture or beautiful its organ-prism; as we have for asserting that any isation, is able to comprehend all the properties and powers of other material existen To the Editor of the Oracle of Reason. SIR,—From reading the last number of the Oracle of Reason, I have been tempted to offer you a few remaks on that much vaunted analogical argument for universal design, based upon a watch. At one time this argument appeared to me insuperable, and I am not surprised that so prominent a station should be assigned to it by the advocates of a god. We are not, I now think, warranted by the strict rules of philosophy and reason in flying from a material to a supposed immaterial agent, to account for any hitherto unexplained phenomenon of nature, until science can truly assert that she is fully acquainted with all the various principles and properties of matter; that she has comprehended the whole compass of nature's powers, under standing its infinite operations, and that any given phenomena cannot be explained by the known properties belonging to matterthen we may reasonably believe in other agents than those of matter. To whatever ces. Therefore man can have no concern with immaterial existences, until he be able to grasp the entire material world, and still find something unexplained. I shall now proceed to an examination of the argument, that the construction of a watch proving a designer, by analogy as much may be asserted from it of the construction of 184 given animal uniting with another given Printed by G.J. HOLYOAKE, 179, Broomhall-Street, Or, Philosophy Vindicated. "FAITH'S EMPIRE IS THE WORLD; ITS MONARCH, GOD; ITS MINISTERS, THE PRIESTS; ITS SLAVES, THE PEOPLE." No. 23.] EDITED FOR CHARLES SOUTHWELL, DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT, JUSTICE. "The subject of duties is the most useful part of all SAME son his due. [PRICE ID. practice justice, is the quality only of heroic and noble souls. It is an unfortunate omen of modern times, that we have so few incarnations of the "just Aristides." In rhetoric, arguments founded on justice have more. weight with rational minds than all appeals the sympathy of those is worth little who are to the feelings ingenuity can invent. Indeed, insensible to the claims of justice. Hierocles, among the ancients, gives some The acknowledgment of its guidance has most judicious directions for the formation of all moral ideas, in accordance with justice; by some been held ennobling above all things. indeed, the ancients may be said to have un-advises men" to be just and fear not." And Hence Shakspere, without any qualification, derstood the science of justice much more accurately than we practice it, which is but saying very little indeed for them, if they did not. asks, What stronger breast-plate than a heart untainted? No observations give so beautiful an idea of charity as those which teach us to resolve it into justice. All charity which, upon ana- Justice was the great charm of Brutus, lysis, is found to partake of any other quality which gave the majesty to his character, it than this, is of an erroneous kind, and leads, is the key-stone to all greatness. Much of when practised, to erroneous action, and the effeminacy of modern times would diswhen spoken of to erroneous ideas. When appear, together with all our artificial moralmen are charitable, in the ordinary accepta-ity, and sound healthy thought and action tion of the term, it really means nothing else would pervade men's minds, if the science of than that they give that as a boon which is justice received the attention it deserves. due as a right. Supposing, for the sake of argument, as a disputant would, that there is a god. If worthy to be entertained, every attribute of such a being should be resolvable into justice. Without it benevolence is assumption, good. Dess a mockery; wisdom is essential to direct it, truth is its consequence, power its support. And, in the same manner, every quality is auxiliary to it. G. J. H. MR. MACKINTOSH'S NEW GOD. ARTICLE II. "A profound ignorance, boundless credulity, weak intellect, and warm imagination, are the materials of which are made bigots, zealots, fanatics, and saints."-Cure of Etrepigny. The same is true of the moral qualities of men, and all those exalted sentiments which should belong to them. Sincerity, the first of virtues, is based upon a strong sense of justice. It is the soul of honesty, it dictates consistency, and careful thonght will show it to be all men really mean by benevolence Mercy is unheard of where full justice is practised. In short, justice is the beginning and the end, the alpha and omega of all virtue, for all the duties of life flow from it, and are ascertained by its standard. WHETHER or not these qualifications are necessary for god-concoctors, they are the indispensibles of god-adoptors. Mr. Mackintosh may not be desirous of nurturing such qualities of mind, but the popularity of his book depends upon his success in finding readers who possess them. To discover the just measure of things is the attribute.of intelligent and generous na ures only. To act consistently with and to A more curious compound of inconsistency has seldom been handed over to the public for their enlightenment than Mr. M.'s pro duction, if the reader takes into account what Mr. M. has, and what he might have produced, had it been politic for him to have taken philosophy and truth for his guides. He labours (par. 12), no one knows why, first to prove that, strictly, there can be no Atheists at the very moment he is writing a book to refute their arguments and check their growing power. It does not a little puzzle the reader to guess the definition of the parties with whom he professes to quarrel. To clear up the mystery thrown around the question, it is proper to premise that no man finds out sooner than the Atheist that there is nothing "absolute" in the universe, and, therefore, he pretends not to the character. As an Atheist, I understand Mr. M. to be a man who thinks there is sufficient reason to believe in, not to know, the existence of a god. On the contrary, I, as an Atheist, simply profess that I do not see sufficient reason to believe that there is a god. I do not pretend to know that there is no god. The whole question of god's existence, belief or disbelief, a question of probability or of improbability, not knowledge. In fine, the Theist believes, and the Atheist disbelieves, that there is a god. When a Theist, like locust-John in the wilderness, comes crying," prepare the way for my lord," I beg leg leave to inquire why he believes his lord is on the road after him? And when an Atheist says, after the fashion of Elisha, god is gone a journey or is taking a nap, and neglects to make his appearance, he is as willing as St. Paul to give a reason for the hope (or more properly in this case), dis belief, that is in him. Mr. M., as a Theist, or professed believer in god, was bound to display the ground of his belief. In that portion of his book reviewed in the last number of the Oracle, he has attempted this, but with what success the reader has seen. In his anxiety to disprove atheism he has mutilated, if not annihilated, theism; and destroyed his own friends while professing to compliment them by attacking their foes. 66 66 In order to make out a case on the outside, if not in the inside, of his book, Mr.M. constructs a sentence to adorn his title-page, in which he confounds "extreme," with mere negative opinions; and, makes the simple matter of dissent from the absurdities of theology, to appear as vulgarity," and then asserts that the "Atheist helps the priest," by his extreme opinions," in the very face of the fact, that the Atheist's opinions are but the negatives of the priest's, and that they cannot "help" him, unless a priest is "helped" by being proved in error and an ignorant or wilful deceiver. If Mr. M. affects to believe this an assistance, the priests, with all the "absurdities of vulgar superstition" upon their heads are acute enough to be of a different opinion. The part of Mr. M.'s book which remains to be particularly discussed in this paper. is that part where he rests the existence of god and its acknowledgment, on new and novel grounds-free from the annoyances of logic or the " vulgar" interruptions of reason. The first introduction to this is contained in pars. 33-4, which are upon the "goodness of god," and evidently written rather to support a theory than to illustrate truth. To fully understand this, the reader is referred to par. 4, where Mr. M. says, "when the theologian talks of the goodness of god, the Atheist points to the disease and death, and suffering, of all kinds existing among sentient creatures; and asks, are these evidences of goodness on the part of the governing power? And these objections have NOT been answered." Reading this, I passed on with impatience to pars. 33 and 34, to see the answers to be given to these queries by Mr. M., and there I found, not the matter at last philosophically cleared up, but slightly passed over, as "special cases adduced by cavillers." To shield his concocted god from the reproach to which, with all others, this deficiency of defence leaves him open, he advances the questionable proposition that "evil is necessary that good may exist": and argues that because "want must precede gratification, cold, warmth, hunger, eating, darkness, light, &c., therefore, evil is necessary." Such logic may do to defend deity evil when the gratification can follow, but a but hardly anything else. Want is no pleasing precursor to it. No one regards warmth can succeed the one, and a good cold or hunger as evils, when agreeable meal the other. All know that the epicure looks upon appetite (but another name for which M. sets down in his theological phi"want") as the greatest earthly blessing, losophy as an "evil." But when want gnaws hunger exhibits his gaunt visage, and famine his victim, and is never satisfied; when drags, as it daily does, thousands to the grave, will Mr. M., in the spirit of his godly consolation to these poor wretches. by cold-hearted and inhuman reasoning, bring telling them that this evil is necessary to such cases as these can never come? their enjoyment of good-which good in cited, are of this character, but Mr. M. cess is evil! And the examples I have just passes such over, and makes the order of nature for the regulation of our enjoyment these erroneous premises. Even death is no to appear as evil, and argues his case from evil, but a blessing in old age, when nature has prepared for it; but, as Cotton says, "when youthful blood runs high" it is a very different thing, and then evil only leads to it. But apart from what is evil and what Ex is not, can the proposition be defended, that | gising for his deity, and prays expediency evil is necessary to good? If so, Mr. M. should embrace it wherever he finds it, with open arms, it being indispensible to the good all men desire, and to stand hesitating in the matter would be to delay his happiness. Did any man ever voluntarily reduce such a precept to practice? To do so would be regarded as madness. When Mr. M. calls on public meetings to adopt the principles of Social philosophy to cure the evils of society, he is inconsistent, as, from his own assertion, he feels evil to be necessary to good. Why, if this be true, then have we the best possible reason to be glad of our condition, for the evil is abundant at preseut, and the good of course, also, evil being one of its conditions; and Mr. M. should rejoice at those evils of vulgar superstition and atheism which he affects to deplore, inasmuch as they are necessary to his enjoyment of consequent good. In morals, if this principle be true, distinctions between right and wrong may be dispensed with, for if evil increases our happiness on the whole, good can do no more, and either will do in the long run. This may do in theological morality, but hardly in that which is to elevate mankind. per I have slightly hinted at the miseries of poverty and famine, and might point to the black and bloody catalogue of crimes petrated by religion alone, to the condition of three fourths of all the people on the globe, which wretchedness Mr. M. would sneer over, as so many "special cases adduced by cavillers," but leaving alone the untenableness of such a position, I may ask, how does it comport with Mr. M.'s chief reason for setting up a god among mankind. In his preface he says, "belief in god is beneficial to man us an individual, and a comfort, stay and support against despair and adversity." But how can I be supported as an individual, or rely on him in the hour of trial, when not only my "despair and adversity," but that also of half the world, or at least the millions of my own countrymen, would be sueered at as "special cases offered to his notice by cavillers." And now upon this subject it may be added, that even if he was willing to help, Mr. M. has further broken the bruised reed of my hopes, by making his god of limited power, so that I should be in doubt as to whether in my case he was able. Mr. M. apparently aware of the weakness of the far-fetched and tortured analogies | whereby he has sought to prove the being of his god, tells us (par. 43) that the question is in reality not a question of fact but of moral influence. After thus apologising for himself, he proceeds to the ungracious duty of apolo to receive the god which sense and argument rejects, and endeavours to rest upon policy the establishment that proof fails to support. Expediency, the gutter hole of politics and sink of mortal reputation, is made the throne of Mr. M.'s pure mind god. Expediency, the apology for every crime and pretect of all injustice, the tolerator of all abortions and enormities in the world: from this loathsome sea of corruption Mr. M. drags out his deity to exercise a moral influence on mankind and exalt our love of justice and excellence. The position Mr. M. takes is this-It is politic to have a god. Against this I most solemnly protest. I object on the ground of economy; we are decidely too poor to support one. God costs us now twenty millions per year, besides the curses in the shape of religions fostered in the hot-bed of the divine sanction, and the perpetual bickerings, heartburning, oppressions, gloom, cruelty, and Bonnerism,' hourly flowing from their influence. Perhaps all our other calamities are not equal in amount and horror to those flowing from, and traceable to god-belief. Priestcraft in every age, and up to the last minute, has written with a bloody pen the destiny of humanity. Had men been without god in the world, this would never have been. The real question for consideration, according to Mr. M., is this: Tell me (he says) the character of the gods of a nation, and I will tell you the character of that nation. * * The real question for consideration is this: "Supposing a moral model, or beau ideal of perfect intelligence and goodness, were so strongly impressed upon the mind of a nation, that they should love and reverence this beau ideal; in doing which they must of necessity love and reverence both intelligence and goodness, for these constitute its essence; would this impression, producing love and reverence for this beau ideal, have a tendency to elevate that nation in the scale of intelligence and goodness?" This question might be put conversely, and the same answer must be given in both cases. "If a nation could be impressed with a love and reverence towards a beau ideal of perfect moral evil, &c., would not this tend to degrade that nation in morals and intelligence?" One cannot here help wondering once more at the unblushing coolness with which Mr. M. leaves the question of fact about the being of a god, upon which his theism only can rest, and which he contends must be es tablished, or the Atheist will triumph. After parading this fact through forty-two sections, as one which none but vulgar Atheists question, he abandons this, and proceeds to build up the moral influence of god without it-and upon what foundation is this sought to be created? Upon a demonstration |