or application of the affection; when the mistakes are either in their nature so gross, or so complicated and frequent, that a creature cannot well live in a natural state, nor with due affections, compatible with human society and civil life; then is the character of virtue forfeited.

And thus we find how far worth and virtue depend on a knowledge of right and wrong, and on a use of reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the species or society is upheld, may on any account, or through any principle or notion of honour or religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of esteem. For such a principle as this must be wholly vicious; and whatsoever is acted upon it can be no other than vice and immorality. And thus if there be anything which teaches men either treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, by divine warrant or under colour and pretence of any present or future good to mankind; if there be anything which teaches men to persecute their friends through love, or to torment captives of war in sport, or to offer human sacrifice, or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves in a religious zeal before their God, or to commit any sort of barbarity or brutality as amiable or becoming; be it custom which gives applause, or religion which gives a sanction; this is not, nor ever can be, virtue of any kind, or in any sense, but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom or religion which may be ill and vicious itself, but can never alter the eternal measures and immutable independent nature of worth and virtue.

1

SECTION IV

UPON the whole. As to those creatures who are only capable of being moved by sensible objects, they are accordingly good

1 Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, § 2; Misc. ii. ch. iii.

or vicious as the sensible affections stand with them. "Tis otherwise in creatures capable of framing rational objects of moral good. For in one of this kind, should the sensible affections stand ever so much amiss, yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational affections spoken of, 'tis evident the temper still holds good in the main, and the person is with justice esteemed virtuous by all men.

More than this. If by temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous, yet resists these passions, and notwithstanding the force of their impression adheres to virtue, we say commonly in this case that the virtue is the greater; and we say well. Though if that which restrains the person and holds him to a virtuous-like behaviour be no affection towards goodness or virtue itself, but towards private good merely, he is not in reality the more virtuous, as has been shown before. But this still is evident, that if voluntarily and without foreign constraint an angry temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, so that neither any cruel nor immodest action can be forced from such a person, though ever so strongly tempted by his constitution, we applaud his virtue above what we should naturally do if he were free of this temptation and these propensities. At the same time, there is nobody will say that a propensity to vice can be an ingredient in virtue, or any way necessary to complete a virtuous character.

There seems therefore to be some kind of difficulty in the case, but it amounts only to this. If there be any part of the temper in which ill passions or affections are seated, whilst in another part the affections towards moral good are such as absolutely to master those attempts of their antagonists, this is the greatest proof imaginable that a strong principle of virtue lies at the bottom and has possessed itself of the natural temper. Whereas if there be no ill passions stirring, a person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous, that is to say, he may conform himself to the known rules of virtue without sharing so much of a virtuous principle as another. Yet if that other person,

who has the principle of virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary impediments supposed in him, he certainly loses nothing in virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his temper, is left more entire to virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

Thus is virtue shared in different degrees by rational creatures, such at least as are called rational, but who come short of that sound and well-established reason which alone can constitute a just affection, a uniform and steady will and resolution. And thus vice and virtue are found variously mixed, and alternately prevalent in the several characters of mankind. For it seems evident from our inquiry, that how ill soever the temper or passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral objects; however passionate, furious, lustful or cruel any creature may become; however vicious the mind be, or whatever ill rules or principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleness or favourable inclination towards the least moral object, the least appearance of moral good (as if there be any such thing as kindness, gratitude, bounty, or compassion), there is still something of virtue left, and the creature is not wholly vicious and unnatural.

Thus a ruffian who out of a sense of fidelity and honour of any kind refuses to discover his associates, and rather than betray them is content to endure torments and death, has certainly some principle of virtue, however he may misapply it. "Twas the same case with that malefactor who, rather than do the office of executioner to his companions, chose to keep them company in their execution.

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In short, as it seems hard to pronounce of any man that he is absolutely an atheist," so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any man "that he is absolutely corrupt or vicious," there being few, even of the horridest villains, who have not something of virtue in this imperfect sense. Nothing! is more just than a known saying, "That it is as hard to find a man wholly ill as wholly good," because wherever there is any

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good affection left, there is certainly some goodness or virtue still in being.

And having considered thus of virtue, what it is in itself, we may now consider how it stands with respect to the opinions concerning a Deity, as above mentioned.

PART III

SECTION I

THE nature of virtue consisting (as has been explained) in a certain just disposition or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong, nothing can possibly in such a creature exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what

1. Either takes away the natural and just sense of right and

wrong;

2. Or creates a wrong sense of it;

3. Or causes the right sense to be opposed by contrary affections.

On the other side, nothing can assist or advance the principle of virtue except what either in some manner nourishes and promotes a sense of right and wrong, or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt, or causes it when such to be obeyed, by subduing and subjecting the other affections to it.

We are to consider, therefore, how any of the abovementioned opinions on the subject of a Deity may influence in these cases, or produce either of these three effects.

1. As to the first case, the taking away the natural sense of right and wrong.

It will not surely be understood that by this is meant the taking away the notion of what is good or ill in the species or society. For of the reality of such a good and ill, no rational creature can possibly be insensible. Every one discerns

and owns a public interest, and is conscious of what affects his fellowship or community. When we say, therefore, of a creature "that he has wholly lost the sense of right and wrong," we suppose that being able to discern the good and ill of his species, he has at the same time no concern for either, nor any sense of excellency or baseness in any moral action relating to one or the other. So that except merely with respect to a private and narrowly confined self - good, 'tis supposed there is in such a creature no liking or dislike of manners; no admiration or love of anything as morally good, nor hatred of anything as morally ill, be it ever so unnatural or deformed.

There is in reality no rational creature whatsoever who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity i in every creature who observes him. So that the offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such treatment from every one as if he had in some degree offended all.

Thus offence and injury are always known as punishable by every one; and equal behaviour (which is therefore called merit) as rewardable and well-deserving from every one. Of this even the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that if there be any further meaning in this sense of right and wrong; if in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolute wicked creature has not; it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a real affection or love towards equity and right for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural beauty and worth.

"Tis impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature originally so ill-constituted and unnatural as that, from the moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should have no one good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of pity, love, kindness, or social affection. Tis full as impossible to conceive that a rational creature coming first to be tried by