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accustomed to think with much coherency on these moral subjects; and that our notions in this respect are not a little confused and contradictory.

Now if the fabric of the mind or temper appeared such to us as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute state, which at its height is confessed to be so miserable; 'twould then undoubtedly be owned that since no ill, immoral, or unjust action could be committed without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and passions, or a farther advancing of that execution already begun, whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good-nature, or worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.

SECTION III

It has been shown before, that no animal can be said properly to act otherwise than through affections or passions, such as are proper to an animal. For in convulsive fits, where a creature strikes either himself or others, 'tis a simple mechanism, an engine, or piece of clockwork, which acts, and not the animal.

Whatsoever therefore is done or acted by any animal as such, is done only through some affection or passion, as of fear, love, or hatred moving him.

And as it is impossible that a weaker affection should overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the affections or passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable party, either by their force or number, thither the animal must incline: and according to this balance he must be governed and led to action.

The affections or passions which must influence and govern the animal are either

1. The natural affections, which lead to the good of the public.

2. Or the self affections, which lead only to the good of the private.

3. Or such as are neither of these, nor tending either to any good of the public or private, but contrary-wise; and which may therefore be justly styled unnatural affections.

So that according as these affections stand, a creature must be virtuous or vicious, good or ill.

The latter sort of these affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vicious. The two former may be vicious or virtuous according to their degree.

It may seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natural affections as too strong, or of self affections as too weak. But to clear this difficulty we must call to mind what has been already explained, "That natural affection may, in particular cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree." As when pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief required; or as when love to the offspring proves such a fondness as destroys the parent, and consequently the offspring itself. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call that unnatural and vicious which is only an extreme of some natural and kind affection, yet 'tis most certain that wherever any single good affection of this sort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their force and natural operation. For a creature possessed with such an immoderate degree of passion, must of necessity allow too much to that one, and too little to others of the same character, and equally natural and useful as to their end. And this must necessarily be the occasion of partiality and injustice whilst only one duty or natural part is earnestly followed, and other parts or duties neglected, which should accompany it, and perhaps take place and be preferred.

This may well be allowed true in all other respects, since even religion itself, considered as a passion, not of the selfish but nobler kind, may in some characters be strained beyond its natural proportion, and be said also to be in too high a degree. For as the end of religion is to render us more perfect and accomplished in all moral duties and performances; if by the height of devout ecstasy and contemplation we are rather disabled in this respect, and rendered more unapt to the real duties and offices of civil life, it may be said that religion indeed is then too strong in us. For how, possibly, can we call this superstition, whilst the object of the devotion is acknowledged just and the faith orthodox? "Tis only the excess of zeal which in this case is so transporting as to render the devout person more remiss in secular affairs, and less concerned for the inferior and temporal interests of mankind.

Now as in particular cases public affection, on the one hand, may be too high, so private affection may, on the other hand, be too weak. For if a creature be self-neglectful and insensible of danger, or if he want such a degree of passion in any kind as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself, this must certainly be esteemed vicious in regard of the design and end of Nature. She herself discovers this in her known method and stated rule of operation. "Tis certain that her provisionary care and concern for the whole animal must at least be equal to her concern for a single part or member. Now to the several parts she has given, we see proper affections, suitable to their interest and security, so that even without our consciousness they act in their own defence, and for their own benefit and preservation. Thus an eye, in its natural state, fails not to shut together of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar caution and timidity, which if it wanted, however we might intend the preservation of our eye, we should not in effect be able to preserve it, by any observation or forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal affections

which respect the good of the whole constitution, must be a vice and imperfection as great surely in the principal part (the soul or temper) as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving affections which are proper to them.

And thus the affections towards private good become necessary and essential to goodness. For though no creature can be called good or virtuous merely for possessing these affections, yet since it is impossible that the public good or good of the system can be preserved without them, it follows that a creature really wanting in them is in reality wanting in some degree to goodness and natural rectitude, and may thus be esteemed vicious and defective.

'Tis thus we say of a creature, in a kind way of reproof, that he is too good, when his affection towards others is so warm and zealous as to carry him even beyond his part; or when he really acts beyond it, not through too warm a passion of that sort, but through an over-cool one of another, or through want of some self-passion to restrain him within due bounds.

It may be objected here, that the having the natural affections too strong (where the self affections are overmuch so), or the having the self affections defective or weak (where the natural affections are also weak), may prove upon occasion the only cause of a creature's acting honestly and in moral proportion. For, thus, one who is to a fault regardless of his life, may with the smallest degree of natural affection do all which can be expected from the highest pitch of social love or zealous friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a creature excessively timorous may, by as exceeding a degree of natural affection, perform whatever the perfectest courage is able to inspire.

To this it is answered, that whenever we arraign any passion as too strong, or complain of any as too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain constitution or economy of a particular creature or species. For if a passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual for being

strong, if we may be assured that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance within, nor of any disproportion between itself and other affections, then consequently the passion, however strong, cannot be condemned as vicious. But

if to have all the passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the creature cannot bear, so that only some passions are raised to this height, whilst others are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion, then may those strong passions, though of the better kind, be called excessive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of inequality in the conduct, and incline the party to a wrong moral practice.

But to show more particularly what is meant by the economy of the passions, from instances in the species or kinds below us.1 As for the creatures who have no manner of power or means given them by Nature for their defence against violence, nor anything by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them, 'tis necessary they should have an extraordinary degree of fear, but little or no animosity, such as might cause them to make resistance, or incline them to delay their flight. For in this their safety lies, and to this passion of fear is serviceable, by keeping the senses on the watch, and holding the spirits in readiness to give the start.

And thus timorousness, and an habitual strong passion of fear, may be according to the economy of a particular creature, both with respect to himself and to the rest of his species. On the other hand, courage may be contrary to his economy, and therefore vicious. Even in one and the same species, this is by Nature differently ordered, with respect to different sexes, ages, and growths. The tamer creatures of the grazing kind, who live in herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in pairs only, apart from company, as is natural and 1 Infra, bk. ii. part ii. § 1; Moralists, part ii. § 4; Misc. iv. ch. ii. VOL. I

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