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each other and there are proud memories of victories and the bitter memories of defeat. This means that greatness is needed if unity is to be achieved. That quality, however, is not lacking. We saw it in fact in the peoples of Europe as they had to face the physical disaster of the recent floods. We also found among the statesmen of Western Europe, and so far as we could judge among the peoples of Western Europe, a real determination to take the hard political decisions which would bury the evil of the past and fortify the good. After our friendly talks, we know, and gladly report, that the political leaders in each of these countries are men of vision and stature. They look not backward but forward. They see the land of promise that lies ahead and they desire to move into it.

WHAT EUROPE EXPECTS OF US

Having spent most of my time in talking about what we hope the European countries will do, I would like to conclude with a mention of what the governments and peoples of Europe expect of us.

Our friends in Western Europe knew, when General Eisenhower was with them in Europe, how deep and firm was his interest in European unity-political, economic, and military. On this trip we were able to assure them that President Eisenhower continues to hold the same interest, the same conviction, with regard to European unity.

In each of these seven countries we visited we found good will and friendliness on the part of the governments and most of the people, but we also found some fear that the United States is not qualified to give the free world the kind of leadership which it needs at this critical moment. It is conceded that we have the material power, but it is questioned whether we have the accumulated wisdom to make the best use of that power. They are particularly concerned because they now have to deal with a new Republican administration, after having worked for 20 years in war and peace with a Democrat [sic] administration. To them, as to many Americans, a Republican administration is a novelty, and the unknown always carries a certain amount of fear.

The talks which we had with the political leaders of the countries we visited went far, I think, to dispel these fears insofar as official quarters are concerned. However, the public and the opposition parties seize upon incidents and upon statements made here which seem to them to be reckless. Unscrupulous persons use such incidents and statements as reasons why the European nations should not

trust us.

It is important for us all to remember that we do carry a tremendous responsibility. Any false step could mean disaster not only for us but for our friends. Possibly our friends would suffer even more than we ourselves. Therefore, we must be sober and restrained in our national conduct.

That does not mean being timid and afraid to take the initiative, to speak frankly or to make hard decisions. Indecision, weakness, and vacillation are the qualities which most often lead to war. It does mean that in order to win and hold the confidence of those whom we

need as friends and allies, we must at all times play the part of a Nation which is fully aware of the grave responsibility which it carries. That is the kind of leadership we shall get from President Eisenhower, who is accustomed to carry heavy responsibilities and calmly make grave decisions. We shall do well to follow the example which he will set. At this dangerous time peace and security depend upon clear vision, righteous purpose, and firm performance. Let us all work together to achieve these goals.

3. ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, APRIL 29, 1953 1

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Last Monday [April 27] I returned from 5 working days in Europe with Secretary Humphrey,2 Secretary Wilson,3 and Governor Stassen.* We went to attend the meeting of the Council of NATO. We have reported to the President and to the Congress and now I report to you. First let me, for background, recall what NATO is. NATO is the grand alliance of 14 nations that was created under the North Atlantic Treaty. That treaty was adopted 4 years ago as a bipartisan act to prevent a third world war coming out of Europe. The administration was then Democratic, but Republicans in the Senate, of which I was then one, took an active part in bringing about Senate consent to ratification. Then, in 1950, General Eisenhower was called to be the first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe. So he knows a great deal about it. It was indeed his vision, energy, and inspiration which largely converted this organization from a paper blueprint into a solid bulwark which already has tremendous protective value to the United States.

Let me recall what this value is. Suppose, for example, that Western Europe were overrun by the Red armies so that the Soviet world included all of Europe. That would so shift the balance of industrial power that we would be in great peril. Take steel production as an example, because steel is a basic commodity. Today we and our allies have an advantage of about three to one over the Communist world. But if Western Europe were shifted from the free world side to the Red side of the ledger, then the steel ratio would be about 50-50. Under those circumstances the Soviet leaders would be much more likely to attack us than is the case today.

Of course, our concern is much more than material. Europe is the cradle of our civilization and dear to many of us as the home of our ancestors. It would be a terrible blow, spiritually and morally, if

1 Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks; Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1953, pp. 671-673.

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George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury.

Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense.

Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security.

5 See the Council's communiqué of Apr. 25, 1953; infra, pp. 1631-1633.

Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949, as amended by protocol of Oct. 17, 1951; supra, pp. 812-815 and 853-854.

See infra, p. 1505.

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Europe's religion and culture were to be stamped out by ruthless

atheism.

We could not and would not sit idly by in the face of such an attack on Europe. So it is a case where we should seek prevention which is cheaper than cure, as two world wars have taught us. NATO is prevention, we hope, against a repetition of 1914 and 1939.

NATO now has approximately 50 divisions in Western Europe and there are more than 25 divisions in the southern flank of Greece and Turkey. Some of these units are not fully trained and equipped and there is still much to be done to get maximum combat effectiveness. Nevertheless the existing forces have great value as a deterrent to aggression. Europe is not yet fully secure, but it is no longer a "pushover," so weak that it is a temptation to others to seize it by an act of war.

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At last week's NATO meeting we tried to find practical ways making NATO even stronger. We went at this with some new ideas, largely drawn from President Eisenhower's own personal experience and judgment.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS TO BE INCREASED

1. We sought military strength which would be born out of economic health, not economic sickness. The European members have been straining toward a theoretical goal and now they are beginning to get out of breath. Since we cannot foresee the year of greatest danger, President Eisenhower believes that it is safest to adopt a pace which can be maintained with growing strength, rather than run the risk of dropping exhausted by the wayside before the haven is reached. Therefore, at this NATO meeting we put our emphasis on getting greater strength by less costly methods. This can be done by improving quality, rather than by seeking an immediate large increase in quantity. In a world of toughness, it is better to be compact and hard rather than to be big and soft. There will be a steady NATO buildup, but in the main this year's and next year's added strength will come through improved quality. That will tend to relieve the exces sive strain which has been placed upon the budgets and currencies of some of the countries, including our own. At the same time there will be a big lift in NATO's combat effectiveness. You can figure this to be as much as 30 percent this year.

2. We sought to fill the big gap in European defense which is the present lack of German forces. This gap in the center cannot be made good by any effort, however great, put forward by the other countries. Further, I do not believe that Americans, or British, or French want to anticipate fighting to defend Germany while the Germans look on as spectators. At present Germans are only spectators because the surrender terms do not authorize Germany to have any armed

forces.1

The continental European countries themselves thought out a solution which was to make agreements largely restoring West 1 See the Act of Surrender, May 8, 1945; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 505-506.

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Germany's sovereignty and permitting Germans to rearm not just as German national forces, which might serve national ambitions, but as part of a single European Defense Community. This in turn would fit into NATO's defense plans.

These agreements were signed almost a year ago, but still they have not yet been brought into force. At this NATO Council meeting I introduced a resolution calling for the prompt creation of the European Defense Community (EDC). This was unanimously adopted.1

All of the EDC governments are fully aware of the importance of early action. But in each of the countries there are parliamentary delays. This strains our patience. But it should not break it. There is no other good solution of the problem of establishing adequate strength and peace in Europe, as the cabinets realize and [,] I trust that the parliaments [,] too [,] will accept that same view during the coming months.

3. We put great emphasis on what is called "infrastructure." That is a strange new word, which has come to have great importance. It means the network of facilities in one country available for NATO forces drawn from different countries. This requires that airfields, pipelines, supply depots, radio communication, radar and the like, in each country, be made available to many national forces on a common basis. In past years, there has been long haggling about working this out. This time we found agreement on a 3-year program for developing this "infrastructure." At moderate cost, it will add enormously to the efficiency of the existing forces. For example, it will create 50 new airfields in a year for common use in Europe. There can be a dispersion and deployment of aircraft on the ground, so that all will not be the concentrated target of a few bombs. And if some airfields are bombed out, there will be alternate fields, well equipped, on which planes aloft can land and take off. This will make NATO forces much more effective and secure.

4. We gave much thought to new tactical weapons, and to the increased power which they can give to the defense of Europe. We are starting some NATO training in these matters with due regard to security.

TALKS WITH MILITARY LEADERS

Just before leaving Paris, I talked at length with two of the top military leaders of NATO, General Ridgway and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther. Naturally, they would like more land and air strength and they are particularly anxious to see the defense forces rounded out with German contingents. However, they believe that today there is enough strength so that if the Soviets planned to overrun Europe, it would be necessary for them first largely to re-enforce the Red armies now in or near Eastern Germany. This they could not do without our knowledge. This fact alone is of great importance.

Resolution of Apr. 24, 1953; Department of State Bulletin May 11, 1953, pp. 674-675.

It means that we would probably get the opportunity to bring into final readiness counter measures both in Europe and elsewhere, which might in fact deter the actual assault and preserve the peace.

What I have said gives you a good idea of what went on at our formal NATO meetings. Outside of these meetings, we talked informally and directly with most of the members. We did not talk to them as though NATO were just our responsibility and not theirs. After all, NATO is a joint enterprise, and it has its primary location in Europe.

Also we discussed with the British and the French, among others, the matter of general economic aid from the United States. Some call it a "hand-out." That is hardly fair, because the United States has gained intangible, if not specific, benefits.

Americans have always generously responded to emergency needs. But outright grants ought to be reserved only for real emergencies. They are a kind of crutch which may be needed from time to time. But as soon as there is economic health and the opportunity for a people to earn their way by their own efforts, then the crutch ought to be thrown away. We believe that this is becoming increasingly possible.

We talked over that viewpoint with our friends in Europe. We found that they welcomed a relationship which would be dignified and self-respecting for all concerned. There are plenty of ways whereby the British and French and others can contribute in Europe or Asia to special efforts which are in the common interest. Then they will be more and more earning their way.

We shall still be spending substantial sums, and these friendly countries do not need to anticipate too great reduction in their dollar income. But our Government will be specifically getting, for the dollars it spends abroad, what may enable it to save in other security measures and thus, on balance, get more security for less money.

At this last week's NATO Council meeting, in the ways I indicated, there came into NATO a transforming spirit. The full effect will only be apparent in later years as we look back. But as we look forward, we can anticipate that NATO will never grow into an organization which sucks the life blood out of the member countries, but rather be the shield behind which confidence will grow to invigorate all of the protected nations.

It has been said that the proper role of military strength is to give time for moral ideas to take root. The role of NATO is to enable the great moral and spiritual principles of Western civilization to take root and blossom again after the ravages of two world wars. That was the conception of those Americans who, without regard to party, joined with the other free peoples to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That is the conception for which so many Americans, without regard to party, have given their dedicated efforts. That is the conception which we believe is now nearing realization.

President Eisenhower, in the message which he sent through us to the NATO Council, said, "NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic

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