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immediate, and we have already learned how swiftly events may move in the modern world. Our allies are building their forces now; the time for our own contribution is now. If each of the North Atlantic nations should wait to appraise its partners' efforts before determining its own, the result would be as disastrous as it would be obvious. Whatever risks we may run by following the policies which our country has pursued thus far, the greatest risk of all is that we might once again hear the bitter refrain: "Too little and too late." And this time there may be no opportunity to remedy the mistake. There can be no real question as to America's willingness to contribute its fair share of manpower and equipment to the defense of the North Atlantic area. But we have another contribution to make which is equally vital-the spark of leadership. Since World War II the Congress and the Executive Branch have recognized this fact and have cooperated fully in performing the many tasks which the role of leadership involves. From the formation of the United Nations to the recent designation of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty forces, this country has remained continuously in the front ranks of the struggle to assure peace, freedom, and security throughout the world.

We sometimes forget the historic nature of the steps through which we have passed in the past 5 years in our efforts to establish peace and security in the world.

We sometimes lose sight of the profound advance which is represented by the close association which has grown up among the nations of the North Atlantic area and the significance of this association for the entire world.

We have passed through the period of organization; we have passed through the phase of planning; we have passed through a time of the awakening of people to the nature of the true danger in the world. We are now deep in the period of action.

We must carry forward the construction of the forces upon which the hopes of peace of the entire civilized world are founded.

At this moment there could be no greater contribution to the cause of peace than for the Government of the United States, in all its branches, to reaffirm the course of action on which we are moving.

25. STATEMENT BY THE CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, FEBRUARY 26, 1951 2

I appreciate deeply this opportunity to testify before the distinguished members of the Joint Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services upon the questions which have been raised by the resolution introduced by Senator Wherry.3

During the course of these hearings, distinguished American officials and private citizens have discussed with this Committee the large interests of American foreign policy and particularly the interest of our own security, which require the defense of Western Europe and our participation in that defense. I believe strongly in the force and validity of their arguments, but I do not intend to repeat or elaborate them in this statement.

The proposals which have been made that the use of American ground forces should be prohibited, or that restriction should be placed upon their use in Western Europe, are based in part upon two related fears. One is that our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will not take adequate measures in their own defense. The second questions their resolution to defend themselves, or, as it is bluntly called, "the will to fight." These doubts have led to statements that the sending of additional troops to Europe would commit the United States to the major share of its defense on the land. It is

1 John Sherman Cooper.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 12, 1951, pp. 428-431.

3 On Jan. 8, 1951, Senator Wherry announced: ". I am submitting to the Senate a resolution declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that no United States ground troops shall be sent to western Europe pending determination by the Congress of a policy on that matter." (Congressional Record, vol. 97, p. 94.) A modified version of the Wherry resolution (S. Res. 8), providing for a joint investigation of the question by the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, was passed on Jan. 23, 1951 (ibid., p. 546):

"Resolved, that the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations are authorized and directed to meet jointly to consider and report recommendations on whether or not the Senate should declare it to be the sense of the Senate that no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress. Such report, which shall be approved by a majority of the combined membership of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, shall be limited to the subject matter of this resolution, and shall not contain any recommendation on any matter which is not germane thereto or which is in substantial contravention thereof, or any recommendation either approving or disapproving the assignment of ground forces of the United States to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty, and shall be made on or before February 2, 1951." (Ibid., pp. 544-545.)

See Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, on S. Con. Res. 8, a Concurrent Resolution Relative to the Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area.

to the questions of the adequacy of the efforts now being made by our partners and their "will to fight" that I desire to address myself today.

NATO MEETINGS

Since last May, I have worked with the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, upon matters connected with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As an adviser, I attended the London meetings of the North Atlantic Council last May 2 and the Brussels meeting in December.3 In August 1950, I went with Mr. Charles Spofford, the United States representative, to attend the first meeting of the Council of Deputies held in London.*

My only purpose in citing these facts is to indicate an opportunity to know the recommendations that have been made by the Council and to appraise through a period of 10 months the adequacy of the measures taken by treaty members toward carrying into effect the Council's recommendations.

At the London meeting of the Council, held last May, the discussions were in the planning stage. They were directed to the completion of a defense plan for the North Atlantic area and the development of an integrated force of national units to make the plan effective. The first meeting of the Council of Deputies in August was held in an atmosphere of greater urgency. The aggression against South Korea, undoubtedly directed by Russia, had been committed. The United States had acted to increase its defense budget and forces. The chief purpose of the August meeting was to urge other nations to make a corresponding effort and to hasten their defense preparations. The response was cautious and inadequate. It was evident that Governments were proceeding upon the premise that it was possible to build a defense, or at least some defense, without any diminution or change in domestic and social programs. It was the time, inconsistent in its terms, of "parallel priorities." The London Times characterized it more correctly as a time of "arms without tears." Members of the Committee will recall that on my return last August, I expressed to them, as I did publicly, a conviction that the defense efforts made at that time, were wholly inadequate."

WESTERN EUROPE INCREASES DEFENSES

After the Brussels meeting in December, I remained in Europe for 7 weeks, visiting Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Western Germany. In these countries I had the 1 Mr. Cooper's appointment as Consultant to the Secretary of State was announced by the Department of State, Mar. 28, 1950; Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 10, 1950, p. 572.

2 See the communiqué of the Fourth Session of the North Atlantic Council, May 19, 1950; infra, pp. 1604-1606.

See the communiqué of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 19, 1950; infra, pp. 1608–1609.

See the statement of Aug. 11, 1950, by the Secretary of State on the content and progress of the NAC Deputies' meeting; Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 21, 1950, p. 306.

See Mr. Cooper's statement of Aug. 19, 1950; New York Times, Aug. 20,

1950.

opportunity to talk to Government officials, leaders of opposition parties, members of the parliamentary bodies, trade union leaders, businessmen, newspaper people, veterans, and students, as well as civil and military personnel of the United States.

From these talks and observations, and upon a basis of comparison with conditions existing last year, I formed certain conclusions upon the defense measures being taken in Great Britain, France, and Italy and upon the extent of their support by public opinion.

The first conclusion is that there has been a complete reversal by the Governments from the attitude held last August that it was possible to have an effective defense program without making it the prior and chief objective.

I am certain that the intellectual and moral decision has been made by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy that their countries must make a full defense effort and that they will support fully the defense of Western Europe.

The extent to which this decision is being implemented and the support that it is receiving from the people varies, but this indispensable decision has been made.

There is a natural tendency to judge the action of European treaty members in terms of the resources and capabilities of the United States.

In comparison with the steps taken by our country, the present defense programs of Great Britain, France, and Italy may not appear large. In terms of their capabilities and responsibilities, they represent large advances. They have made the start toward adequate defense programs.

UNITED KINGDOM

My second conclusion is that defense measures will be enlarged and enlarged quickly if the United States participates fully in the defense of Europe. I will speak first of the United Kingdom. Prior to the war in Korea, the United Kingdom was spending a larger proportion of its gross national income upon defense than the United States and, in proportion to population, the strength of its armed forces was larger than that of the United States. Nearly 275,000 of its troops were serving in foreign countries.

Since Korea, the defense budget of the United Kingdom has been increased three times from a figure of 2,237 million dollars to ap proximately 4,700 million dollars annually. It has been announced that programs are under way which will double military production in 2 years and quadruple production in the third and fourth years. Regular military forces are being increased and reservists will be called up. Compulsory service in the armed forces has been increased from 18 to 24 months, and the bottom age limit is 18 years. Great Britain has as large a force in Germany as the United States and has already made the decision to send additional divisions. Thus, the difficult decisions of increasing the term of military service, fixing the minimum age limit for compulsory service, and of sending additional

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troops to Europe, which are being debated today in the United States. have been made by the United Kingdom.

The matter of economic controls is very much on our minds today. Again it must be remembered that the Government of the United Kingdom possesses the power to mobilize totally the manpower and material resources of the United Kingdom and that many controls have been continuously in effect since 1940.

Upon the political side, it can certainly be said that there is no opposition from the "opposition party" to an expanding defense program.

I believe that it is a true statement to say that the United Kingdom has an adequate program under way and that it will make its full defense effort and contribution to European defense. I have never heard anyone question the British "will to fight."

FRANCE

France, like the United Kingdom prior to the Korean war, was appropriating to its defense budget a larger percentage of its national income than the United States. Its military forces were larger than ours in proportion to population. Large French forces have been engaged in Indochina for many months, tying down the bulk of commissioned and professional soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the French army. France believes that these forces are performing a valuable mission in preventing the spread of aggression in Southeast Asia.

Since Korea, France has increased its defense budget by some 30 percent to approximately 2,200 million dollars, tightened its compulsory service system, and increased the length of military service from 12 to 18 months. It is reequipping its forces with the aid of our Military Defense Assistance Program. It has more troops in Germany than has the United States and has made the decision to send additional troops.

Upon the question of "will to resist," France can point to these decisive steps that have been taken by its Government, a Government containing men whom it would be difficult to match in intelligence, courage, and imagination. There is no question about this Government's "will to fight." It can point to the heroism of its troops in Indochina and Korea. The high estimate which French officials place upon the improved morale and effectiveness of their troops in Germany was confirmed to me by United States and British military personnel.

It is more difficult to report upon the attitude of the French people. I can only say that every French official and every private person with whom I talked said vigorously and, at times with some anger, that there was no substantial support in France for a policy of "neutralism."

The officials of the anti-Communist labor union were confident that their strength is growing and that their membership will support fully the defense program of the nation. They point to the inability

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