lation to implement those provisions has been submitted to the Congress by the executive branch. The draft legislation authorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay the claims adjudicated under the provisions of the agreements, and establishes the procedure to be used in settling claims which arise under the agreements in the United States. It is now pending before the Committee on Foreign Relations which intends to give it early consideration after ratification of the treaties. XV. SPECIAL AREAS A. JAPAN The United States security treaty with Japan,1 which the Senate ratified in 1952, provides for the negotiation of an administrative agreement between the two countries governing the status of United States forces in Japan. The administrative agreement negotiated under the treaty 2 in turn provides in article XVII that upon the coming into force of the NATO status-of-forces agreement the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of that agreement. The administrative agreement further provides in paragraph 5 of the same article that- in the event the said North Atlantic Treaty agreement has not come into effect within one year from the effective date of this agreement, the United States will, at the request of the Japanese Government, reconsider the subject of jurisdiction over offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, the civilian component, and their dependents. The effective date of the administrative agreement was April 28, 1952. The Japanese have indicated that they will request reconsideration of the criminal jurisdiction provisions on April 28, 1953. The committee deems it desirable, therefore, that the Senate act on the status-of-forces agreement as soon as possible, even though under a strict construction of the terms of that agreement it would not come into force for the United States until 30 days after completion of the ratification process. At the present, under the interim terms of the administrative agreement with Japan, the United States retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all offenses committed by American military personnel, civilian employees, and their dependents in Japan. This situation is the cause of much unrest and bad feeling toward the United States in Japan, and the committee believes that our relations with the Japanese would be improved if criminal jurisdiction over our troops in Japan were put on the same basis as in the NATO countries. In any event, the United States is already committed to reconsidering its exclusive jurisdiction at the request of Japan on April 28, 1953. In view of the fact that Japan is now a fully sovereign, independent nation, it can hardly be expected to continue to grant what amounts 1 Supra, pp. 885-886. 2 Infra, pp. 2406-2423. to extraterritoriality to a foreign power. It seems in the interests of the United States, therefore, to take prompt action on the status-offorces agreement so that American personnel in Japan may be assured of the rights provided by that agreement. B. GREENLAND Under the terms of the 1951 agreement between the United States and Denmark for the defense of Greenland,' the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement with respect to criminal jurisdiction, right of entry, and taxation become applicable to Greenland upon the coming into force of the treaty. The other provisions of the treaty may also be extended to Greenland at the option of Denmark. XVI. WHY THE AGREEMENTS ARE IN THE INTEREST OF THE Ratification of the agreements is in the national interest of the The agreements will replace the present hodgepodge of interim arrangements in Europe with a permanent, uniform system. Difficulties have arisen under the present arrangements, and the fact that these interim arrangements have worked as well as they have has been due in large part to the good will of all concerned. However, while good will is an indispensable ingredient of all fruitful international relations, it is not a satisfactory substitute for binding treaty relationships. The absence of such relationships, moreover, frequently leads to irritations and friction between troops and local populations and these in turn are destructive of good will. The agreements will reduce the paperwork and administrative burdens now falling on American commanders in Europe. They will also insure the international mobility of forces in Europe. The military advantages of such mobility are obvious. All of these advantages will be enhanced by the multilateral character of the agreements. The status of troops and civilian personnel will be the same in all NATO countries, and they may be transferred from one country to another without the administrative complications which would otherwise be met. This uniformity among all members of NATO is not only desirable from the point of view of integrating the defense of the area; it also furthers the concepts of mutuality and sovereign equality embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. Under the agreements the United States will acquire a number of new rights in the fields of criminal jurisdiction, civil claims, the carrying of arms, free movement of personnel, and tax and customs treatment. In some instances, these rights conform to the present practice; but under the agreements the rights will be firm and authoritative, whereas those which we now have are exercised only by the good will of a foreign power. The United States gives up no rights as a receiving state which it 1 Agreement of Apr. 27, 1951; infra, pp. 1661-1667. does not acquire as a sending state. The advantages accruing to the United States as a sending state far outweigh whatever disadvantages it may feel as a receiving state. It should be kept clearly in mind that the United States gives up no rights over our troops in Europe which we now have, in respect to criminal jurisdiction or to any other matter. On the contrary, all of the rights of the sending state written into the agreements represent net gains for the United States. The committee believes that the agreements will improve the present position of United States forces in Europe. This position, as noted above, is not entirely satisfactory. It is doubtful, however, that even the existing status quo could be maintained if the agreements should not be ratified. Many of the present interim arrangements have been continued on the expectation that they would shortly be replaced by the pending agreements. If this expectation should not be borne out, a breakdown of the present arrangements could reasonably be anticipated. XVII. CONCLUSION In view of the considerations set forth above, the Committee on Foreign Relations is of the opinion that the agreements provide ample safeguards for the rights of the United States and its citizens, that on balance these rights will be increased rather than decreased by the agreements, and that prompt ratification is in the national interest. 33. UNDERSTANDING OF THE SENATE IN ADVISING RATIFICATION OF THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT, JULY 15, 19531 It is the understanding of the Senate, which understanding inheres in its advice and consent to the ratification of the Agreement, that nothing in the Agreement diminishes, abridges, or alters the right of the United States of America to safeguard its own security by excluding or removing persons whose presence in the United States is deemed prejudicial to its safety or security, and that no person whose presence in the United States is deemed prejudicial to its safety or security shall be permitted to enter or remain in the United States. In giving its advice and consent to ratification, it is the sense of the Senate that: 1. The criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII do not constitute a precedent for future agreements; 2. Where a person subject to the military jurisdiction of the United States is to be tried by the authorities of a receiving state, under the treaty the Commanding Officer of the Armed forces of the United States in such state shall examine the laws of such state This statement was incorporated in the 1TIAS 2846; 4 UST 1828-1829. President's proclamation of the agreement. with particular reference to the procedural safeguards contained in the Constitution of the United States; 3. If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all the circumstances of the case, there is danger that the accused will not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the commanding officer shall request the authorities of the receiving state to waive jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 (c) of Article VII (which requires the receiving state to give "sympathetic consideration" to such request) and if such authorities refuse to waive jurisdiction, the commanding officer shall request the Department of State to press such request through diplomatic channels and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives; 4. A representative of the United States to be appointed by the Chief of Diplomatic Mission with the advice of the senior United States military representative in the receiving state will attend the trial of any such person by the authorities of a receiving state under the agreement, and any failure to comply with the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article VII of the agreement shall be reported to the commanding officer of the armed forces of the United States in such state who shall then request the Department of State to take appropriate action to protect the rights of the accused, and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. 34. TESTIMONY BY THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE PROPOSED REVISION OF AGREEMENTS GRANTING FOREIGN COUNTRIES CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER AMERICAN ARMED FORCES STATIONED WITHIN THEIR BOUNDARIES, JULY 19, 1955 2 Let me begin with a word about the testimony which the committee has heard until now. The Department of State-and I am sure I can speak also for the Department of Defense in this regard-fully sympathizes with the concern expressed by the witnesses who have appeared before this committee. It is not, I trust, necessary to say that this concern for the members of our forces is fully shared by the 1 Robert Murphy. 2 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1955, pp. 178-185. 3 For the testimony of previous witnesses, see Status of Forces Agreements: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, on H. J. Res. 309 and Similar Measures Providing for the Revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and Certain Other Treaties and International Agreements, or the Withdrawal of the United States from Such Treaties and Agreements, So That Foreign Countries Will Not Have Criminal Jurisdiction over American Armed Forces Personnel Stationed Within Their Boundaries, Part I, pp. 1-158. Department of State and by the Department of Defense. Their welfare, indeed, is not only our concern but our responsibility. Unfortunately, some of the statements made before this committee, and much that has appeared in public print, reflect basic misconceptions and misinformation. Our efforts to inform the American people on the very important matter with which this committee is concerned have apparently been less successful than we had hoped. It is for that reason that the Department is particularly grateful for the opportunity you have offered this morning to inform and to explain to this committee, and to the American people, what are the basic issues involved, what is the legal situation, and what are the facts. By way of preface to my remarks, let me summarize what we believe to be the situation. We believe that the arrangements we do have. are, in general, the best that we can obtain today. We believe that maintaining these arrangements, while remaining ever on the alert to protect the individual member of our forces against possible error or abuse, is in the national interest. We believe that these arrangements are reasonable and practicable and represent considerable concessions to the viewpoint of the United States by our allies. We believe that the experience to date which the representative of Defense is prepared to summarize for you-shows that our statusof-forces arrangements have worked in favor of the members of our military forces abroad. This experience, as you will see, shows how small is the percentage of servicemen tried by foreign courts and how few of these were actually sent to jail. As to the handful who went to jail, we can say this: In every one of these cases a United States representative carefully followed the trial. In not one of these cases do we believe that an innocent man has gone to jail. In not one of these cases did we feel warranted in objecting that there had been an unfair trial. In not one of these cases was there cruel or unusual punishment. In not one of these cases can we say that the sentence meted out was substantially more severe than that which would probably have been imposed by a United States court martial. In the history of American treaty making there have been few agreements more carefully and painstakingly negotiated than the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. There are few agreements which have received more widespread support from military and diplomatic officials familiar with the circumstances. The terms of the agreement were worked out by diplomatic and military officials of two administrations. The treaty was presented to the Senate by President Eisenhower and received his full support, as well as that of Secretary Dulles, and Secretary Wilson, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Admiral McCormick, Supreme Allied Com 2 1 Wilber M. Brucker, General Counsel, Department of Defense; for the text of the statement, see ibid., pp. 170 ff. 2 Message of Feb. 27, 1953; S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess. President's message of June 16, 1952; S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess. See also the |