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We can feel that confidence because we see the nations becoming more and more sensitive to the moral verdicts of this organization. This Assembly is a hall of understanding, and thus of hope. It is also a hall of judgment. Here the nations of the world expound, explain, and defend their international policies. In the process, national purposes are disclosed and oftentimes altered to meet the opinions that are reflected here. Sometimes true purposes are sought to be concealed. But this Assembly has a way of getting at the truth. The perceptions and the moral judgments of the nations meeting here endow this Assembly with genuine power. No nation lightly risks the Assembly's moral condemnation, with all that such condemnation implies.

This fact that our organization's power derives largely from moral judgments formed here-illuminates the problem of membership. It shows how essential it is that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of the charter.

Today we have a wide and important membership. But about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here. Most of them meet the membership tests of our charter. They are peace-loving, and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the charter's obligations. Their governments could reflect here important segments of world opinion.

To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is not only a grave wrong to them; it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members.

I hope that, during this Tenth Session, action will be taken by the Security Council and by this Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind.

This Tenth Session of ours must deal with the question of a charter review conference. That is mandatory under the charter.

The United States believes that such a conference should be held. One impelling reason would be to reconsider the present veto power in relation to the admission of new members, particularly if that veto power continues to be abused.

Also, epochal developments in the atomic and disarmament fields may make it desirable to give this organization a greater authority in these matters. They are vital to survival itself. When the charter was drafted, none knew of the awesome possibilities of atomic warfare. Our charter is a pre-atomic-age charter.

Our founders believed that, after 10 years, the charter should be reviewed in the light of that first decade of experience. I believe that they were right. That does not necessarily mean that drastic changes should be made. On the whole, the charter has proved to be a flexible and workable instrument. But few would contend that it is a perfect instrument, not susceptible to improvement.

The United States believes that this session should approve, in principle, the convening of a charter review conference and establish a preparatory commission to prepare and submit recommendations

relating to the date, place, organization, and procedures of the General Review Conference.

Let me turn now to some of the events which have occurred since last December, when the Ninth Session adjourned. On balance, these developments have contributed notably to the advancement of our charter goals of international peace and security in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. I shall allude only to those events where United States policy has played a part, usually in partnership with others.

Turning first to Europe, we see that the Federal Republic of Germany has become a free and sovereign state by treaties concluded with it by France, Great Britain, and the United States. Concurrently, the Federal Republic joined the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.2 Also, the Brussels Treaty was itself made over so that, in combination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there was developed an effective system of limitation, control, and integration of armed forces, the like of which the world has never seen before.3

This system insures against the use of national force in the Western European area for aggressive and nationalistic purposes. The arrangements provide security, not only for the participants but also for the nonparticipants. They end the conditions which have made Western Europe a source of recurrent wars, the last two of which have developed into world wars, endangering all.

Never before have collective security and individual self-restraint been so resourcefully and so widely combined. The result can be hailed as a triumph by all who believe in the dual principle of our charter, that security is a collective task and that "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."

As a sequence to these developments regarding Germany, Austria became free. The Austrian State Treaty, which had been pending for 8 years, was signed last May and now is in effect. Thus are finally fulfilled pledges given by the Moscow Declaration of November 19435 and hopes which this General Assembly expressed at its Seventh Session.6

It should be noted that the Austrian State Treaty, bearing the Soviet Union's signature, contemplates support for Austria's admission to the United Nations.

Quickly following these German and Austrian developments came new efforts by France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States to reduce the danger of war and to solve outstanding issues by negotiation.

Last May the three Western Powers proposed a two-stage effort."

1 Agreements of Oct 23, 1954; infra, pp. 483–612.

2 See Declaration of Oct. 23, 1954, by the Brussels Treaty Powers (infra, p. 972), and the Protocol of Oct. 23, 1954, to the North Atlantic Treaty (infra, pp. 871873).

3 See the Protocols of Oct. 23, 1954, to the Brussels Treaty; infra, pp. 972–989. Infra, pp. 643-675.

5 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, p. 11.

See General Assembly Res. 613 (VII), adopted Dec. 20, 1952; infra, pp. 1834–

1835.

7 See the Western Powers' note of May 10, 1955, to the Soviet Government; infra, pp. 1886-1887.

The first stage would be a meeting of the Heads of Government themselves to provide "a new impetus" for a second stage, which would be that of detailed examination of the substance of the problems. The first phase of the program occurred at Geneva last July when the four Heads of Government met.' They clearly manifested their common desire for peace and better relations. Specifically they agreed that further efforts should be made in three fields, namely:

(1) European security and Germany; (2) disarmament; and (3) development of contacts between East and West.2

Now, we enter on the agreed second stage, where the "spirit of Geneva" will be tested. A United Nations subcommittee is already discussing the Geneva ideas about disarmament.3 Next month, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States will meet at Geneva. The Western Powers will associate with them, where appropriate, the Federal Republic of Germany and their other NATO partners.

At the coming meeting, agreed priority will be given to the closely linked problem of the reunification of Germany and the problem of European security. This is as it should be.

The German people have now been forcibly divided for over 10 years. The perpetuation of this division is a crime against nature. Three-quarters of the Germans are in the Federal Republic, and they are fortunate in having a great leader, Chancellor Adenauer. He stands for a united Germany that will be peaceful and that will find its mission in friendly cooperation with its neighbors. He is determined that Germany's legitimate needs for security and sovereign equality shall be met without a revival of German militarism.

It would, however, be a tragic mistake to assume that, because most of the Germans now have chosen that enlightened viewpoint, the injustice of dividing Germany can therefore be perpetuated without grave risk.

There are many nations who feel that their own future security and world peace urgently require that Germany should be reunited and enabled, if it so desires, to become a party to the Western European arrangements for limitation, control, and integration of armed forces, so that they can never serve an aggressive purpose. There are others who profess to feel that a united Germany within NATO would endanger them even under these conditions.

To bridge this difference, the Western Powers are ready to advance some overall plan of European security which would give the Soviet Union substantial additional reassurances. The conjunction of this attitude of the Western Powers with the like mood of the Federal Republic of Germany provides an unprecedented opportunity. But the German mood which I describe may not always persist. Also, it

1 See The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955 (Department of State publication 6046; 1955), and supra, pp. 111-114, and infra, pp. 1887-1897, 2005-2016, and 2841-2843.

See quadripartite directive to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, infra, pp. 1896-1897.

3 See the summary of these discussions contained in the U.S. Memorandum of Oct. 7, 1955; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 31, 1955, pp. 708-711.

See supra, pp. 115-122, and infra, pp. 1897-1927, 2018-2039, and 2844-2850

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cannot be assumed that the Western Powers, including the United States, will always be ready to enlarge their present commitments to meet Soviet concern about European security.

The present opportunity is so unusual and so full of constructive possibilities that it can be hoped that the forthcoming four-power Foreign Ministers Meeting will find a solid basis for the reunification of Germany within a framework of European security.

At Geneva President Eisenhower mentioned two causes of international tension which were not accepted for the agenda of the conference. The first was "the problem of respecting the right of peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." As to this, he said that "the American people feel strongly that certain peoples of Eastern Europe, many with a long and proud record of national existence, have not yet been given the benefit of this pledge of our United Nations wartime declaration, reinforced by other wartime agreements." 1

President Eisenhower also raised the problem of international communism. He said that for 38 years this problem has disturbed relations between other nations and the Soviet Union. It is, indeed, difficult to develop really cordial relations between governments when one is seeking by subversion to destroy the other. The head of the Soviet Government took the position that these problems were not a proper subject of discussion at the Geneva conference. Nevertheless, the eyes of much of the world will remain focused upon these two problems. What, in fact, the Soviet Union does about them will, to many, be a barometer of the Soviet's real intentions.

If the "spirit of Geneva" is genuine and not spurious, if it is to be permanent and not fleeting, it will lead to liquidating abnormal extensions of national power, which crush the spirit of national independence, and to the ending of political offensives aimed at subverting free governments.

Turning now from Europe to this hemisphere of the Americas, we find the Organization of American States continuing to demonstrate how the purposes and principles of the United Nations can be effectuated through regional arrangements for collective self-defense. The organization's general meetings have promoted political understanding and economic and social cooperation. On three occasions within the last 15 months, in relation to Guatemala, 2 to Costa Rica, and now in relation to the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute, the organization has acted promptly and effectively to maintain international order. Its activities in this field have been fully reported to the Security Council, pursuant to our charter.

3

In the Near East the situation remains troubled. It has been difficult to assure the sanctity of the armistice lines established in 1948 under the auspices of the United Nations to end the fighting between Israelis and Arabs. The United States desires to pay high tribute to

1 Statement of July 18, 1955; infra, pp. 2009-2012.

2 See infra, pp. 1303-1316.

See infra, pp. 1279-1285.

4 For these armistice agreements, see infra, pp. 698-724.

those who, during these troubled days, have been serving the United Nations, and particularly to General Burns of Canada and his associates.

On August 26 of this year, I addressed myself to certain fundamental aspects of this situation. I said that if the parties desired a stable settlement, they could, I thought, be helped from without. I had in mind financial assistance in relation to the problem of Arab refugees, and of irrigation projects which would enable the people throughout the area to enjoy a better life. I also spoke of the importance of bringing greater security to the area. I said that, if nations from without the area made clear their readiness to contribute to these three essential aspects of a settlement, it might then be more possible to bring order, tranquillity, and well-being to the area itself.

President Eisenhower authorized me to say that he would recommend participation by the United States in these monetary and security commitments, if this were desired by the governments directly concerned and on the assumption that action wherever feasible should be on an international basis, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations.

The United Kingdom immediately associated itself with these United States suggestions. A number of other countries have also indicated their support.

If there is a favorable response from the Near Eastern countries, many aspects of this problem would eventually come to the United Nations for its action at some future session.

During the past year the fabric of peace in the Far East was strengthened by the coming into force of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. An organizational meeting of the Treaty Council was held at Bangkok toward the end of February at the ministerial level.1

This security arrangement is unique. It marks the first time that any considerable number of countries have banded together, in eastern Asia, for collective self-defense. There are eight parties to the treaty, which, in addition, applies to Cambodia, Laos and Free Viet-Nam. Also, the arrangement draws together western and Asian countries. This would not have been possible had not all the parties firmly committed themselves to the principle of political independence and selfdetermination. This commitment is found both in the preamble to the treaty and in the concurrent Pacific Charter,5 which reflects the aspirations of men everywhere to be free.

The Southeast Asia Treaty does not envisage the establishment of a combined military organization comparable to that which has grown up under the North Atlantic Treaty. The conditions in the area do

1 Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns.

Infra, pp. 2176-2180.

Infra, pp. 912-916.

See The Bangkok Conference of the Manila Pact Powers, February 23-25, 1955 (Department of State publication 5909; 1955) and the communiqué of Feb. 25, 1955; infra, pp. 2334-2337.

Infra, pp. 916-917.

See infra, pp. 1594-1658.

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