THE close of 1824 arrived without the accomplishment of any of the great designs announced by the Porte in the beginning of that year. Of the forces enumerated in the plan of campaign which has been mentioned, the Egyptians had proceeded no farther than Crete, while the armies ordered for Northern Greece had either not been assembled at all or had dwindled into small bodies which had performed nothing of importance. By the experience of the three preceding summers there remained no hope to the Porte of making an impression upon the Moréa from the northward, without the simultaneous debarkation of a large and well appointed force on some part of the Peloponnesian coast; but the finances as well as the military ardour of the provinces of Europe and Asia were too much exhausted to render that easy in 1825 which had so thoroughly failed in 1822. As long, however, as any of the fortresses of the Moréa remained in possession of the Turks there was some prospect of success, and as the Pasha of Egypt entered cordially into the war, prompted apparently by a Musulman feeling, by the importance to him at all times of a good

understanding with the Porte, by the flourishing state of his treasury, and by the hope of at least of retaining to himself Crete and Cyprus; the Ottoman government was by his means furnished with an army for debarkation, to the providing of which their own resources were insufficient. They continued deaf, therefore, to any suggestions for entering into a compromise with the insurgents, they flattered themselves that the effort of 1825 would be decisive, and the assurance was carefully repeated in every part of Europe by the enemies of Greek independence.

It may be supposed that it was not without some hesitation that the Porte resolved upon thus tacitly giving up both Candia and the Moréa to the already too powerful Mehmet Aly; but it was the least of two evils; the chief pecuniary burthen of the war would be thrown upon him, the rest they left to Kismét or destiny-to those chances from treachery or accident, which have seldom allowed a troublesome provincial governor to die a natural death, and still less frequently to bequeath his authority to his family.

To those politicians who endeavour to persuade the Greeks that their views of independence are premature, it must be admitted that the insurrec

tion has been so in one respect. It never before happened that Egypt had a Turkish Viceroy of such talent, ambition and good-fortune as to effect military conquest beyond the limits of his government, at the same time that he filled foreign harbours with his merchandize,-and who, though, like a true Turk, he has no other object than personal gratification through the misery of the great body of his subjects, is certainly a formidable power at the present moment.

By turning into his own coffers the greatest part of the land-revenue and of the commercial profits of Egypt, by improving the inexhaustible agricultural resources of that country, and particularly by his good fortune in raising a species of cotton, eagerly purchased for the manufactures of England,* he has created a revenue very far exceeding that of any of his predecessors, while his ambition has prompted him to expend those treasures in the increase of his military establishment, which now amounts to forty thou

*

Upwards of a million sterling is stated to have been paid for Egyptian cotton imported into England in one year; of this the Pasha monopolizes both the purchase from the grower, and the sale to the merchant. Thus it appears, that both the contending parties in Greece are now supporting the war with finances derived from England.

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sand men, with a fleet of thirty vessels of war. That which the Greeks have been prevented from attaining, by disunion, by a want of government and by the constant pressure of immediate danger,-Mehmet Aly, having to consult only his single will, has in a very short time accomplished, namely, the formation of a body of infantry, instructed in the European use of the musket, and which, although their discipline is probably as yet imperfect, have at least acquired an advantage of great importance against the irregular troops of an anarchical people, that of obedience and the habit of acting as a single body.

Who could have foreseen even a year ago, that the Pasha of Egypt should so suddenly have increased his financial resources: or that his wealth should have attracted to his military service a great number of unemployed officers from France and other parts of Europe:* or that he should

* The influx of French officers into Egypt may lead to important consequences, unless Mehmet Aly should take the alarm, before the Europeans have made such a progress in organizing an army similar to that of the native troops of British India, as could not fail to give them great power and influence in the country. It is not intended to infer that the French government has any ambitious designs in encouraging

so quickly have mastered a difficulty which has hitherto been found insurmountable by any Turkish government, namely, that of bringing his army to submit to European discipline: or that he should so heartily have entered at an immense expense into designs, which with the most favourable result are more calculated to gratify a dangerous ambition than to serve his real interests. event has totally changed the nature of the war in Greece, which before, although slowly, seemed to be surely leading to an independence de facto, which would have been the best preliminary to a pacification.*

The

this emigration; perhaps it has no other view at present than that of finding employment for a large portion of the needy survivors of the army of Bonaparte. But it is not difficult to conceive that circumstances may arise out of the proceeding, well calculated to suggest such designs. The strictest virtue cannot always resist temptation, and nations have been known by a dexterous management in peace, to regain what has been lost on the field of battle.

* In the same manner as Spanish American independence has been established without even the apprehension of any war with the power that lately ruled those countries. The Turks are a people seldom diverted from their purposes but by fear, and to move them the danger must be imminent; but it is equally in their character to submit when they are conscious that what is actually done cannot be reversed by any exertions of theirs, though it might be a most arduous task to obtain their previous concurrence in the same measure. Unhappily the