Greece, exclusively of the Moréa and the European islands, would be enabled, without any difficulty, to supply a revenue to the Sultan greater than he formerly derived from the whole country. The Albanian and Greek soldiers, being em-. ployed in considerable numbers, and regularly paid by the provincial or local governments, would thus be prevented from troubling the public tranquillity, while the Greek population, attending in security to agriculture, commerce, and education, would be following the surest road to a further improvement in their political condition.

Northern Greece might be divided into three governments, of which the chief places would be Arta, Larissa, and Egripo; Eubœa, according to this mode of pacification, being attached to the continent, and not considered one of the islands. Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, Cos, Samos, Chios, Lesbos, Lemnos, might each constitute a separate government, tributary to the Porte, but secured from any interference of the Turks. In Crete, in the plains of Thessaly, and in the parts of Boeotia and Euboea around Egripo, where Turkish individuals possess a considerable quantity of landed property, they might claim some share in the civil government; but the general effect of

the new system would probably be, that many of them would dispose of their lands to the Greeks, and that they would gradually withdraw into Asia, or towards Constantinople.

In proposing the independence of the Moréa as the basis of the pacification of Greece, the writer does not wish to disguise, either from himself or his reader, that he has thought more of the interests of Greece and of Great Britain than of what may be agreeable to some of the other powers of Europe. At the same time he cannot avoid entertaining the opinion, that this is the only plan which promises to save the Turkish empire from destruction and Europe from a general war.

We have already observed that there are two other modes of disposing of this great question-to reduce Greece to its former condition, or to partition it into principalities under governors taken from the Greek families of Constantinople.

In reference to the former, it must be admitted that there is no tranquillity so profound as that of solitude and desolation-that it is by the operation of a principle somewhat similar that the Turkish empire has so long opposed a barrier to the conflicts of European avarice or ambition, on that fine field which is situated on the eastern

side of the Mediterranean-and that it may be said, that if the Greeks chuse to submit their necks to the Turkish sabre, the nations of Christian Europe have no right to object to this mode of keeping the peace. But enough has been stated in the preceding pages to shew that such a result has now become scarcely possible. It may be a better mode of occupying the reader's time, therefore, to add a few words on the plan of forming Greece into principalities.*

It cannot be perceived that the advancement in knowledge, which has taken place among the Greeks during the last half century, has been, in

* The reader will find, in the documents appended to the Annual Register of 1825, a translation of the semi-official Russian paper which contains this latter plan, together with a remonstrance of M. Rodios, secretary of the Greek Executive, addressed to the British government, and Mr. Canning's reply. According to this plan, one principality was to consist of Eastern Greece, or of Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; a second of Western Greece, or of Epirus, and Acarnania, from the Austrian boundary northward to the gulf of Corinth; the third of the Morea and Candia: the other islands to remain under a municipal government nearly in their former state. It may be thought, perhaps, that this plan differs little from that which we have suggested for Greece beyond the Isthmus; but the entire independence of a part of the country together with the latter, as an arrangement, rather intended to be provisional than permanent, makes a very wide difference in the two propositions.

any degree, the consequence of the connexion with the Turkish subjects of the Greek church, which Russia acquired in the years 1774, 1779, and 1802; unless it be inasmuch as the Russian flag was for some years very useful to the Greek seamen in the islands; still less can that amelioration be attributed to the power which has been delegated by the Porte to a small number of Greeks during the last century. In short, there seems little doubt that the formation of Greece into governments, like those of the Ultra-Danubian provinces, would be almost as unfavourable as its former state to that further moral improvement which must precede the complete admission of the Greeks among the civilized people of Europe. Is it that the proposers of this method of pacifying the country are fearful of the example of Greek freedom upon their brethren of the same church in the Russian dominions? is it that hence they are desirous that the Greek character should not lose the defects which it has acquired under the Turkish yoke, and that the Greek, in every gradation of office, should still closely resemble the Turk similarly situated?

But it is chiefly as tending to increase a power already too formidable, as adding further strength

to the monarch who has declared the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Finland indissolubly united to the Russian empire, as enabling him to stretch his giant arms around Constantinople on the west, as he has already done towards the frontiers of Persia on the east, that the plan alluded to is most objectionable.

It has for many years been the general opinion, that a hostile attack from Russia with all its strength would be immediately fatal to the Turkish empire in Europe. The Porte, however, has been sufficiently confident in the impediments to such an undertaking, never to lower its tone towards the court of St. Petersburg to the degeee which a contrary conviction would naturally have produced, always trusting that such an attempt would meet with great opposition from other governments, and would probably give Turkey several powerful allies. The difficulties, in fact, are not trifling. As it would be impossible to supply a large army in such an impoverished country as Turkey, without the assistance of a numerous fleet in the Black Sea, the preparation of which would require much time and expense; and as every Turk is armed and would be an obstinate defender of his own walls,